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

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ABSTRACTS

International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation

By O. R. YOUNG

Although we live in a world of international regimes, the scholarly literature on them remains rudimentary, especially in analytic terms. This essay examines the proposition that all international regimes are social institutions, even though there is great variation among them. Among other things, this suggests that regimes are dependent upon the maintenance of convergent expectations among actors; formalization is not a necessary condition for the effective operation of regimes; and regimes are always created rather than discovered. A conceptual framework and a research agenda for the comparative study of international regimes, as laid out in this essay, would guide studies of specific regimes and improve our ability to reach general conclusions about this fundamental, yet poorly understood, international phenomenon.

Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes

By E. B. HAAS

Why do nations create institutionalized modes of multilateral collaboration? How can common interests develop in the face of inequalities in power and asymmetries in interdependence? The author explores the role of knowledge in the definition of political objectives and interests. The systematic interplay of changing knowledge and changing objectives results in the redefinition of "issues" and the practice of "issue linkage." The dynamics of issue-linkage, in turn, tell us something about international regimes for the management of progressively more complex issue areas. An ideal-typical "regime" is described, theoretically applicable to all types of issues. Since the cognitive attributes of the actors who set up such a regime cannot be expected to remain stable, this concept of a "regime" can illuminate discussion and analysis, but cannot be expected to provide a clear model for desirable policy. However, it can illustrate the options open to policy makers wishing to choose a mode of collaboration. Regimes dealing with money, the oceans, and technology transfer are used for illustrative purposes.

Clio on the Couch

By H. N. HIRSCH

An analysis of six recent works of psychotherapy. A scheme is presented for classifying such works. Four different types of psychohistory are discussed; this typology is offered as a means of understanding and controlling the methodological difficulties inherent in the genre.

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Theories of Revolutions: The Third Generation

By J. A. GOLDSTONE

The work of Ted Robert Gurr, Chalmers Johnson, Neil Smelser, Samuel P. Huntington, and Charles Tilly has dominated the recent study of revolutions. However, Jeffrey Paige, Ellen Kay Trimberger, S. N. Eisenstadt, and Theda Skocpol have lately produced theories of revolution that are far better grounded historically than those in earlier works. Five major points were neglected by earlier theorists: (1) the variable goals and structures of states; (2) the systematic intrusion of international pressures on the domestic political and economic organization of societies; (3) the structure of peasant communities; (4) the coherence or weakness of the armed forces; and (5) the variables affecting elite behavior. Starting from these points, Paige, Trimberger, Eisenstadt, and Skocpol have produced analyses of the causes and outcomes of a variety of revolutions. Yet significant challenges to the theory of revolutions—such as extending the range of cases analyzed, clarifying the grounds of peasant behavior, and tying theoretical analysis to demographic data—still remain.

Multinational Corporations and Politics in Developing Countries

By H. J. LEONARD

Recently, much attention has been focused on the influence that multinational corporations (MNCs) have on the politics of developing countries. Even setting aside past legacies of sinister corporate conduct, most students of politics agree that MNCs are potentially important actors—for better or for worse—in a country's political development because they can influence the rate, direction, and beneficiaries of change. Most case studies begin with the assumption that the political impact resulting from the presence of MNCs in developing countries is primarily a function of the international economic system. However, all but one of the books under review focus on the domestic political system in individual host countries as the independent variable rather than on the international economic system. Taken together, these studies make a strong case that the analysis of the MNC and its impact on politics in developing countries must place heavy emphasis on the particular political circumstances prevailing in each country. The wants, needs, and motivations of key domestic political actors—many of whom do not behave in the manner predicted by either Liberal or Marxist world models—appear to be of fundamental importance in determining how MNCs affect a developing country's politics, and whether that country can counter any potentially adverse political impacts that may accompany MNCs.

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INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: Problems of Concept Formation

By ORAN R. YOUNG*

WE live in a world of international regimes. Some of them deal with monetary issues (for example, the Bretton Woods system); others govern international trade in commodities (for example, the coffee agreement). Some regimes serve to manage the use of natural resources at the international level (for example, the international arrangements for whaling) or to advance the cause of conservation (for example, the agreement on polar bears). Still other regimes address problems pertaining to the control of armaments at the international level (for example, the partial test-ban system) or to the management of power within the international community (for example, the neutralization agreement for Switzerland). And there are some international regimes that encompass several issues within well-defined geographical areas (for example, the Spitzbergen agreement and the arrangement for Antarctica).

International regimes vary greatly in terms of functional scope, areal domain, and membership. Functionally, they range from the narrow purview of the polar bear agreement to the broad concerns of the treaties on Antarctica and outer space. The area covered may be as small as the highly restricted domain of the regime for fur seals in the North Pacific or as far-flung as that of the global regimes for international air transport (the ICAO/IATA system) or for the control of nuclear testing. A similar diversity occurs with respect to membership: the range runs from two or three members (as in the regime for high-seas fishing established under the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention) to well over a hundred members (as in the partial nuclear test-ban system). What is most striking, however, is the sheer number of international regimes. Far from being unusual, they are common throughout the international system.

It is therefore surprising that scholars have not focused more intensively on international regimes, and that much of the existing literature on the subject is weak, particularly in analytic terms. During the last several years, there has been a noticeable upsurge of interest in the

* This paper was prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, March 1979.

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study of international regimes.[1] We now have fairly extensive descriptive accounts of some specific regimes[2] and some speculative ideas about phenomena such as regime change.[3] But the fundamental character of international regimes remains elusive. Considering the pervasiveness and importance of regimes at the international level, the underdeveloped state of the existing literature on them constitutes a serious deficiency. In this essay, then, I propose to take some preliminary steps toward filling this gap by drawing on the studies of resource regimes I have been conducting over a number of years, and making use of some formulations I am currently developing at greater length elsewhere.[4]

The Core Concept

Regimes are social institutions governing the actions of those interested in specifiable activities (or meaningful sets of activities). As such, they are recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge. It follows that regimes are social structures. It is important not to mistake them for functions, though the operation of regimes frequently contributes to the fulfillment of certain functions. Like other structures, regimes may be more or less formally articulated, and they

[1] See, among others, Richard N. Cooper, "Prolegomena to the Choice of an International Monetary System," *International Organization*, XXIX, No. 1 (1975), 63-97; Ernst B. Haas, "On Systems and International Regimes," *World Politics*, XXVII (January 1975), 147-74; John Gerard Ruggie and Ernst B. Haas, eds., *International Responses to Technology*, special issue of *International Organization*, XXIX, No. 3 (1975); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Oran R. Young, *Resource Management at the International Level: The Case of the North Pacific* (London and New York: Pinter and Nichols, 1977); Seyom Brown and others, *Regimes for the Ocean, Outer Space, and Weather* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977); and Edward L. Morse, "Global and Other International Commons in the 1980s" (mimeo., Council on Foreign Relations, 1976). In addition, international lawyers have talked about international regimes for some time. To illustrate, see L.F.E. Goldie, "The Management of Ocean Resources: Regimes for Structuring the Maritime Environment," in Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order*, IV: *The Structure of the International Environment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 155-247.

[2] For a range of examples, see William M. Ross, *Oil Pollution as an International Problem: A Study of Puget Sound and the Strait of Georgia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973); M. M. Sibthorp, ed., *The North Sea: Challenge and Opportunity* (London: Europa, 1975); Kenneth Dam, *Oil Resources* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); and Arild Underdal, "The Politics of International Fisheries Management: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic" (unpub., 1978).

[3] For example, Keohane and Nye (fn. 1), Part II.

[4] See Young, "International Resource Regimes," in Clifford S. Russell, ed., *Collective Decision Making: Applications from Public Choice Theory* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 241-82, and Young, "Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Institutional Design," in progress.

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may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizational arrangements.

International regimes pertain to activities of interest to members of the international system. Typically, these activities take place entirely outside the jurisdictional boundaries of sovereign states (for example, deep seabed mining), or cut across international jurisdictional boundaries (for example, high-seas fishing), or involve actions having a direct impact on the interests of two or more members of the international community (for example, major adjustments in exchange rates). In formal terms, the members of international regimes are always sovereign states, though the parties carrying out the actions governed by international regimes are often private entities (for example, fishing companies, banks, or private airlines). Implementing the terms of international regimes therefore involves a two-step procedure, a feature that is not characteristic of regimes at the domestic level.[5]

The mere existence of a regime will lend an element of orderliness to the activity it governs. But there is no reason to assume that regimes will guide human actions toward well-defined substantive goals such as enduring peace, economic efficiency, or maximum sustained yields from renewable resources. The concept "regime" contains no intrinsic metaphysical or teleological orientation, though actors involved in the creation or reform of any given regime will often attempt to shape its contents with clearcut goals in mind.[6] It is, however, possible to enumerate several components that every international regime will possess.

1. *The substantive component.* The core of every international regime is a collection of rights and rules. They may be more or less extensive or formally articulated, but some such institutional arrangements will structure the opportunities of the actors interested in a given activity, and their exact content will be a matter of intense interest to these actors.

A right is anything to which an actor (individual or otherwise) is entitled by virtue of occupying a recognized role. The role of human being, for example, is often said to carry with it a right to life. In the system of the United States, the role of citizen carries with it the right

[5] Among other things, it will often prove necessary to rely on domestic courts to enforce the rights and rules incorporated in international regimes. See Richard A. Falk, *The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1964).

[6] Actors will virtually never operate behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" in real-world situations. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), chap. III.

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to vote in elections, the right to speak freely, and the right to move about at will. We are now witnessing vigorous campaigns to clarify and, in some cases, to redefine the rights of women, children, hospital patients, inmates in prisons, and animals. Many roles carry with them bundles of rights that may be more or less extensive and whose precise content is subject to change over time.[7] Of course, the possession of a right in no way guarantees that an actor will actually receive those things to which he is entitled under the terms of the right. Although rights are often respected, even acknowledged rights are violated with considerable frequency in real-world social contexts.

Several differentiable categories of rights are prominent in international regimes. Property rights may take the form of private property rights (for example, rights to commodities traded internationally) or common property rights (for example, rights to airspace or high-seas fisheries).[8] Because of the prevalence of common property arrangements at the international level, international regimes often emphasize the development of use-and-enjoyment rights. These may be exclusive in nature (for example, the right to exploit a given tract on the deep seabed), or they may be explicitly formulated in non-exclusive terms (for example, the right to use certain international straits).[9] But all such rights are designed to ensure the availability of key resources to actors under conditions in which private ownership is infeasible. International regimes may also encompass an assortment of other types of rights, including the right to protection against certain forms of aggression, the right to receive specified benefits from international transactions or productive operations, the right to trade on favorable terms with other members of the international community, and the right to participate in making collective decisions under the terms of a given regime.

In contrast to rights, rules are well-defined guides to action or standards setting forth actions that members of some specified subject group are expected to perform (or to refrain from performing) under appropriate circumstances.[10] Any given rule will exhibit the following

[7] On the notion of bundles of rights, see Charles A. Reich, "The New Property," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 73 (April 1964), 733-87.

[8] Consult, among others, Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, "Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," *Journal of Economic Literature*, x, No. 4 (1972), 1137-62.

[9] The result might be described as a system of "restricted" common property: see J. H. Dales, *Pollution, Property, and Prices* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 61-65.

[10] My use of the concept "rules" differs somewhat from that prevalent in recent contributions to jurisprudence. Compare H.L.A. Hart, *The Concept of Law* (Oxford:

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features: (a) an indication of the relevant subject group, (b) a behavioral prescription, and (c) a specification of the circumstances under which the rule is operative. In some societies, for instance, there are near-universal rules enjoining individuals to tell the truth and to keep promises in their dealings with other members of the society. A rule may be directed toward some clearly designated group, as in the case of ethical prescriptions relating to the behavior of teachers, doctors, or lawyers. Or a rule may focus on some specific activity, as in the case of prescriptions pertaining to civil aviation or maritime commerce. Of course, the existence of an acknowledged rule does not guarantee that the members of the subject group will always comply with its requirements. Even in well-ordered societies, non-compliance with rules is a common occurrence.

Among the numerous rules associated with international regimes, three general categories are particularly prominent. First, there are use rules. For example, members of the ICAO/IATA system are required to follow certain safety rules in using international airspace; those engaged in high seas fishing should abide by rules pertaining to the conservation of fish stocks; and those using international sea lanes are subject to rules designed to maximize safety and to minimize marine pollution. Frequently, such use rules take the form of limitations on the exercise of rights. Just as rights commonly safeguard the freedom of actors to behave in certain ways, rules often spell out restrictions on the freedom of actors to do as they wish.[11] Liability rules constitute a second category. They spell out the locus and extent of liability in cases of (usually unintended) injury to others arising from the actions of individual parties under the terms of a regime. They range from rules concerning compensation for expropriation of foreign investments under various circumstances to rules pertaining to responsibility for cleaning up maritime environments in the wake of accidents.[12] Finally, international regimes often specify a variety of procedural rules, which deal with the handling of disputes or the operation of explicit organizations associated with the regimes.

At the domestic level, collections of rights and rules are commonly supplemented by extensive sets of regulations and incentive systems.

Oxford University Press, 1961), and Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), esp. chaps. 2 and 3.

[11] See G. H. von Wright, *Norm and Actions* (New York: Humanities Press, 1963).

[12] On liability rules and their significance, compare R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," *Journal of Law and Economics*, III (October 1960), 1-44, and Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 85 (April 1972), 1089-1128.

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Regulations are administrative directives emanating from public agencies and specifying conditions under which certain actors are to operate on a day-to-day basis. They are widely used to translate rights and rules formulated in general terms into working managerial arrangements applicable to real-world situations.[13] Incentive systems, on the other hand, are penalties and rewards employed by public agencies for the purpose of altering the behavior of identifiable actors in desired directions.[14] Perhaps the classic cases of incentive systems are taxes and subsidies.

Obviously, regulations and incentive systems will be used less extensively in conjunction with international regimes than with regimes operating at the national or subnational level. They require the existence of some public agency possessing a measure of authority and power; such agencies are far less characteristic of highly decentralized social systems like the international system than of the more centralized systems that are common at the national level. Nevertheless, international regimes accompanied by explicit organizations can and sometimes do employ these devices. For example, the International Monetary Fund has promulgated extensive regulations pertaining to the drawing rights of individual members, and the proposed International Seabed Authority would be able to regulate production of manganese nodules to implement more general rules concerning such matters as the impact of deep seabed mining on the world nickel market.[15]

2. *The procedural component.* Although collections of rights and rules form the substantive core of international regimes, they are not the only components of such regimes. A procedural component encompasses recognized arrangements for resolving situations requiring social or collective choices. Situations of this type arise whenever it is necessary or desirable to aggregate the (non-identical) preferences of two or more individual actors into a group choice.[16] Such problems occur in most social systems; they range from the selection of individuals to

[13] I use the concept "regulation" in a somewhat different sense than it is used in discussions concerning public regulation of private industries. For a clear example of this alternative usage, see George Stigler, *The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

[14] Incentive systems can also be used to raise or disburse revenue. Ordinarily, however, their primary purpose is to structure the behavior of certain groups of actors.

[15] See, for example, Robert Z. Aliber, *The International Money Game* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

[16] For a general analysis of social choice, see A. K. Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1970).

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fill top positions to establishing the terms of trade for exchange relationships and deciding on the distribution of valued goods and services.

Several types of problems requiring social choices can be expected to arise within the framework of an operative international regime.[17] Some of these will involve the allocation of factors of production (for example, deep seabed mining tracts, total allowable catches in the fisheries, and segments of the global radio spectrum). Such problems will be especially difficult to solve at the international level due to the prevalence of common rather than private property. Other social choice problems will relate to issues with explicit distributive implications (for example, decisions relating to adjustments in exchange rates or royalties in connection with deep seabed mining). Collective choices will also be required in settling disputes. Typically, these will arise from efforts to apply general rights and rules to the complexities of real-world situations. Nor does this exhaust the range of problems of social choice that can be expected to emerge continually under the terms of international regimes. Thus, there will be cases in which group decisions are necessary to determine the sorts of research activities to permit in an area like Antarctica, to resolve conflicts between different uses of the same resource, and to organize collective sanctions aimed at obtaining compliance with the rights and rules of an international regime.

Social choice mechanisms are institutional arrangements specialized to the resolution of problems of social choice arising within the framework of particular regimes. Like other components of regimes, these mechanisms may be more or less formalized, and it is typical for a regime to make use of several at the same time. The range of these mechanisms is wide, encompassing such devices as the "law of capture," markets, voting systems, bargaining, administrative decision making, adjudication, unilateral action backed by coercion, and organized violence.[18] Certain conditions are required for the effective operation of each of these mechanisms; we may therefore assume that individual mechanisms will be associated primarily with particular types of social systems. The most striking features of the international system in this connection are its relatively small number of formal members and its high level of decentralization with respect to the distribution of power and authority. Social choice mechanisms characteristic of systems of this type are the "law of capture," bargaining,

[17] Problems of social choice pertaining to the selection and reform of international regimes *per se* are discussed in a later section of this essay.

[18] The classic study (focusing on voting systems) is Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (2d ed.; New York: Wiley, 1963).

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various forms of coercion, and, to a lesser degree, markets. We should therefore expect important problems of social choice arising in international regimes to be handled through these procedures.[19] Still, procedures involving voting and administrative decision making will not be altogether absent in international regimes. Voting, for example, is of some significance in cases like the International Monetary Fund and the ICAO/IATA system. But there can be no doubt that unilateral claims, bargaining, and coercion are central to the processes of reaching social choices within most international regimes.

It is also worth noting that some regimes do not possess social choice mechanisms of their own. They may rely upon the institutional arrangements of larger social structures in dealing with problems of social choice, or they may share mechanisms with other regimes. Such situations are common in cases where adjudication or voting is employed in reaching collective choices. For example, the same courts may resolve conflicts of interest pertaining to civil liberties, business activities, and land use. In principle, the International Court of Justice or the General Assembly of the United Nations could be employed to deal with many social choice problems arising under specific international regimes. In practice, however, various combinations of bargaining and coercion geared to the problems of specific regimes constitute the norm at the international level.

3. *Implementation.* Smoothly functioning international regimes are difficult to achieve.[20] Rights are not always respected, and even widely acknowledged rules are violated with some frequency. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the relevant actors will simply accept the outcomes generated by social choice mechanisms as authoritative, and abide by them. Accordingly, it is important to think about the effectiveness of international regimes,[21] and this suggests an examination of compliance mechanisms as a third major component of these regimes.

Any discussion of compliance must deal with the issue of incentives. What are the benefits and costs of complying with rights and rules, in contrast to violating them? How do individual actors decide whether to comply with the substantive provisions of international regimes? There is a tendency to assume that the typical actor will violate such

[19] Young, "Anarchy and Social Choice: Reflections on the International Polity," *World Politics*, xxx (January 1978), 241-63.

[20] That is, reality seldom approximates the condition of "perfect compliance" discussed in Rawls (fn. 6), 351.

[21] For a similar observation about domestic problems, see A. Myrick Freeman, "Environmental Management as a Regulatory Process," Discussion Paper D-4, *Resources for the Future*, January 1977.

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provisions so long as the probability of being caught in specific instances is low—a line of reasoning which implies that the availability of effective enforcement procedures is essential to the achievement of compliance. But this argument appears to be quite wide of the mark in many real-world situations. It is not difficult to identify circumstances in which considerations of self-interest will lead to compliance, especially in conjunction with long-run perspectives on iterative behavior. Further, there is no reason to assume that individual actors make large numbers of discrete benefit/cost calculations relating to compliance with the provisions of international regimes. Actors will often develop general rules or policies in this realm, and it seems reasonable to expect that long-term socialization as well as feelings of obligation will play an important role in the articulation of these rules.[22]

A compliance mechanism is any institution or set of institutions publicly authorized to pursue compliance with the substantive provisions of a regime, or with the outcomes generated by its social choice mechanisms. The image that comes to mind here is one of formal governmental agencies, and such agencies are no doubt the classic institutions specializing in the achievement of compliance. But less formal compliance mechanisms are common, and highly decentralized social systems, such as the international system, typically rely upon them.[23] The result is apt to be a heavy emphasis on self-interest calculations coupled with publicly recognized procedures for self-help in the redress of wrongs.[24] Alternatively, the outcome may involve reliance on arrangements in which explicit agencies are employed to gather information and to inspect the actions of individual actors, but decentralized procedures are retained for the application of sanctions (for example, the ICAO/IATA system and many of the regional fisheries regimes).[25]

From the point of view of the members of a regime, the development of compliance mechanisms poses an investment problem. Any expenditure of resources on such mechanisms will generate opportunity costs, and declining marginal returns from such investments will virtually always become pronounced before perfect compliance is reached. Ac-

[22] For an intriguing empirical example, see Abram Chayes, "An Enquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements," *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 85, No. 5 (1975), 905-69.

[23] Young, *Compliance and Public Authority, A Theory with International Applications* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), esp. chaps. 4 and 5.

[24] For empirical examples, see Lucy Mair, *Primitive Government* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1977), esp. chap. 1.

[25] Ronald S. Tauber, "The Enforcement of IATA Agreements," *Harvard International Law Journal*, x, No. 1 (1969), 1-33.

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cordingly, it is safe to assume that the members of a regime will rarely attempt to develop compliance mechanisms capable of eliminating violations altogether. Exactly where equilibrium will occur with respect to these investment decisions depends on the assumptions made about the members of international regimes. In view of the decentralization of responsibility that goes with the decentralization of power and authority in the international system, however, it seems safe to conclude that underinvestment in compliance mechanisms will be characteristic of international regimes.[26] Still, various types of compliance mechanisms do occur at the international level,[27] and such mechanisms must be accepted as a third major component of international regimes.

Several clarifying observations are in order in closing this section. It is possible to argue that some regime must always be present with respect to any given activity: regimes can vary greatly in extent, and extreme cases can simply be treated as null regimes. Thus, the arrangement for high-seas fishing prior to World War II might be described as a regime based on unrestricted common property and the procedure known as the "law of capture," rather than as a situation lacking any operative regime.[28] But this line of reasoning leads to serious problems. Sometimes activities are initiated *de novo* in the absence of prior experience (for example, international satellite broadcasting or deep seabed mining). In such cases, we would have to develop some fictions about latent or tacit regimes to avoid the conclusion that there are situations in which no regime is present. Further, existing regimes sometimes break down, leaving a confused and inchoate situation with respect to some activity (for example, the current situation regarding the territorial sea).[29] Here too, the concept would have to be stretched excessively to assert the continued existence of a regime. Additionally, avoiding the temptation to assume the presence of some regime in conjunction with every specifiable activity will facilitate later discussions of the origins of regimes and of regime transformation.

[26] International regimes, like other social institutions, will ordinarily exhibit the attributes of collective goods (that is, non-excludability and jointness of supply) to a high degree. For further discussion of the problems of supplying collective goods, see Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

[27] For a variety of examples, see William T. Burke, Richard Legatski, and William W. Woodhead, *National and International Law Enforcement in the Ocean* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975).

[28] Francis T. Christy and Anthony Scott, *The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965).

[29] For the background of earlier efforts to reach agreement on a regime for the territorial sea, consult Philip C. Jessup, "The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," in *Essays on International Law from the Columbia Law Review* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 197-231.

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In analyzing international regimes, there is a tendency to focus on highly coherent and internally consistent constructs. Yet, real-world regimes are typically unsystematic and ambiguous, incorporating elements derived from several analytic constructs. This divergence between the ideal types articulated by students of regimes and the more inchoate regimes in operation in real-world situations is partly attributable to misunderstandings by those who make decisions about regimes. Much of it, however, arises from two other factors. The development of an international regime usually involves intense bargaining and the hammering out of critical compromises among the interested actors. A dramatic current illustration of this phenomenon is the ongoing bargaining relating to the proposed International Seabed Authority. Furthermore, international regimes generally evolve and change over time in response to various economic and political pressures. This is true even of regimes initially formulated comprehensively in some sort of "constitutional" contract. With the passage of time, regimes generally acquire additional features and become less consistent internally. The point of these remarks is neither to criticize existing regimes nor to argue that the examination of ideal types is unimportant in conjunction with the development of international regimes. But a failure to bear in mind the distinction between ideal types and reality is bound to lead to confusion.[30]

Finally, there is a difference between the conditions required for the effective operation of an international regime and the consequences resulting from its operation. To illustrate, consider a regime governing international trade in some commodity based on private property rights and a competitive market. The conditions necessary to ensure effective operation of such a regime include the availability of information about potential trades, a willingness to accept the terms of trade dictated by the market, and an absence of natural monopolies.[31] The consequences of the operation of the regime, by contrast, relate to the extent to which it yields economically efficient outcomes; the degree to which it produces social costs or neighborhood effects; the attractiveness of the results in distributive terms; and so forth. Both the conditions for operation and the consequences of operation are central issues in the analysis of international regimes. But it is important to differentiate clearly between them, as well as to bear in mind that both these

[30] On the relationship between ideal types and reality, with special reference to the theory of games, see Anatol Rapoport, *Two-Person Game Theory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966), 186-214.

[31] For a succinct and clearly written discussion of such conditions, see Robert Haveman, *The Economics of the Public Sector* (New York: Wiley, 1976), 22-27.

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issues are separable from efforts to characterize the institutional content of an international regime.

Regimes in Operation

Having examined the analytic content of the concept "regime," with special reference to the international system, let me turn to some of the major features of regimes as they occur in real-world situations.

1. *Varieties of regimes.* Variety with respect to extent, formality, direction, and coherence is a prominent feature of international regimes. Sometimes these differences are attributable to underlying philosophical orientations. For example, regimes resting on socialist premises will encompass more extensive collections of rules as well as more explicit efforts to direct behavior toward the achievement of goals than *laissez-faire* regimes that emphasize decentralized decision making and autonomy for individual actors. In other cases, variations arise from the character of specific bargains struck in the processes of setting up regimes, or from the particular patterns of institutional evolution over time.

The extent of a regime is a matter of the number and restrictiveness of its rights and rules. At one extreme is the case of unlimited *laissez-faire*, in which the actors are completely free to do as they please without even the constraints of a system of property or use rights.[32] At the other extreme are arrangements emphasizing central planning and detailed rules governing the actions of individual members. Between these extremes lie various mixed cases that are differentiable in terms of the extent to which they include rights and rules restricting the autonomy of the actors. International regimes tend to be less restrictive than domestic ones, but they do not generally approximate the extreme of unlimited *laissez-faire*.

International regimes vary greatly in the extent to which they are laid out in formal agreements, conventions, or treaties. For example, the current regime for Antarctica is formalized to a greater degree than the neutralization arrangements for Switzerland. As in domestic settings, moreover, it is common for informal understandings to arise within the framework established by the formal structure of an international regime. Such understandings may serve either to provide interpretations of ambiguous aspects of the formal arrangements (for exam-

[32] A regime for some natural resource with no private property rights, no liability rules, and allocation based on the principle known as the "law of capture" might approximate this extreme case.

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ple, the notion of maximum sustained yield in conjunction with the marine fisheries), or to supplement formal arrangements by dealing with issues that they fail to cover (for example, the treatment of nuclear technology under the terms of the partial nuclear test-ban regime). Though it may be helpful, formalization is clearly not a necessary condition for the effective operation of international regimes. There are informal regimes that have been generally successful, and there are formal arrangements that have produced unimpressive results (for example, several of the commodity agreements).[33]

Regimes are directed to the extent that they exert pressure on their members to act in conformity with some clear-cut social goal. Various goals are feasible—including economic efficiency, the preservation of ecosystems, distributive justice, and so forth. Even where there is agreement in principle about the pursuit of some social goal, however, it may prove difficult to meet under real-world conditions. For example, the goal of "optimum" yield with respect to the marine fisheries is notoriously difficult to fulfill in reality.[34] Additionally, when a regime is directed toward the achievement of several goals at once, close attention must be paid to the determination of trade-offs among these goals.[35] In the absence of systematic efforts to construct trade-off functions, any apparent directedness of a regime encompassing two or more distinct goals will be an illusion.

Coherence refers to the degree to which the elements of an international regime are internally consistent. Severe internal contradictions are common in real-world regimes, even in cases where they have been articulated in more or less explicit "constitutional" contracts. For example, there are often contradictions between use rights for marine resources and rights vested in adjacent coastal states to exclude outsiders. Similarly, conflicts commonly arise between the alleged requirements of indivisible state sovereignty and the obligations imposed by the rules of international regimes. It is not hard to account for these elements of incoherence in terms of the compromises necessary to achieve initial acceptance of a regime, or in terms of the piecemeal evolution of regimes over time in response to changing political, economic, and social forces. But the widespread occurrence of incoherence means that

[33] United Nations, *International Compensation for Fluctuations in Commodity Trade* (New York: United Nations, 1961).

[34] P. A. Larkin, "An Epitaph for the Concept of Maximum Sustained Yield," *Transactions of the American Fisheries Society*, Vol. 106 (January 1977), 1-11.

[35] On the economic approach to such trade-offs, see Richard Zeckhauser and Elmer Shaefer, "Public Policy and Normative Economic Theory," in Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds., *The Study of Policy Formation* (New York: Free Press, 1968), 27-101.

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we must beware of relying too heavily on neat analytic constructs in interpreting real-world situations, and that we must learn to cope with the existence of contradictions.

2. *Explicit organization.* All regimes, even highly decentralized private-enterprise arrangements, are social institutions, but they need not be accompanied by explicit organizational arrangements with their own personnel, budgets, physical facilities, and so forth. Effective regimes lacking explicit organizational arrangements are common to "primitive" societies,[36] but they are by no means confined to societies of this type. For example, free-enterprise systems making use of competitive markets are classic cases of social institutions performing vital functions in society in the absence of explicit organization.[37] Many other social institutions—such as those governing manners, dress, and intergenerational relations—serve to structure behavior effectively with little need for explicit organization. Although it is undoubtedly true that international regimes characteristically involve fewer explicit organizational arrangements than domestic regimes, it is important not to carry this generalization too far. The explicit organizations associated with the international monetary regime are certainly not trivial, and the organizational arrangements contemplated in conjunction with the proposed International Seabed Authority are quite complex.

Even where a need for explicit organization is apparent, regimes may make use of organizational structures created for other purposes, or associated with a more comprehensive public authority, in preference to establishing autonomous arrangements of their own. Such situations are common at the domestic level: regimes regularly turn over tasks that involve information gathering, inspection, dispute settlement, and enforcement to agencies specializing in these matters, so that they will not require court systems or police forces of their own. At the international level, this practice appears to be far less common. Situations in which substantive regimes could benefit from such arrangements occur frequently enough. For example, arms-control regimes could make use of more general inspection procedures, and the ICAO/IATA system could rely on some larger authority to enforce its rules.[38] But comprehensive organizational capabilities are either lacking or severely underdeveloped in the international community. Thus, the United Nations is hardly capable of inspecting activities carried out

[36] Mair (fn. 24), Part I.
[37] See Haveman (fn. 31), 21, for a description of markets in precisely these terms.
[38] See Richard A. Falk and Richard Barnet, eds., *Security in Disarmament* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), as well as Tauber (fn. 25).

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under the regime for Antarctica or resolving disputes pertaining to deep seabed mining. In the international system, therefore, individual regimes are not tightly linked, even though they often lack extensive organizational arrangements in their own right.

Perhaps the most obvious and compelling reason to endow regimes with explicit organizational arrangements is to resolve problems of interpretation and dispute settlement.[39] But there are several other tasks that are difficult to accomplish without such organizations. For instance, it may be desirable to conduct research and to monitor various activities in order to determine whether rights and rules need to be adjusted to deal with changing conditions. Such problems are common with respect to the management of fisheries, the stabilization of commodity trade, and the handling of oil spills. Whenever revenues must be collected and disposed of, some organizational arrangements will be required. For example, a regime for deep seabed mining that requires leaseholders to make regular royalty payments can hardly function without some organization to handle the resultant funds. Moreover, explicit organizational arrangements often become important in dealing with problems of social choice and compliance that are outside the realm of dispute settlement. The exploitation of fish stocks purely on the basis of the "law of capture" requires no explicit organization, but the need for organization arises as soon as regulations limiting harvests, quotas, or entry schemes are introduced. The same holds true of compliance. Some regimes (for example, the partial test-ban regime) are able to resolve their basic problems of compliance without creating explicit organizations. But with the introduction of systematic surveillance or formal sanctions, the establishment of explicit organizations becomes a necessity.

The emergence of explicit organizational arrangements raises a range of classic questions that are just as pressing at the international as at the domestic level. How much autonomy, vis-à-vis other centers of authority in the social system, should the organizations possess? What sorts of decision rules and procedures should be adopted in conjunction with these organizations? How much discretion should the organizations have to make changes that affect the substantive content or the procedural character of the regime itself? How should the organizations be financed: where should their revenues come from, and how should they be raised? How should the organizations be staffed? What

[39] This is, for example, the classic argument developed by Locke and similar contractarians concerning the origins of government. See John Locke, *The Second Treatise of Government*, paragraphs 123-131.

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sorts of physical facilities should the organizations have, and where should these facilities be located? The answers to all these questions can affect the impact that any given regime has on its members. It is therefore to be expected that these issues will be fought over vigorously —not only at the outset, but also during the whole period over which the regime is effective. To the extent that explicit organizational arrangements are less important in international regimes than in domestic ones, this sort of contention will be less pervasive at the international level. Nevertheless, it is impossible to make sense out of recent negotiations relating to international monetary arrangements, deep seabed mining, or the allocation of the broadcast frequency spectrum without paying careful attention to these questions of organizational design.[40]

3. *Policy instruments.* Policy instruments are elements of regimes that are subject to deliberate or planned manipulation in the interests of achieving social goals. Such instruments can operate at different levels of generality. Thus, changes in bundles of property rights, the introduction of restrictive regulations, and decisions concerning individual applications for loans or mining licenses may all be treated as matters involving the use of policy instruments, but they obviously address problems occurring at different levels of generality. Policy instruments are also apt to be articulated in terms that are specific to individual regimes or types of regimes. Thus, the determination of allowable catches, as well as decisions concerning the opening and closing of harvest areas, are standard issues involving policy instruments in fisheries regimes. Adjustments of exchange rates or the issuance of broadcast licenses are common policy instruments in other regimes.[41]

At the international level, a key distinction concerns the extent to which the use of policy instruments requires the existence of explicit organizational arrangements. For example, it is possible to redefine the contents of rights and rules at occasional assemblies of the members of a regime; it may even be possible to do so by means of unilateral actions on the part of some members of a regime to which others subsequently conform on a *de facto* basis. Policy instruments of this sort will have an obvious appeal in highly decentralized social systems. This

[40] See, for example, Brown (fn. 1), and Michael Hardy, "The Implications of Alternative Solutions for Regulating the Exploitation of Seabed Minerals," *International Organization*, XXXI, No. 2 (1977), 313-42.

[41] For further discussion, see Giandomenico Majone, "Choice among Policy Instruments for Pollution Control," *Policy Analysis*, II (Fall 1976), 589-613.

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appeal may account for the current tendency to respond to problems relating to international maritime regimes by redrawing jurisdictional boundaries (that is, shifting from the domain of international common property to the domain of national property) rather than by agreeing to specific rules for the use of common property resources at the international level.[42] Jurisdictional changes can be pursued unilaterally; they do not generate requirements for new international organizations. The creation of use rules for common property resources, by contrast, is apt to require the development of explicit organizations, though the results produced may be more equitable than those arising from shifts in jurisdictional boundaries.[43]

Nonetheless, policy instruments suitable for use by explicit organizations are not altogether lacking in connection with international regimes. The International Whaling Commission has the authority to adjust annual harvest quotas for individual species of great whales. The International Monetary Fund can lay down specific conditions in granting loans to countries experiencing currency problems. The International Coffee Agreement allows for the allocation of export shares among its members. And the proposed International Seabed Authority would be able to make use of a relatively complex system of permits and licenses to regulate the production of manganese nodules from the deep seabed. The ability of these organizations to reach autonomous decisions about the use of such instruments may be severely limited. Moreover, compliance can become a major problem in the use of such instruments (for example, export quotas for coffee).[44] But these facts do not suggest a qualitative distinction between the use of policy instruments in international regimes and their use in domestic regimes.[45] In short, though the use of these instruments is limited by the characteristic weaknesses of explicit organizations associated with international regimes, the instruments are by no means irrelevant at the international level.

[42] Recent changes in regimes for marine fisheries arising from unilateral extensions of jurisdiction on the part of coastal states exemplify this prospect. In the case of the United States, the transition was accomplished through the passage of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (PL 94-265).

[43] For a case in point, consult the analysis of the proposed International Seabed Authority, in Young, "International Resource Regimes" (fn. 4).

[44] Bart S. Fisher, "Enforcing Export Quota Commodity Agreements," *Harvard International Law Journal*, XII, No. 3 (1971), 401-35.

[45] It is not necessary to subscribe to Marxian precepts to realize that domestic as well as international regimes may be heavily influenced by actors who are, in principle, subject to regulation under the terms of these regimes. In fact, this is the central insight of the "capture" theory of regulation.

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Regime Dynamics

Like other social institutions, international regimes are products of human interactions and the convergence of expectations among groups of interested actors. They are not autonomous entities waiting to be discovered by actors searching for institutional arrangements to govern their activities. Nor are they like natural rights, possessing some normative status independent of the evaluations of the affected actors.

It is significant that regimes arise from the actions of *groups* of actors.[46] Sometimes social institutions of this type emerge and function effectively without any deliberate effort on the part of individual participants. That is the idea underlying the "invisible hand" conception of markets, in which it is suggested that groups of individuals—each vigorously pursuing his own self-interest—will interact in such a way as to produce socially desirable outcomes (for example, economic efficiency). But invisible-hand mechanisms cannot generally be counted on to yield effective international regimes. The conditions necessary to produce such outcomes are highly specialized even in the realm of straightforward economic transactions.[47] In the international arena, the pursuit of individual self-interest commonly leads to outcomes that are socially undesirable (in the sense of being Pareto-inferior); even conscious efforts to coordinate the actions of individual actors frequently run afoul of severe conflicts of interest.[48]

Since regimes are human artifacts, there will be no physical barriers to their creation and reform. But change—especially guided change—is not necessarily easy to achieve in this realm. Social institutions frequently prove resistant to change, even when they generate outcomes that are widely regarded as undesirable. Existing institutions are familiar constructs, while new arrangements require actors to learn unfamiliar procedures and to accept (initially) unknown outcomes. Further, guided change requires not only the destruction of existing institutions, but also the coordination of expectations around some new focal point. In view of the prevalence of conflicts of interest regarding problems of international coordination, it is fair to assume that a convergence of expectations around new institutional arrangements will often be slow in coming. What is more, social institutions are complex entities, which typically encompass a number of informal as well as

[46] Compare this view with the analysis of conventions in David K. Lewis, *Convention: A Philosophical Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

[47] For a more optimistic assessment of invisible-hand mechanisms see Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 18-25.

[48] Thomas C. Schelling, "On the Ecology of Micromotives," *The Public Interest*, No. 25 (Fall 1971), 61-98.

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formal elements. Consequently, deliberate efforts to adjust a regime run the risk of doing more harm than good; they may produce disruptive consequences that were neither foreseen nor intended by those advocating the specific changes. Although not all initiatives along these lines are doomed to failure, naive hopes concerning the efficacy of social engineering in this realm abound among policy makers and students of international relations alike.[49]

1. *Origins of regimes.* It is helpful to differentiate three channels or tracks in the emergence of international regimes. There is, to begin with, the contractarian track. The actors interested in some activity (or their authorized representatives) may meet for the explicit purpose of negotiating a "constitutional" contract laying out a regime to govern the activity in question.[50] The regime for Antarctica that was agreed upon in 1959 exemplifies this track; the current effort to work out a comprehensive international regime for the oceans constitutes a far more ambitious attempt to engage in regime construction on a contractarian basis.[51]

An alternative approach can be described as the evolutionary track: social institutions sometimes arise either from widespread practice over time or as a consequence of dramatic unilateral actions that are subsequently accepted by others on a *de facto* basis. In general, regimes governing the use of marine resources have traditionally originated in this fashion. More specifically, the post-1945 regime for the continental shelves exemplifies this pattern.[52]

In an intermediate process of regime construction, which might be labeled the piecemeal track, actors sometimes reach agreement on one or more components of a regime without entering into a comprehensive social contract regarding the activity in question. A common justification for this approach rests on the (dubious) argument that the introduction of one or several regime components will initiate a process of task expansion or "spillover" that will lead over time to the emer-

[49] This point of view may seem conservative (in the Burkean sense), but surely it is more than that. There are similar themes in many of the anarchist criticisms of Marxian or authoritarian socialism, as well as in many contemporary expressions of libertarianism. Skepticism about the efficacy of social engineering, therefore, is not a good indicator of ideological orientation.

[50] On the concept of a "constitutional" contract, see James M. Buchanan, *The Limits of Liberty* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), esp. chap. 4.

[51] Howard Taubenfeld, "A Treaty for Antarctica," *International Conciliation*, No. 531 (1961), and Edward Miles, "The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in the Seabed Committee and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," *International Organization*, XXXI, No. 2 (1977), 159-234.

[52] Note that it was formalized or codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Outer Continental Shelf. For relevant background, see Jessup (fn. 29).

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gence of a more comprehensive and coherent regime.[53] Prominent examples of this piecemeal track at the international level include many of the regional fisheries regimes (for example, ICNAF or INPFC), as well as the institutional arrangements relating to marine pollution.

There can be no doubt that the evolutionary track will be followed more often than the contractarian track in highly decentralized social systems like the international system. These systems lack authoritative procedures for dealing with regimes; it is often difficult even to determine the pertinent set of actors to deal with the development of a regime. At the same time, group size undoubtedly makes a difference within the class of highly decentralized systems. It is possible to identify cases in which small groups of actors have been able to reach contractarian bargains even in highly decentralized systems, but such bargains are extremely difficult to reach in systems that are both highly decentralized and large with respect to number of members. To illustrate, the 12 original signatories to the Antarctica Treaty of 1959 were able to reach agreement on a relatively comprehensive regime for Antarctica, but in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) the combination of decentralization and large numbers has led to fundamental difficulties in working out a meaningful "constitutional" contract covering the oceans.

Does it make a difference whether the institutional arrangements governing a given activity emerge along one or another of these tracks? Contractarian processes offer the distinct advantage of producing explicit arrangements that are incorporated into documents (such as treaties or conventions) which become part of the public record available for consultation. But the articulation on a "constitutional" contract is not always an unmixed blessing, even when it is politically feasible to persuade the actors to accept it. Agreements of this type may be explicit, but they are frequently couched in ambiguous language designed to obscure irreconcilable conflicts of interest among the actors.[54] Moreover, actors frequently indicate superficial acquiescence in arrangements to which they do not intend to abide in practice. In such cases, the promulgation of a "constitutional" contract purporting to spell out a regime for some activity will not only generate confusion; it is also apt to breed disillusionment and cynicism among the members of the relevant social system. Despite their obvious initial draw-

[53] Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, eds., *Regional Integration: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[54] On the resulting problems of treaty interpretation in international law, see Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller, *The Interpretation of Agreements and World Order* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

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backs, international regimes emerging from evolutionary processes may yield results that are preferable to those arising from a contractarian approach gone sour.

In the piecemeal approach, the critical issue concerns the likelihood that the introduction of one or several regime components will actually generate substantial task expansion or "spillover." Although the approach seems to offer opportunities for deliberate or planned development of international regimes where contractarian procedures are politically infeasible,[55] actual experience is not reassuring. With respect to regional economic and political integration, where the notion has been investigated most thoroughly, the available evidence offers no assurance that the logic of functionalism can be counted on to yield significant results.[56] What is more, the piecemeal track may lead to severe problems of incoherence when little spillover occurs: it may leave a trail of half-formed regimes with little if anything to recommend them.

2. *Regime transformation.* International regimes do not become static constructs even after they are fully developed. They undergo continuous transformation in response to shifts in their political, economic, and social environments. Significant alterations may occur with respect to the content of a regime's rights and rules, the character of its social choice mechanisms, or the nature of its compliance mechanisms. It would be arbitrary to identify some critical point of transition at which such alterations yield a qualitative change in the sense of one regime disappearing and another one taking its place. Rather, my objective in this discussion is to identify the processes through which international regimes change, and to comment on institutional procedures for handling these changes.

It is possible to differentiate several types of pressure for transformation in international regimes. In some cases, there are fundamental changes in the nature of the relevant activity. For example, shifts from light to heavy usage have generated major problems for traditional regimes in the marine fisheries; and the advent of communications satellites has raised significant problems affecting the pre-existing regime for international broadcasting.[57] In other cases, pressures for change arise from the dissatisfaction of some actor or class of actors

[55] The classic early expression of this reasoning appears in David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943).

[56] Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

[57] See Brown (fn. 1).

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with the distributive consequences of a prevailing regime. The unilateral imposition in recent years of 200-mile fishery jurisdictions on the part of numerous coastal states constitutes a dramatic illustration of this type of regime change. A third type of pressure for major alterations is a desire to introduce a systematic or coherent regime to replace a chaotic or inchoate regime. The basic idea here is to streamline or rationalize a regime that has grown ambiguous or contradictory in the course of evolution.[58] This objective is undoubtedly one of the motivating forces behind current efforts to work out a new "constitutional" contract for the oceans.

Regimes frequently anticipate pressures for change through the articulation of transformation rules. These are institutional arrangements specifying how pressures for change are to be treated, what steps must be taken to bring about alterations in a regime, and what decision rule is to be employed as a standard for determining when proposed changes are to be accepted. Transformation rules may vary greatly with respect to their stringency (the extent to which they make it easy or difficult to get alterations accepted), and there is no reason to assume that those wishing to change a regime will always abide by the terms of such rules. Nevertheless, the existence of a set of transformation rules—even if they are not always followed in practice—is likely to structure efforts to alter regimes. Regardless of the precise content of the rules, they will not be neutral in their impact on the interests of the actors affected by a regime.[59] Transformation rules will determine what skills (such as bargaining, legislative coalition building, legal reasoning) will be essential in efforts to alter a given regime, and actors will never be equal in the possession of these skills, or ease of access to them. It follows that the promulgation of transformation rules for an international regime will be treated as an important matter, and that members of the regime will promote the acceptance of rules they expect to favor their own interests over time.

Guided reform of social institutions is a difficult process in all social systems, especially in the presence of rapid political, economic, and social changes. But the difficulties are unusually severe in systems that, like the international system, are highly decentralized in their distribution of authority and power. Such systems lack routinized procedures

[58] The distinction between this type of pressure and redistributive pressure frequently becomes blurred in practice because it is politically more acceptable to cloak redistributive desires in the guise of promoting good management practices. Numerous illustrations of this phenomenon can be found in the debates over the American Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.

[59] See Young (fn. 19), 260-62.

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(for example, legislative mechanisms) capable of accommodating pressures for institutional change. Where the number of members is small and the system has been in operation a long time, it may be possible to solve such problems through regularized bargaining processes. Where the number of actors is large and their interests are heterogeneous, however, the transaction costs associated with efforts to transform international regimes will be substantial; it may prove impossible to arrive at clearcut outcomes without resorting to highly coercive practices—either in the form of unilateral actions taken in disregard of the interests of others, or in the form of efforts to impose changes on others in the absence of their voluntary consent. Current efforts to hammer out a new international regime for the oceans offer a clear illustration of these problems of achieving guided institutional change in large, decentralized systems.

3. *Change and social choice*. Like all social institutions, international regimes exhibit the attributes of collective goods to a high degree.[60] Therefore, no markets will arise in international regimes *per se*, though there may be markets in entry permits for fishing, pollution rights, licenses for deep seabed mining, and so forth. Since regimes never yield neutral results, it is safe to assume that interested parties will express non-identical preferences with respect to both the initial development and the subsequent reform of these social institutions. Moreover, the expected impact of international regimes is generally great enough to deter the affected actors from consigning matters relating to their development and alteration to administrative experts. Under the circumstances, regime dynamics typically revolve around processes of social choice or procedures through which conflicting preferences concerning institutional arrangements can be aggregated into collective decisions. Again, a particularly clear illustration of this phenomenon can be seen in the current complex negotiations concerning the institutional features of the proposed International Seabed Authority.[61]

In the highly decentralized environment of the international system, the prescribed procedure for resolving such problems of social choice is to resort to multilateral bargaining within the framework of an international conference. However, conflicts of interest among major

[60] This argument is set forth clearly in Olson (fn. 26), for the general case of social institutions.

[61] Compare the views expressed in Young, "International Resource Regimes" (fn. 4), with those advanced in Ross D. Eckert, "Exploitation of Deep Ocean Minerals: Regulatory Mechanisms and United States Policy," *Journal of Law and Economics*, XVII (April 1974), 143-77.

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actors or groups of actors are typically severe. There is no effective tradition that puts pressure on interested parties who find themselves in the minority to accept the preferences of majority coalitions.[62] Since actors commonly mistrust the performance of institutional arrangements (to the point of attempting to resolve all potential issues during the phase of regime formation), multilateral bargaining is often a costly method of resolving problems of social choice relating to international regimes; sometimes it fails to yield any clearcut outcomes altogether.

Two alternative methods exist for dealing with the development and alteration of international regimes. In some situations, small groups of actors possessing strong and generally compatible interests in a particular activity band together to work out an acceptable set of arrangements to govern that activity. The existing regimes for Antarctica, whaling, and fishing in the northeastern Atlantic are all products of this method of handling problems of social choice. There are also indications that several important actors are preparing to follow the same route in developing a regime for the marine fisheries of the Antarctic or Southern Ocean area.[63]

The other method involves dramatic unilateral action on the part of one or a few powerful actors. Under suitable conditions, this process will lead to *de facto* conformity on the part of others in the same way that price leadership operates to produce coordinated behavior in certain oligopolistic industries. Both the existing regime for the outer continental shelves and the emerging regime for the marine fisheries have arisen largely in this fashion, and the postwar international monetary regime may be considered a product of American dominance in the aftermath of the war.[64] If the United States gets its way, development of a regime for deep seabed mining may follow a similar course.[65]

Any given case of regime development or alteration at the international level will undoubtedly be governed by the configuration of

[62] Some analysts favor unanimity as a decision rule, especially at the level of "constitutional" contracts: see James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Rawls (fn. 6) suggests that individuals contemplating principles of justice in the "original position" would reach unanimous agreement.

[63] "Thaw in International Law? Rights in Antarctica under the Law of Common Spaces," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 87 (March 1978), 804-59.

[64] See, for example, Robert Gilpin, "The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations," *International Organization*, XXV, No. 3 (1971), 398-419.

[65] A Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act (H.R. 3350), setting forth a unilaterally imposed regime for deep seabed mining, narrowly failed to pass in the 95th Congress. Similar legislation (S. 493) has been introduced in the 96th Congress, and stands a relatively good chance of passing.

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power among the interested actors.[66] The resultant dynamics are much like those occurring in oligopolistic industries. Where one actor is clearly dominant, unilateral actions are likely to loom large in the processes of regime construction and reform. Where several actors share power as well as a strong interest in the activity, by contrast, regimes are likely to emerge from bargains struck among small groups of key players.[67]

Conclusion

Although there is great variation among international regimes, they are all social institutions. Among other things, this suggests that regimes are dependent upon the maintenance of convergent expectations among actors; formalization is not a necessary condition for the effective operation of regimes, and regimes are always created rather than discovered. Undoubtedly, these attributes account for certain methodological problems that arise regularly in efforts to study international regimes systematically. But the recognition of these attributes is a prerequisite for the achievement of any analytic success in this realm.

In closing, I would like to lay out an agenda of questions that should be considered in the analysis of any international regime:

1. *Institutional character*. What are the central rights, rules, and social choice procedures of the regime? How do they interact with the behavior of individual actors to produce a stream of outcomes?
2. *Jurisdictional boundaries*. What is the coverage of the regime with respect to functional scope, areal domain, and membership? To what extent is this coverage optimal under the prevailing conditions?
3. *Conditions for operation*. What conditions are necessary for the regime to work at all? Under what conditions will the operation of the regime yield particularly desirable results (for example, economic efficiency or equity)?
4. *Consequences of operation*. What sorts of outcomes (either indi-

[66] For a review of recent thinking about power in international relations, see David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics*, XXXI (January 1979), 161-94.

[67] For a more extensive development of the analogy between oligopolistic industries and international relations, see Young, "The Perils of Odysseus: On Constructing Theories of International Relations," in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., *Theory and Practice in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 190-95.

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vidual or collective) can the regime be expected to produce? What are appropriate criteria of evaluation in this context?

5. *Regime dynamics.* How did the regime come into existence, and what is the likelihood of its experiencing major alterations in the foreseeable future? Does the regime include transformation rules and are they likely to be effective?

This agenda is intended to stimulate the development of a growing body of comparable substantive material on international regimes. In time, this material can be expected to improve our ability to arrive at general conclusions about this fundamental, yet poorly understood, international phenomenon.

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WHY COLLABORATE?
Issue-Linkage and International Regimes

By ERNST B. HAAS*

I. Why Study Regimes?

THIS essay is yet another attempt to specify the particular mode of international collaboration we call a "regime." The need for collaboration arises from the recognition that the costs of national self-reliance are usually excessive. Although that has always been true to a certain extent, in the contemporary world there are some novel features that seem to make collaboration more generally desirable. These have to do with the universal preoccupation with wealth and welfare, development and industrialization. One historically unprecedented feature is the reliance on scientific and technological knowledge in the attainment of economic welfare. Hence, we are concerned especially with regimes designed to increase welfare by relying on scientific and technological knowledge.

How do contemporary international economic relations differ from earlier patterns? The numbers and types of participating actors are greater than ever. In addition to foreign and economic ministries, almost every agency of modern government has a stake in some aspect of international relations and maintains direct contact—often by-passing the foreign ministry—with its opposite numbers. More business activity than ever before depends on overseas investment and trade, often sidestepping the firm's home country. More non-governmental groups of all kinds maintain continuous contact with their counterparts elsewhere, and seek to shape the foreign policies of their home countries. In short, the channels of international communication are more numerous, decentralized, and diverse than ever.

Moreover, there seems to be greater reluctance to use force in the solution of economic disputes. Governments no longer dispatch their navies to collect foreign debts or to open up ports to trade; they no longer conquer neighboring countries in order to gain access to oil,

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copper, or gold. They do not even use the threat of military force to foist an unwanted trade agreement on a weaker country. And the expectation that the stronger will not use violence in economic relations has given the weaker the courage to assert themselves in many international forums.

Finally, the proliferation of channels of communication and the relative unimportance of force go hand-in-hand with pervasive disagreement on how the issues on the global agenda should be ordered. There no longer is a consensus on what is "more" or "less" salient to wealth and welfare. Witness the inability of the world's rich countries to agree among each other whether it is more important to control inflation or to have stable rates of exchange. Nowadays, governments recognize complex cause-and-effect linkages between issues they once considered as distinct; but they no longer agree about the norms of conduct that governed collaboration in the past.

The ensemble constitutes the condition of "complex interdependence."[1] It underlies many of the efforts of governments to understand contemporary reality and to adapt to it by collaborating with each other. It underlies the core concept explored here: international regime.[2] *Regimes are norms, rules, and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area.* The specific definitions and justifications of each of these terms are the concern of this essay.

The focus is on arrangements for institutionalized collaboration on topics and issues characterized by complex interdependence—not *all* kinds of collaboration or even *all* multinational arrangements. A combination of deductive and inductive procedures is used to explicate the idea of a regime. The result is an ideal type. What we know of the

[1] The concept was developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 24-29. Some implications of the condition for international collaborative action are explored in Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration," *International Organization*, xxx (Spring 1976), 173-214.

[2] The literature on regimes tends to be focused on specific regimes, not the type, such as discussions of the Bretton Woods regime. For an excellent structural analysis of that regime, see Fred Hirsch, Michael Doyle, and Edward L. Morse, *Alternatives to Monetary Disorder* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977). Oran Young's essay in this issue, on the other hand, treats as a "regime" *any* international agreement which focuses and structures convergent expectations, rights, and obligations of actors with respect to a substantive matter. Although I am in broad agreement with his definitions of regime attributes, my purpose is narrower. I seek to reserve the concept for the particular kind of agreement that features "issue linkage"—a subset of Young's universe, but a broader notion than is implied in the literature on the decay of the Bretton Woods regime. I thoroughly agree with Young's restriction stressing *agreement* instead of following the practice of some writers who equate "regime" with the more diffuse notion of "world order."

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history of other collaborative arrangements is the basis of the reasoning, though that reasoning follows some of the canons of organization and learning theory. The ensemble is history distilled through the apparatus of some current theories. Regime characteristics are deduced from the distillation, not established empirically. We do not yet know whether the ideal type accurately describes and explains the ongoing efforts to fashion collaborative arrangements. The discussion is a preliminary theoretical effort to guide empirical work.

This approach to the study of regimes is motivated by my ambivalence toward other efforts now prominent. These efforts often succeed in capturing aspects of the collaborative process that are undoubtedly significant. But they defer to two opposing organizing principles with which I am not at ease. One is the idea of "structure," and the other is the notion of "evolutionary holism."

Structuralists stress the role of hegemonial states—of power—in the creation and maintenance of regimes. No doubt power matters. But complex interdependence implies that we can no longer explain state behavior on the basis of a given international configuration. Explanations that rely on the structure of power assume a constancy of state interests; complex interdependence suggests that states are no longer certain how various goals should be ranked when the opportunity costs of adopting new goals at the expense of old ones must be evaluated. When old goals are in doubt, the previously used calculus of opportunity costs becomes equally problematical. Structural explanations can show how a regime fits into the global hierarchy of the moment; they can explain change only in terms of a different hierarchy, not in terms of a different calculus of benefits. Opportunity costs can be considered a structural constraint on choice only as long as interests remain constant. Goals may change because of developments that have little relation to the structure of international power; and familiar ways of determining the national interest may change with them. Power then still matters, but the extent of its explanatory vitality becomes ambiguous because states are uncertain how much power should be applied to which of several competing interests.

Evolutionary holists, in opposition to structuralists, stress both the fact of perceptual change and the need for further changes. They conclude that the contemporary world is different from all prior experience because key perceptions concerning welfare, equity, and the quality of life have changed rapidly; they also insist that these perceptions must change even more in order to assure a harmonious life on a

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habitable planet. Desirable changes can be made to occur regardless of a given hierarchy of power, and desirable regimes can be specified in accordance with this teleological dynamic.[3]

In this essay, I will explore a notion of "regime" that accepts the existence of power differentials and the importance of hierarchy among states—without sacrificing to such a view the possibility of choice based on perception and cognition inspired by additional calculations. I also intend to capture the demonstrable change in perception—the dynamics of the evolutionists—without enshrining their particular view of evolution. My notion of regime is cognitive, but it is designed to subsume *all* competing perceptions, not a particular one.

Hence certain core themes in the current discussion of regimes are deliberately excluded as unnecessary. If the emphasis is on how actors perceive the need for collaboration, certain activities or places cannot *by definition* be regarded as a "collective good." Whether they are so regarded depends on the mixture of perceptions and the modes of reasoning employed by those who fashion regimes. We must drop the distinction commonly made between "politicized" and "depoliticized" collaboration, with the implication that the former is bad and the latter is to be cherished. Under complex interdependence, everything is actually or potentially politicized; institutionalized collaboration, though it may be of benefit to all, is still part of politics. Consequently, there is no need to spend time exploring the differences between "liberal" regimes and their "neomercantilist" enemies. Liberal regimes are supposed to be self-regulating; they should not require the interference of people other than the experts who manage them. Such a situation is not credible under complex interdependence; therefore, most regimes conform to the world portrayed by the neomercantilists.[4] Conflict is far

[3] Important works of this type are: Seyom Brown, Nina W. Cornell, Larry L. Fabian, and Edith Brown Weiss, *Regimes for the Ocean, Outer Space and Weather* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977); Richard A. Falk, *This Endangered Planet* (New York: Random House, 1971); and Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1975). For efforts to subsume world-order issues under the larger question of natural and human evolution, see Kenneth E. Boulding, *Ecodynamics: A New Theory of Societal Evolution* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978), and Edward O. Wilson, *On Human Nature* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978). For some political implications of the holistic approach, see Haas, "On Systems and International Regimes," *World Politics*, XXVII (January 1975), 147-74, and Haas, "Is There a Hole in the Whole?" *International Organization*, XXIX (Summer 1975), 827-76.

[4] Liberalism and neomercantilism, politicization and depoliticization are discussed in Hirsch and others (fn. 2). Collective goods and global commons as focuses for regimes are treated by Brown and others (fn. 3), and by Edward L. Morse, "The Global Commons," *Journal of International Affairs*, III (Spring/Summer 1977), 1-21. I question the utility of collective-goods theory when applied to these concerns, on grounds of inherent analytical shortcomings, as described in Jeffrey Hart and Peter Cowhey, "Theories of

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from banished; in fact, since its prevalence must be taken for granted, the question becomes: Under what conditions do convergences of interest arise that call for the creation of regimes? How can there be international collaboration despite the persistence of conflict and of differentials in the power of actors?

Institutionalized collaboration can be explored in terms of the interaction between changing knowledge and changing social goals. It seems axiomatic that parties in conflict will, under conditions of changing understanding of their desires and of the constraints under which they must act, seek to define an area of joint gains. The definition of joint gains must be based on the goals of the actors *and* on the calculations ("knowledge") that influence the choice of goals. What, then, about the social power of certain groups and the hegemonic position of strong states in world politics?

If it were possible to predict the outcome of international negotiations by projecting the power of the parties, our question would be answered. If social classes and governments never changed their minds about individual and joint gains, there would be no question. But under conditions of complex interdependence, no such projection is possible. The existence of an unstable hierarchy of issues on the international agenda means that minds are being changed all the time. Hence we focus on changing knowledge and changing goals. If we did not, we would have predicted that in 1979 the oil-hungry bourgeoisie and its hegemonic governments would have taken on the Ayatollah Khomeini and Colonel Kaddafi, instead of letting their citizens line up at gas stations.

We will begin by exploring relationships between types of interdependence, issues, and the need for collaboration. Next, we will inquire how issues become "linked" into packages called "issue areas." By examining the role of changing knowledge and social goals in defining the content of such packages, four patterns of cognition for choosing regimes are developed. Finally, we will look into the type of organizational arrangements that correspond to various types of regimes.

The discussion is illustrated throughout with references to three actual attempts at institutionalized collaboration. The Bretton Woods Agreement on monetary management is used to show how and why a

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Collective Goods Re-examined," *Western Political Quarterly*, xxx, No. 3 (1977), 351-62. For the classic argument that collective-goods theory predicts noncollaboration, see John Gerard Ruggie, "Collective Goods and Future International Collaboration," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972), 874-93.

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regime that endured for about twenty years came into being and then disintegrated. The Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations are used to illustrate the difficulties encountered by the world during the past ten years in defining joint gains and attempting to institutionalize them. The current negotiations for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) provide a focus for studying a huge package that may result in the creation of a regime.[5] The three share one attribute of importance to the present effort: the participants are very conscious of the enormous impact of money, the oceans, and technology on overall prosperity and welfare. Each regime is just another way of talking about political economy.

II. Interdependence, Issues, Issue-Areas

Negotiations may be controversial or smooth, laden with conflict or free of it. As long as the parties agree on the benefits to be derived from collaboration, conflict does not arise. During the 19th century, for instance, it was taken for granted by all concerned that British investment in Argentine beef production and electric utilities was beneficial for both Britain and Argentina. Negotiating the capital and technology transfers considered appropriate then did not pose a problem. No *issue*, no controversy arose until Britain sought to intervene, diplomatically or militarily, to protect the British investment against Argentine efforts to change the understanding under which it had been introduced earlier. Collaboration becomes conflictual only when the parties begin to disagree on the distribution of benefits to be derived. There is a need for regulating their interdependence if they wish to continue the collaboration despite the conflict.

INTERDEPENDENCE

Thus, an international issue arises when the terms of interdependence are questioned by one or more of the parties concerned, provided the weaker party succeeds in persuading the stronger to pay attention.

[5] On the monetary regime, see W. F. Monroe, *International Monetary Reconstruction* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974); Law of the Sea issues are summarized well in Edward Miles, ed., "Restructuring Ocean Regimes," *International Organization*, XXXI (Spring 1977). For an account of the ongoing negotiations dealing with technology transfers, see Karl P. Sauvant and Hajo Hasenpflug, eds., *The New International Economic Order* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), Parts 5 and 6. For North-South issues, I have relied heavily on Robert L. Rothstein, *Global Bargaining* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), and Roger D. Hansen, *Beyond the North-South Stalemate* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For mining, see George W. Bulkley, *Who Gains From Deep-Ocean Mining*? (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979); for fishing, see *Papers of the Program of International Studies of Fishery Arrangements* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1974).

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Conflict is rife in the negotiations designed to work out different terms. Issues become visible, acquire names and places on agendas, elicit studies, and emerge as recurrent topics of discussion in national parliaments and interest groups.

The attempt to resolve the issue forces the parties to examine the terms of their mutual dependence. Can Argentina do without British capital and still produce beef? Can it obtain the engineering know-how to maintain its electric utilities from some place other than Britain? If British investors abandon the beef industry, will Britain still buy the product? Are alternative markets available? Britain must also examine the terms. Are there places where investments of equal profitability can be made? Are there other countries who will buy electrical equipment if Argentina turns to the United States or Germany as its supplier? Can beef be obtained equally cheaply from Canada or Uruguay? If Britain decides that she can do as well without Argentina, we must conclude that Argentina is *more sensitive* to change in British policy than vice versa. If Britain considers herself relatively insensitive to a change, we say that Argentina is *more vulnerable* than Britain. Sensitivity is measured by the perceived effects of interrupting a pattern of interdependence. Vulnerability is measured by the opportunity costs incurred by making alternative arrangements for collaboration when the initial arrangement breaks down. Unequal sensitivity and vulnerability amount to *asymmetrical interdependence*: Britain is less dependent on Argentina than Argentina is on Britain. Such asymmetry is one complaint of the contemporary *dependentistas*. The construction of international arrangements regulating interdependence—which we call regimes—under conditions of complex interdependence depends on how the asymmetries are perceived by the participants. Their definition of the issues requiring regulation is a function of the perceived costs of asymmetrical interdependence. Calculations of sensitivity and vulnerability therefore inform the discussion of remedial measures.

Any two countries may collaborate on a number of topics at the same time. There is not necessarily a connection between these topics in the minds of the actors. Some may become controversial issues while others remain free of conflict. Some may involve third parties, others not. Some may raise overarching principles and longer-term collaboration while others remain confined to very immediate and mundane preoccupations. Conflict may be more or less intense. The simultaneous presence of several issues, therefore, should not lead us to the conclusion that, in the minds of the actors, these issues are somehow linked to each other.

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Our first step must be to clarify what is meant by "issue" and by "linking issues." The discussion of linkages will enable us to specify what we mean by "issue-area."[6] We will then be able to discuss how knowledge may or may not be used in the establishment of linkages, and how issue-areas differ from each other. Only then can we proceed to the discussion of regimes.

ISSUES AND ISSUE-AREAS

Issues are separate items that appear on the agenda of negotiators. In the LOS negotiations, some of the issues are concerned with the width of the territorial sea and the national economic zone, who can mine the deep sea for manganese nodules and under what conditions, who can draw up rules for fisheries conservation, and whether marine pollution should be controlled by national or multilateral means. The issues in international monetary collaboration include the size and type of reserve assets held by the International Monetary Fund, the conditions under which members can draw on them, and the proportion to be used for maintaining international liquidity, protecting the balance-of-payments positions of certain members, and compensating other members for losses incurred because of foreign trade vicissitudes. The agenda also includes, of course, the question of whether there should be fixed, flexible, or floating exchange rates. In what sense are these issues connected with each other?

It is possible to think of monetary management as being made up of separate issues. Central banks will negotiate to increase liquidity, shore up each others' currencies, and fix the rate of exchange between currencies either by manipulating the currency market or through administrative regulation. In negotiating a conflict, each issue can be handled separately. Monetary management was largely handled this way prior to the Bretton Woods Agreement. Efforts were made to deal with monetary issues as packages only when it was generally recognized that the resolution of *each* of these issues had an effect on the overall economic health of the participants. Degrees of currency fluctuation were no longer considered in terms of the short-term balance of pay-

[6] My use of the term "issue-area" differs from Dahl's and from the version adapted by James Rosenau for use in the comparative study of foreign policy in "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966). In Rosenau's version, each issue-area is thought to possess unique attributes, apparent to the analyst but not necessarily to the actor, making boundary maintenance a part of the definition. Whether boundaries are or are not maintained is an important empirical question. Rosenau seeks to make issue-areas "objectively real," while my concern is to abstract only what can be experienced by the actors.

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ments alone but also in conjunction with overall rates of growth, inflation, and deflation. Previously separate monetary issues had been converted by the actors themselves into an *issue-area*, a recognized cluster of concerns involving interdependence not only among the parties but among the issues themselves. One-dimensional sets of conflicts were converted into a two-dimensional pattern. We can speak, since 1944, of the existence of an internationally recognized monetary issue-area.

How did central banks learn to recognize the existence of a more complex set of interdependencies while, at the same time, bureaucracies dealing with world trade failed to do so? The lesson of the disasters associated with mercantilist policies during the Great Depression was learned by both sets of actors. The new macroeconomic goals associated with Keynesianism were also shared (though the conversion was not complete in the United States until some years later, whereas Lord Keynes himself led the British delegation at Bretton Woods). New knowledge and new social goals provided the *necessary* explanations of the regime, but they were not *sufficient*. In the case of money, the hegemonic position of the United States meant that other countries had little choice, even if they had wished to opt differently (which most did not); but since no internal consensus on trade existed in the United States, the hegemonic actor was not motivated to impose the packaged issues represented by the version of the International Trade Organization that was preferred by the U.S. To put it differently: American power was put at the disposal of a consensus on monetary knowledge and broader goals for managing the economy to maintain full employment, but could not be so used in the absence of a consensus on desirable trade policies.

Things are more complicated in ocean management because no consensus on knowledge has emerged to give coherence to the consensus on goals. The ocean matters to governments because their citizens use it to fish, sail ships, extract oil, fight wars, and conduct research; they also now recognize that the oceans help determine the weather and that it may not be a good idea to use them as the world's garbage dump. Each of these activities has given rise to conflicts among countries. Governments have sought to resolve them by means of bilateral treaties and multilateral conventions establishing basic ground rules for behavior. But until very recently, each issue was approached separately.

The underlying conflict pitted the maritime countries with strong navies and active merchant and fishing fleets, with an interest in untrammelled access to all corners of the seas, against the weaker countries who were fearful of not being able to defend their actual or pre-

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sumed ocean resources. The stronger held out for the three-mile territorial sea and unregulated access everywhere else; the weaker sought to extend the width of their territorial sea and to regulate access to their coastal waters. Until World War II, the strong had things their way under the reigning doctrine of the "freedom of the seas." Local conflicts between strong and weak were settled by means of separate treaties dealing with fisheries, innocent passage of ships, smuggling, and access to mineral deposits. The first breach came with the unilateral American declaration of the "continental shelf" doctrine, which extended territorial jurisdiction farther offshore for purposes of mining. When new superordinate principles chipping away at the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine were negotiated in 1958-1960, the issues were still kept separate in the form of different treaties for fishing, the continental shelf, the territorial sea, and the high seas. The separateness of the issues was underscored by the fact that some participating countries ratified fewer than the four treaties, and others ratified none.

In 1967 a new doctrine was announced: the oceans were to be considered "the common heritage of mankind," and the totality of their resources a means for redistributing income and welfare among all countries. To achieve this, it was no longer possible to consider issues separately since each issue was thought to contribute to increased equality among states. More importantly, effects of interdependence *among* issues were now recognized: changing marine technology could result in over-fishing, unacceptable pollution, greater ship disasters; and the mining of deep-sea minerals could depress the price of the same minerals mined on land. As a result, the Law of the Sea Conference was convened by the United Nations to resolve the cluster of issues by means of a single treaty. Ocean matters became, for the first time, a tentatively recognized issue-area. But, as we shall see, there is a considerable distance between the cognitive event of issue-area recognition and the institutional event of regime construction: the inter-issue Law of the Sea negotiations have dragged on for a decade.

There are important differences between the construction of regimes for money and for the oceans. Knowledge relevant to ocean management is far less consensual than the macroeconomic professional consensus that existed between 1950 and 1970. Although oceanographers, fisheries specialists, and mining engineers accumulated a great deal of technical information during these decades, neither they nor government officials have succeeded in *integrating* this information into a strategy for realizing the common heritage of mankind. Global welfare is indeed recognized as an overriding social goal; but there is no con-

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sensus on *how* the management of specific resources can be aggregated into attaining it in the form of joint gains. Hence the actors remain preoccupied with the realization of individual gains, and these depend on the special capability of each to fish, mine, wage war, transport containers and oil, or prevent pollution.

State power is a vital mediating agent in the absence of consensual knowledge. Those who claim the knowledge and the ability to act can negotiate for private goods they are able to control. When they want others to be barred from the benefits of fisheries conservation and prevented from polluting the shoreline, they create exclusive national zones; when they want to exploit a high-sea resource, they invoke the principle of open access. Nobody has the power to impose a global regime, but many have the power to impose private spheres; and a few have the capability to monopolize deep-ocean mining.

The LOS negotiations (like the parallel effort to construct the NIEO), constituted a case of "premature" issue-packaging. The package was the result of a negotiating strategy adopted by the weak—first in UNCTAD and later in all international economic forums. In addition, the character of the resources to be subjected to a regime may explain the difference in outcomes. Ocean-related resources constitute a very heterogeneous group of concerns, united only by the fact that they are situated on or under the water. Money, on the other hand, is a universal medium on which all economic activity depends; for better or for worse, the management of money responds to some widely accepted theories. The management of ocean resources does not, because it is characterized by the competing claims of the particular resource specialists who do not subscribe to a globally accepted doctrine of resource management for the benefit of all. The vision of ecological holism is not yet the political equivalent of monetary theory. Nor can we be certain that an aggregate welfare function for the oceans can ever be worked out.

KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge has emerged in our argument as a basic ingredient for exploring the development of issue-areas. A further explication of this notion is essential if I am to avoid being labelled a technocratic determinist. I do *not* mean that knowledge is a synonym for the discoveries of natural science, the opposite of ideology, the sole basis for establishing objective truth, superior to politics, or a substance that makes experts wise and politicians clowns.

Knowledge is the sum of technical information and of theories about

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that information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal. Knowledge incorporates scientific notions relating to the social goal. Such notions are rarely free from ideological elements. Nor are they necessarily free from the self-interest of their proponents. Questionable metaphors, imperfect analogies, exaggeration, and other epistemological sins abound in science for policy as well as in policy for science. Economists adjust their models to the kind of society they prefer, and advocate the results of their simulations as the findings of science. So do ecologists, energy specialists, and lawyers drawing up regulations for technology transfers. None of this matters for our purposes. As long as these activities are accepted as a basis for public policy by groups and individuals professing varying political ideologies, we consider such notions as consensual. Knowledge is the professionally mediated body of theory and information that transcends prevailing lines of ideological cleavage.

Internationally, then, the sharing of a fund of knowledge among governments otherwise in opposition to each other is a form of cognitive convergence. When Soviet and American engineers agree on the properties of strategic weapons, and economists on the determinants of the business cycle and how to model it (and there is evidence that such agreement has occurred), certain ideological differences are being bridged by converging modes of thought. The same happens when pollutants are identified, measured, and related to the quality of life, or when the trade-offs among various sources of energy are assessed.

It does not matter that the knowledge was generated originally in rich and powerful countries, that not everybody has equal access to it, and that some of it is being rationed by its possessors. Nor does it matter that the generation of knowledge may have been embedded in a certain class structure, and that it may have been manipulated for the benefit of a class, a state, or a single firm.[7] All that matters for our

[7] My argument obviously sidesteps a number of competing views on this matter. Some—notably those associated with the Pugwash movement—argue for the existence of an "internationale" of scientists whose knowledge can reform the world. Others—for instance Jean-Jacques Salomon—argue that science is always used in the service of power and of the state that finances science. Neo-Marxists—for instance Jürgen Habermas—consider science an instrument of bourgeois hegemony within the state, if not a means of oppression. Some classical economists and political realists treat scientific knowledge as an aspect of investment, and its diffusion as a result of how competition is structured internationally. All but the Pugwash view have some plausibility, though each is in fact disputed. But each also exaggerates the case by imputing a certain monolithic quality to the core actors: classes, the state, the scientific professions, entrepreneurs. My own empirical bias forces me to reject these as meaningful categories of actors on the stage of history, at least in the last quarter of this century.

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purposes is the demonstration that technical theory and information is *in fact* being applied to policy making across the lines of cleavage associated with its origins. It is possible, indeed likely, that the lines of cleavage persist even while the sharing of knowledge takes place; but we must then suppose that policy resulting from the application of knowledge will eventually change the original lines of cleavage (to be replaced by new ones, no doubt). How else is one to explain the remarkable changes in national position that have taken place in recent international negotiations? To argue that the explanation lies exclusively in changes in national power positions is to say too little: the reappraisal of national power is itself partly the result of changing knowledge about capabilities to act meaningfully. The old national interest is questioned when a new claim to truth is generally accepted *and* when this claim is thought to contain a remedy for some generally experienced social ill. However, the two impulses may originate at different times and do not need to coincide.

There is no single point of origin for this process, no single historical or sociological cause. Knowledge is embedded in many social processes that are to be found in all economic and social systems which have come under the sway of scientific and technological modes of education and industrial organization. Once knowledge escapes the political and economic control of its originators, it becomes a kind of international public good. If the word "consciousness" had not acquired too many metaphysical and countercultural meanings, it might be a more appropriate term than "knowledge" for the notion I am developing.

But *who* is knowledgeable—the technical expert, the businessman, the politician, the peasant? Another way to put this question is to ask at what point knowledge is consensual. The monetary theory underlying the Bretton Woods regime existed in the professional literature before 1945; an effort to put it to work internationally was made in 1933. The management doctrine underlying the LOS negotiations had been developed by Arvid Pardo before 1967. Neoclassical economic development doctrine was challenged before 1974. What matters is not when a given view was first developed, but when it attains general acceptance as a guide to public policy. It is normal that technical specialists originate a particular body of knowledge and claim relevance for it. Knowledge becomes salient to regime construction only after it has seeped into the consciousness of policy makers and other influential groups and individuals.[8] In 1945, Keynesian economics was

[8] But, it is said, experts always disagree with each other; how can we speak of a consensus? In the early stages of any shift in paradigm, they certainly do disagree, and

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widely accepted by economists and labor leaders, had made important inroads into the U.S. bureaucracy, but was still being resisted by the business community; a few years later, some key business groups made their peace with it. Pardo's approach to ocean management has not been accepted by specialists or governments. The "basic human needs" doctrine has officially taken the place of older development views without completely pre-empting them; it is not yet consensual, but it has its adherents. A claim to knowledge becomes consensual whenever it succeeds in dominating the policy-making process—and that implies acceptance by all major actors involved in that process. In the NIEO negotiations, no such consensus exists. The *dependencia* doctrine is the property of the poor; it is *their* way of organizing the appropriate knowledge, but not the lore on which the rich rely. It is therefore not knowledge in the sense in which the term is used here.

Knowledge constitutes only one dimension of our exploration into issue-areas and issue-linkages. Regimes are constructed by states through the medium of multilateral negotiaton. The linking of issues that remained separate in earlier periods can be interpreted as a kind of learning. But learning is but another word for reinterpreting one's interests. Interests may—but need not—change with more consensual knowledge. We now inquire into negotiations and learning as an aspect of issue-linkage that takes into account the varying interests and goals of the parties.

KNOWLEDGE, LINKAGES AND ISSUE-AREAS

Issue-specific negotiations usually deal with topics on which there is an accepted body of knowledge. Economists in general agree on the effects that exchange rate systems have on the benefits derived from trade; fisheries specialists subscribe to the principle of the "maximum sustainable yield;" nodule miners agree that the existing technology and methods of oceanographic mapping serve to condition the profita-

there is no consensus. Even later, experts will continue to disagree on certain aspects of their field, but not on all. In the early stages of discussion regarding the creation of regimes, the use of knowledge will be no more consensual than is the current U.S. debate among the experts on the future of nuclear energy. Experts disagree with each other on the facts *and* on the social goals to be realized. Moreover, they do tailor the factual discussion to whatever goal they espouse. But that is not the case during the entire lifecycle of a technology or a theory. At times there is consensus (as there was with respect to nuclear energy in the 1950s and 1960s because the dissidents were few in number and outside the policy-making process); it is permanent consensus that is inconsistent with the process of scientific investigation itself. See Howard Margolis, *Technical Advice on Policy Issues*, Sage Professional Paper No. 03-009 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973).

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bility of deep-sea mining. This means that in issue-specific negotiations on these topics there is a high degree of certainty about the efficacy of the *immediate* solution; benefits can be calculated fairly reliably as long as the existing base of knowledge remains unchanged. All other things being equal, the narrower the scope of issues to be negotiated, the higher the degree of certainty about efficient solutions. However, when we assume a dynamic situation of rapidly changing knowledge, the pattern is reversed. Experts can no longer be sure that accepted solutions will bring certain benefits. They will be tempted to expand the scope of topics as they suspect that knowledge in cognate fields has something to tell them about the efficacy of broader types of solutions. For instance, fisheries specialists concerned only with optimal harvesting of a fixed stock may begin to think about artificially manipulating the size of the stock when (1) the means for doing this become known, and (2) fish stocks are considered as a constituent of overall dietary calculations. Under such conditions, inter-issue negotiations offer a greater hope of efficient solutions even though the knowledge base is itself changing and far from conclusive. Greater certainty is a hope, not a scientific given.

Why link issues? Since changes in knowledge and social goals do not necessarily go together we have no warrant for arguing that all economic regimes relying on scientific and technological information *must* owe their origin to this confluence. Nor are we entitled to argue that issues *will* be linked simply because we live under conditions of complex interdependence. Successful negotiations for institutionalizing international collaboration depend on the congruence of interests as much as on changes in consensual knowledge. It follows that issue-linkage will not succeed if the states with a strong stake in the existing distribution of benefits, and the capability to control it, prefer to keep things as they are. The United States and the Soviet Union, for example, saw no reason to link the issues of peaceful nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons as long as each was able to control the process of technological diffusion. The desire to construct the non-proliferation regime arose only when the process seemed to pass out of their control. Issue-specific negotiations tend to favor the coalition of states who have long had an interest in the issue and who dominate the resource. Issue-linkage, on the other hand, is favored by those who want "in": a regime that links issues will come into existence only if the "outs" somehow manage to persuade the "ins."

There are three ways of persuasion. (1) One can link issues by introducing into the agenda of multilateral negotiations items that are not

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connected by any intellectual coherence at all; we call this "tactical linkage." The objective is simply to obtain additional bargaining leverage, to extract a *quid pro quo* not obtainable if the discussion remains confined to a single issue. (2) Issue-linkage may also be attempted, however, to maintain the cohesion of one's coalition. The coalition is held together by a commitment to some overriding social goal, even though the partners disagree with respect to the knowledge necessary to attain it. They also disagree on the extent to which the issues in the package are interdependent in terms of the anticipated effects. Uncertainty about outcomes is part of the glue that holds the coalition together. Elements of consensual knowledge are unevenly distributed among the coalition partners; but doubts about connections between ends and means, cause and effect, are suspended in the interest of maintaining collective bargaining strength. We call this behavior pattern "fragmented linkage." (3) Issue-linkage may also proceed on the basis of cognitive developments based on consensual knowledge linked to an agreed social goal. This is the pattern of greatest interest to the construction of regimes; we call it "substantive linkage."[9]

Power is present as a mediating agent in all three modes. The credibility of a tactical linkage depends on the "linkee's" perception of the linker's ability and willingness to withhold collaboration if the linkage is refused. In fragmented linkage situations, the potential defectors from the coalition must be held in line by means of side-payments or promises, and the opposing coalition must be effectively threatened. Even in situations of substantive linkage, knowledge is rarely so consensual as to eliminate the role of threat and reward as a way of persuading the weaker negotiating partners. But the use of power is always limited by the perception of complex interdependence that motivates the parties to negotiate in the first place.

Tactical issue-linkage is a negotiating ploy that eschews reliance on intellectual coherence among the issues linked. The Jamaica monetary regime did not have to provide for special aid to underdeveloped countries merely because there was also a desire to legitimate floating exchange rates. Deep-sea nodule mining can be regulated without also worrying about the right of passage through straits. Yet these issues

[9] Tactical and substantive linkage are discussed by Kenneth A. Oye in "The Domain of Choice: International Constraints and the Carter Administration Foreign Policy," in Oye, Donald Rothchild, and Robert J. Lieber, eds., *Eagle Entangled* (New York: Longman, 1979). Fragmented linkage is discussed in Ernst B. Haas, Mary Pat Williams, and Don Babai, *Scientists and World Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 121-23.

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were in fact linked because the victims of asymmetrical interdependence wished to link them and had enough leverage to succeed. Tactical linkage is a cheap way to increase pay-offs because it expands the agenda of possible benefits to be derived. Since the issues are not inherently connected, the sacrifice of a peripheral demand poses no problem as long as what is really wanted is accomplished. The weaker party will be better off after an agreement even if some issues fail to be resolved; but the same is not always true of the stronger party. Negotiations featuring tactical linkages among issues are not necessarily Pareto-optimal. What is called "package dealing" and "linkage politics" in journalistic accounts of foreign policy conforms to this pattern; so does the legislative practice of log-rolling. Tactical issue-linkage, then, is simply a way of maximizing the separate gains of the parties, even though the outcome of the negotiations may be an agreement that establishes a new regime.

Fragmented linkages are best illustrated by the NIEO negotiations, which constitute an attempt to realize some joint gains, even though it is far from clear how the gains will be distributed.[10] Uncertainty over distribution *is* a reason for issue-linkage. If the linkers are uncertain about the interdependence effects of the issues, it is safer to link, in the interest of gaining maximum concessions and holding their coalition together—even in disregard of knowledge that may suggest that *linking is unwise substantively and unacceptable to the opposition politically*. Thus we find in the NIEO that every outstanding economic grievance of the South is linked to an overarching argument for global redistribution of resources, ranging from such immediate matters as aid and debt relief to the long-range considerations of technology transfer, commodity price stability, and nonreciprocal tariff treatment. The intellectual justification for the package was worked out by the UNCTAD economists in a series of studies that were widely challenged by economists in the developed countries. Professional knowledge is far from consensual. Naturally, the negotiators relied on what-

[10] I rely greatly on Rothstein (fn. 5), in this section, even though he considers the inter-issue linkage in the Integrated Commodity Program to be essentially tactical, used solely to hold the heterogeneous Group of 77 together. Rothstein also shows that, while the parties agreed on many specific economic arguments and demonstrations, they continued to disagree on whether to act in accordance with them in the creation of the UNCTAD-designed Common Fund. What mattered was whether they thought in terms of "best-case" or "worst-case" scenarios. The issue that divided them was whether, in the process of commodity price stabilization, equity (the goal of the G-77) or efficiency (the goal of Group B) should be maximized. The Common Fund that they eventually agreed to differs from the proposal UNCTAD had used to link the issues.

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ever intellectual justification supported their demands. Yet it would be an exaggeration to maintain that there is no coherence at all among the issues. Technology transfers *are* related to industrialization and export-led growth. Multinational corporations, if they remain unregulated, *do* influence technology transfers, even if the precise relationship is not exactly as presented by UNCTAD. In general, the entire package *is* related to the global redistribution of resources. There is some coherence from the point of view of the coalition attempting the linkage; but if there is none for the opposing party, we still lack a base of consensual knowledge.

Hence it is the principle of substantive linkage that is of greatest interest to us. We are concerned with explaining how negotiators link issues into packages in deference to some intellectual strategy or evolving awareness of causal understanding. How do issue-areas emerge from a multitude of separate issues in response to challenges additional to the logic of coalitions? Latin American engineers, scientists, economists, and civil servants have come to think of "technology transfer" as an issue-area instead of worrying about such matters as foreign capital inflows, obtaining patents for specific products, finding markets for their products, or building a certain type of factory. These things *are* the issues; they remain in people's minds even when issues are combined and abstracted into a more holistic construct. But instead of being ends in themselves, they become means toward a more complicated end. Instead of being effects, they are reconceived as causes leading to new effects: wealth, prestige, status, autonomy.

This proposition must not be overstated: substantive knowledge *alone* cannot legitimate a holistic package of issues. The legitimation depends on the acceptance of a new understanding on the part of key political actors. Governments—even when exposed to novel insights about energy, growth, pollution, or food—cannot be expected to stop considering their policies within the perspective of what passes for the national interest. Substantive issue-linkage depends on learning that the national interest can be redefined or broadened, and that international collaboration is *required* for the realization of national goals. *Knowledge can legitimate collaborative behavior only when the possibility of joint gains from the collaboration exists and is recognized.*

All modes are "rational" in the sense that the actors show concern over cause and effect, and the relationship between ends and means, in seeking to attain a specific goal. But the types of rationality differ. In issue-specific and tactical linkage negotiations the actors may agree in

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principle that their understanding is incomplete, that ends may change, and that new means for attaining them may be discovered. But they will insist that their understanding of the specific topic is better than any rival understanding of linked topics *at the time of action*. Solutions may thus be sub-optimal in the context of a possible wider understanding; but since the wider understanding eludes the actors, they consider their solution as the best to be had under the circumstances. Moreover, they may be buying stability by excluding other possible options.

Bargaining under conditions of fragmented issue-linkage is not always rational. Everything depends on whether the challengers of the status quo are interested in increasing their share of a fixed pie, changing the rules under which the pie is baked, or joining the bakers. The revisionist coalition will defeat its own purpose if it merely seeks to enlarge its share of the global pie because it sacrifices a comprehensive agreement to the maintenance of its internal unity when it knows that the opposing coalition will not accept the formula. This tends to happen in single-shot conferences pitting the North against the South. However, changing the rules and joining the bakers implies that any single negotiating session is merely an episode in a long struggle. Here the maintenance of political cohesion in the challenging coalition is rational in order to sap the divide-and-conquer tactics that the opposing coalition will surely adopt.[11] It makes sense to give up immediate gains in the expectation of eventual success in joining the firm as a regular member.

Substantive issue-linkages lend themselves to holistic prescriptions of salvation. Many holists consider them to be the most conscious of complex systems of cause and effect, most sensitive to many ends and purposes, and most attuned to scan the full range of the means available for solving "the problem." Hence, they consider only this mode "rational" in the common use of the term, and issue-packages agreed upon by any process less rational as just another case of sub-optimizing. This view is not helpful if we wish to understand how regimes come into being; substantive issue-linkage can be effected by cognitive means short of the holistic extreme.

We now apply these propositions about issue-areas and issue-linkage to the way actors order their goals and apply knowledge in the construction of regimes. Issue-linkage refers to negotiating behavior. Our next concern is with the negotiators' structure of perceptions.

[11] Rothstein (fn. 5), 150-51.

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III. Knowledge and Goals: How to Order Them to Choose Regimes

KNOWLEDGE AND GOALS IN OVERCOMING DEPENDENCY

The actors whose cognition is of interest are thinking beings: they do not normally act randomly. They are anxious to "understand" their world, so as to be able to reshape it. We need not assume goal-seeking behavior which desires to "optimize" with respect to the results to be obtained. We do assume that the actors are "motivated by a conscious calculation of advantage"—the minimum Thomas Schelling assumes when he dissects modes of strategic bargaining.[12] Actors can be expected to utilize whatever knowledge is available to help them in the calculation of advantage, whether they do so efficiently or not.

The regimes of concern here all have to do with wealth, welfare, and economic equality among nations. All the goals that matter to the actors are articulated in the global debate about the New International Order. That debate encompasses the conflict over goals associated with an open international economy and the Bretton Woods regime on the one hand, and the revolt of the Third World against that regime on the other. It pits the "liberal" ideology of the wealthy North against the antidependency ideology of the South. Asymmetrical, complex interdependence, as perceived by the underdeveloped countries, provides the basis for the confrontation; the shared goal of the South is to overcome dependency. That goal contains several different development strategies which provide the occasion for the introduction of knowledge.

Import-substituting industrialization is one of the strategies. Its proponents are concerned with raising aggregate national income; they expect the benefits accruing to a few successful enterprises to trickle down into the rest of the society eventually. The policy issues consist mainly of fiscal and monetary measures to motivate innovation by domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors. The need for collaboration among nations becomes an additional issue only when these policies fail to result in the anticipated benefits. Collaboration is an unanticipated consequence of failure. The goals remain "specific," somewhat separate, and static.

Others propose the strategy of economic and technological self-determination. They associate dependency with the structure of capitalism and its global division of labor. The factors causing dependency are thought to include education, the media, the habits of the "center"

[12] Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 4.

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classes in the "periphery" and their unholy alliances with the elites of the North, as well as the behavior of foreign investors. The remedies include selective disengagement from the North, obtaining the best from the North on terms defined by the South, and cautious and informed participation in the global division of labor. No single goal can be attained without paying attention to a wide variety of economic, scientific, and social policies now considered relevant. Hence, goals "expand" and "become interconnected."

REDEFINING GOALS

Changes in goals and in knowledge are crucial to our argument. But in the real world neither one changes all the time. We summarize the two processes under discussion without assuming covariation. The goals of governments, in modern times, change because new groups, parties, opinions, and demands enter the national political arena rapidly and in large numbers, reflecting the process of accelerating social mobilization. The increase in the number of actors implies the articulation of ever more ambitious goals for the governments. Authoritarian Brazil and democratic Venezuela today aim at goals that had not occurred to their rulers twenty years ago. But this expansion of goals may occur *without* a coherent intellectual understanding of causes and effects, and *without* a complete mastery of the means considered necessary and sufficient to attain the ends. Or the expansion of goals may include such understandings, even if only provisional and filtered through the simplifying mechanisms of ideologies. A call for international collaboration in order to help attain goals that promise joint gains may involve a sophisticated understanding of ends and means, or it may simply be an ill-thought-out reaction.

Similarly, knowledge about causes and effects, means and ends, may expand rapidly and command an increasing consensus among the experts who generate it. Consensual knowledge may or may not infect the politicians. Biologists, resource economists, and some engineers are increasingly concerned about and united in proposing strategies of development that respect ecological constraints; some politicians are impressed and others are not. The conventional wisdom among economists used to be that increases in aggregate income will trigger welfare benefits for all; the widespread popularity of the doctrine of "basic needs" suggests that a new consensus which questions this assumption is evolving among experts.

The hallmark of complex interdependence is uncertainty: there are too many goals, all competing for attention; there is no agreement

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on the best means for attaining them; the understanding of causes is subject to ideological disputation, not consensus; what is a cause to one actor is an effect to another. In short, *goals cannot be ordered into a hierarchy of importance or salience equally acceptable to all.* International collaboration, the effort to regulate asymmetrical interdependence, is an attempt to reduce uncertainty when a multiplicity of values are at stake and the simplest strategy for reducing uncertainty—autarky—is not practicable. Linking issues is fallible man's way of marshaling what knowledge he has in order to attain his goals. Constructing issue-areas by way of substantive linkages implies some ordering. How orderly is the ordering?

Occasionally, a persuasive doctrine lights up the murky world of uncertainty, and consensus develops around it—thus ordering the steps the rulers must take. More often, political actors do not subscribe to such unambiguous uncertainty-reducing ideologies; they therefore must make policy by means that do not meet the canons of rationality associated with operations analysis and marginal utility theory. They may cope with uncertainty by filtering, simplifying, and foreclosing choices. Trade-offs are fudged rather than systematically examined. Causal sequences are assumed or guessed at rather than studied fully. Means found effective in past situations are projected as being useful in a new crisis, even though the ends may not be comparable. Or actors may employ the techniques of sub-optimizing and "satisficing."[13]

We can now come back to our discussion of how linkages among issues are negotiated. Issue-specific negotiations do not involve these kinds of uncertainties and coping mechanisms because I do not associate them with complex interdependence. They do not refer to situations in which the need for a new regime is felt, though they are commonly used for adapting and maintaining existing institutional arrangements. We may therefore disregard issue-specific negotiations. In tactical linkage negotiations, knowledge is either not consensual or irrelevant; therefore it cannot inform the negotiations in a systematic fashion. The dissonance-reducing mechanisms used by the negotiators defy clear attribution: each actor or coalition uses its own psychological defense, not one shared by all in the effort to master uncertainty. Goals to be attained—although perhaps rendered under some rhetorical label to which all claim to subscribe—are in fact very diverse. Any resulting

[13] See Jack L. Snyder, "Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence," *World Politics*, xxx (April 1978), 347-53; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chaps. 4 and 11.

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agreement bears the scars of this situation; it is only as stable as the power of the most resourceful linkers can make it.

Linking issues on the basis of fragmented or complete substantive awareness of applicable knowledge is our real concern: actors espousing an "expanding" set of goals seem doomed to relying on what is known or knowable about the physical and social world. That is true of all societies which concede that they depend on this kind of knowledge in order to industrialize, have a technologically proficient military, fight malnutrition, stop the population explosion, halt environmental degradation, or overcome dependency. They therefore share a commitment to consensual knowledge, whether on a partial or a more complete basis. In an international negotiating situation they may or may not share a common set of goals. Or they may use the negotiations as an opportunity for defining joint gains although no such notion prevailed when the bargaining began. The cognitive processes associated with reduction of dissonance must become common to the parties if such an outcome is to be envisaged.

FOUR COGNITIVE STYLES

Goals and knowledge may be combined. Figure 1 suggests schematically how issue-areas develop from separate issues.

FIGURE 1

BELIEFS OF EXPERTS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE BECOME:	GOALS CONSIDERED BY POLITICIANS ARE: *specific, static*	GOALS CONSIDERED BY POLITICIANS ARE: *interconnected, expanding*
more consensual	pragmatic	rational
not more consensual	eclectic	skeptic

Each cell captures a particular cognitive style, a particular convergence of ways of thinking about knowledge and action. One may think of the units in the cells as individuals or decision-making teams such as delegations to conferences. The units, however, are *not* the bargaining style that dominates any single conference; that style must be coded as the interaction among delegations; it is described in our typology of issue-linkage.

The distinction between static-specific and interconnected-expanding

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goals has been explained. A clarification about "consensual" knowledge is now needed. What matters is not that substantive knowledge about soil chemistry, ocean currents, or the biology of fish stocks is changing, but that there be a constant and active evolution of ideas about how scientific knowledge can and should be related to politics and policy making. Not merely information, but the management *of knowledge for action* is the vital consideration for the growth of issue-areas. Some scientists believe that, if the right kinds of questions are asked, a consensus on disciplinary and interdisciplinary issues can evolve which will link knowledge effectively with the attainment of social goals. Others are less sanguine. The management of knowledge which uses as its focal point a given *machine* or *method* or *place* (particle accelerators, gene splicing, space research) is for our purposes "not more consensual," because it concentrates on research whose possibilities and range are defined by the experts without reference to clear political goals. "More consensual" knowledge includes efforts to pick and choose, from among scientific disciplines and endeavors, those items that can be combined in a comprehensive effort to achieve the social or political goals of concern to us. The two modes opt for different principles of organization. They also use different ideologies to justify one procedure or the other.[14]

The Rational Mode. In the rational mode, there is covariation between changes in knowledge and changes in goals. Experts increasingly agree on the management of knowledge for action; politicians accept their consensus as they make it part of their striving to attain more ambitious goals. The combination implies an acceptance of synoptic planning as the appropriate administrative technique. Enough validated knowledge is assumed to exist to permit the formal analysis of a problem, its decomposition into interrelated components, the specification of overarching objectives, and the assignment (to given administrative and production units) of quantified tasks designed to bring about the realization of the goals. The rational mode presupposes inspiration by a comprehensive doctrine which is the source of the planners' optimism, be it sociobiology, environmental holism, or "soft

[14] This distinction originates with Stephen Toulmin, "The Complexity of Scientific Choice: A Stocktaking," in Edward Shils, ed., *Criteria for Scientific Development, Public Policy, and National Goals* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1968), 63-79. The full rationale underlying this discussion and the matrix is contained in Haas, Williams, and Babai (fn. 9), chaps. 3, 5, and 6. For illustrations of the distinction in the early history of nuclear energy, see Spencer R. Weart, *Scientists in Power* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

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energy paths." Rationalists consider themselves masters of technique and substance, means and ends, causes and effects.

Of course, an ordering of goals is achieved by such means—however temporarily. *This ordering depends on the acceptance of the goals and the knowledge by all important actors*, or the exclusion from decision making of any actors who do not share the faith. Has such a situation ever existed in the history of international collaboration? One can think of experts who advocated doctrines of this kind and failed to convince all of the key actors of their vision: such was Arvid Pardo's fate in the Law of the Sea negotiations, Robert Triffin's in the reform of the international monetary system, and Lord Orr's in the field of food.

In the heyday of the Northern economic boom after World War II, Keynesian macroeconomics came close to providing such a consensus. There was considerable agreement among economists on the instrumental role of monetary policy in attaining other economic objectives. This consensus was successful in convincing the major governments of the West. Domestic full employment, rapid industrial modernization, the growth of world trade under nondiscriminatory conditions, and the expansion of the welfare state *were* considered together as a set of interconnected and expanding goals informed by a consensual body of knowledge. The Bretton Woods economic regime was the expression of this mode. The substantive way of linking the issues was used when the regime was perfected, even though the institutionalization took place under the hegemony of the United States.

We now know that the consensus was temporary. The goals of many of the actors changed; the NIEO reflects the change. Consensual economics disintegrated into "left" and "right" Keynesianism, neoconservativism and neo-Marxism. Each school has its own way of linking issues, or of not linking them. The rational mode has not demonstrated its staying power—whether the knowledge comes from economics, oceanography, or nuclear engineering.

The Eclectic Mode. Eclecticism is the logical obverse of rationalism. Knowledge is not used in decision making so as to arrive at a more integrated understanding among sectors and disciplines. Fisheries experts, geophysicists, petroleum engineers, and naval architects go their separate professional ways; they make little effort to reinterpret their specialized knowledge under the conceptual roof of "managing the common heritage of mankind." Politicians and administrators also

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make no concerted effort to change the social objectives to which they are committed. They continue to conserve fish stocks instead of planning to meet nutritional needs; they encourage the construction of supertankers, issue leases for ocean mining, exclude foreign polluters from straits and harbors—all without integrating these objectives into an ordered set of priorities for the oceans.

"Eclectics" comprise the large number of actors who are content to continue doing what they have always done. They believe neither in salvation by way of more consensual knowledge about techniques nor in the possibility of fashioning more integrated and ambitious goals. They support or oppose new ideas and programs for reasons having little to do with any structured attitudes toward either knowledge or political purpose. Such actors may engage in package-dealing when they encounter one another in international negotiations; but the deals feature the *tactical* linking of issues.

Whether or not conceptual integration takes place is a matter judged by the outside observer on his own terms. The participants, unmindful of the distinctions made by us, may well consider their activities as constructing issue-areas in line with the best scientific knowledge available to them. The key is the mode of decision making they adopt; eclecticism prevails if no attempt is made to transcend disjointed incrementalism. The participants do not use methods of synoptic assessment; they do not construct formal models of the oceans including *all* activities of concern; they do not attempt to make a joint simulation of cost-benefit alternatives covering fishing, mining, shipping, and pollution control (and hence, there is no real appreciation of trade-offs). Politicians package issues in line with coalitional and bargaining dynamics, rather than in terms of agreement on integrated objectives to be attained. A little is added at each new encounter, without necessary reference to a superordinate conception of shared objectives. Existing knowledge does inform the process of adding items, but it is not knowledge integrated by the methods of planning and formal analysis.[15]

[15] This discussion runs parallel with and is indebted to Charles E. Lindblom's *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

At this point we must face the question of "who decides": a given phenomenon may be coded as an "issue" by the analyst and seen as an "issue-area" by the participating actors; two analysts may well code the phenomenon differently. How reliable, then, are our attributions?

It is useful to distinguish between three ways of assigning attributes. (1) The simplest way is to code phenomena on the basis of the actors' self-perception; if they characterize their style as "eclectic," that is it. (2) A more complex procedure is to code the actors' *behavior*, not only their self-perception, on the basis of categories defined by the analyst. This procedure calls for inferring self-perceptions and matching them with actual

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The Skeptic Mode. What if goals entertained by politicians *do* become broader, more interconnected, and more consensual, but the accompanying knowledge remains or becomes fragmented? The effort to order issues along a hierarchy of priorities is made, but there is no adequate, accepted body of knowledge informing the order. The ordering is merely rhetorical: one set of negotiators is committed to one line of analysis with its source of certainty while another set professes quite a different approach. Agreement among actors on the hierarchy is not likely to be long-lived. Substantive linkage of issues is certainly attempted; but the participants are unsure about the way of going about it, and the attempt is fragmented. There may be some tactical linkage: some actors may be content to reach agreements based on a fragmentary consensus on goals; others may be preoccupied with merely insti-

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behavior for consistency. (3) The third procedure is to neglect the actors' perceptions and behavior altogether and make attributions solely on the basis of categories set up by the analyst. The first two methods stress cognitive concepts; the third way relies on structural considerations. Making attributions on the basis of structural concepts is the procedure favored by analysts working in the Marxist, state-centric, and Parsonian traditions. It is illustrated by Rosenau's use of the notion of issue-area.

In opting for the second of these procedures, we code by asking the following questions of the negotiations being studied:

1. How did the actors define the substantive items about which they are negotiating *before* the session under examination?
2. *In* the session being studied, is there evidence that these items are being redefined and regrouped under larger headings corresponding to more ambitious goals not previously on the agenda?
3. *In* the session being studied, is there evidence that the redefinition and regrouping of items under larger headings is tending toward the acceptance by all actors of some core concept (or doctrine) which represents the ambitious social goals?

If we were to compare the LOS, monetary, and NIEO negotiations before and after 1967, 1971, and 1977, respectively, we would arrive at the following answers:

	Law of the Sea		*Money*		*NIEO*	
	Before 1967	*After 1967*	*Before 1971*	*After 1971*	*Before 1977*	*After 1977*
Issues linked?	no	tactically	substantively	tactically	fragmented	no?
Issues redefined?	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Core concept consensual?	no	no	yes	no	no	no

The price of this procedure is lack of uniformity and of full comparability among issue-areas and regimes. Uniform empirical attributions that correspond to the actors' self-perceptions are sacrificed to a scheme that allows assessments of change, but the assessment is a function of the analyst's view of the world, which may or may not be shared by the actors. Comparison of different regimes and their evolution is possible, but only if we neglect the *salience* of these regimes to the various actors. Since the actors' self-assessments are subordinated to the analyst's way of ordering the world, we have no way of being sure that the Law of the Sea and monetary management are of equal importance in terms of the allocations of time, energy, and attempts to plan which the governments have allocated.

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tutionalizing a process of learning, while resisting fragmentary solutions based on the unlinking of the issue-package.

"Skeptics," therefore, are either impatient or unconcerned with knowledge. They do not believe in, or are unwilling to wait for, the arrival of consensus among the experts about the means and causes that might require understanding before they define ends and specify effects. Yet they are interested in using whatever consensual knowledge may exist at the moment in order to realize the ambitious goals they have in mind. Synoptic planning and analytic techniques coexist with disjointed incrementalism in making decisions. Therefore there can be no collective certainty, only fragmentary bits of it. The collective effort is condemned to continuing experimentation as the promise of joint gains remains in doubt. The larger goals are approached through hit-or-miss programs and single-shot solutions that are not consistently justified in terms of some overarching logic or method.

The Pragmatic Mode. But what if there is an increasing body of consensual knowledge among experts, which is not fully matched among politicians with an expanding set of social goals recognizing intellectual interconnections? The situation prevails when publics and policy makers become aware of unwanted and unanticipated consequences of industrialism while also wanting its benefits. Goals do change in recognition of more consensual knowledge, but not all actors agree on how the goals ought to be ordered. Pragmatists attempt to use the analytical techniques associated with what Lindblom calls "strategic planning." They do seek to contrive substantive linkages on the basis of such efforts at integrating knowledge. But pragmatic experts can never be sure to find an understanding and sympathetic audience among all of their political masters.

While rationalists strive for the aggregating of goals into issue-areas, pragmatists tend to experiment with combining two or three issues; they may consent to decompose them into separate issues once they are convinced that the aggregation is conceptually faulty or politically ineffective. Pragmatists would prefer to link issues substantively at all times, but will settle for partial substantive linkage when they must. Tentative moves toward the growth of consensual doctrines are discernible; to the extent that they take root, certainty about how to proceed also develops. But in the pragmatic mode, nothing is ever final and complete. The social and economic goals to which the politicians subscribe are *not* expanding and not becoming more interconnected under the umbrella of some consensual doctrine; they continue to co-

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exist and to compete in a more inchoate fashion. Therefore, improved and accepted knowledge cannot be used to order goals in any final way. As single goals change and coalitions among actors shift, so does the order of priorities among goals. Improved knowledge may help in the ordering; but knowledge, too, is rarely final and uncontested. Pragmatists must work on the border of relative and temporary certainty and of occasionally ordered social goals. Hence, they must settle for stop-and-go tactics—attempts at grasping larger wholes, followed by periods of retrenchment. And their inability to opt for a clear set of ordered consensual goals at a high level of abstraction is bound to make pragmatists cautious about the sweep of techniques they employ for marshaling knowledge.

IV. Cognitive Processes, Change, and Regimes

My purpose is to suggest an ideal-typical definition of regimes, to inquire how, in our era, international collaboration can flourish in a setting of conflict, how islands of order can form in an ocean of disorder. Different modes of cognition can suggest how men redefine their interests to attempt the realization of joint gains in some fields while continuing to play the zero-sum game in others. Negotiation on the basis of substantive linkages does not guarantee successful regimes. Cooperation on an informal basis can certainly take place in the absence of full-fledged regimes.[16] Other writers have suggested the utility of such qualifiers as "partial," "weak," "quasi-," and "proto-" regimes as expressions of less-than-complete regulation of interdependence. The value of such distinctions depends on the purpose of the analysis. As long as my purpose is the elaboration of an ideal type useful for empirical exploration, I see no need to disaggregate the concept prematurely.

Hypotheses of Change

Our immediate purpose is to summarize the discussion in terms of some hypotheses about regime construction. Since we are dealing with ideal types, these hypotheses are modest: they suggest what *cannot* happen rather than predicting what *will* happen. They limit the universe of possibilities, but they suggest no determinate outcome.

[16] Various modes of collaboration for reducing uncertainty, involving issues similar to technology transfers, are explored systematically and searchingly by Peter Cowhey in *The Problems of Plenty* (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming). Cowhey shows how such collaboration can be carried out in the absence of a full-fledged regime, and at what cost. Both structural and cognitive explanations are used and fully integrated, with "structure" being identified as an unchanging and consensual knowledge base.

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The four hypotheses that follow make claims about cognitive styles, issue-linkage, the prominence of state power in the linkage, and the capacity of any resulting regime to survive. We assume that the cognitive style informing the negotiations characterizes all the important parties: all are rationalists, skeptics, eclectics, or pragmatists. The more complex situation of mixtures of prevalent styles will be taken up when we discuss "learning through negotiation."

1. If the negotiating conference is characterized by *eclecticism*, issues will be linked exclusively in a tactical manner. The credibility of the linkage is largely a function of the will and the ability of key parties to impose it, including the manipulation of technical information. It is unlikely that a regime will emerge; if it does, it will not outlive the first important technological innovation.

2. If the negotiating conference is dominated by the *rational mode*, substantive issue-linkage on the basis of agreed doctrines will prevail. Power differentials among states are not important as mediating instruments. The resulting regime will be as stable as the doctrinal consensus on which it rests.

3. If the negotiators are *skeptics*, fragmented issue-linkage will prevail, and the will and capability of powerful states can be expected to remain important as instrumentalities for rewarding coalition partners and paying off opponents. The resulting regime will be weak and unstable.

4. If the negotiators are *pragmatists*, they will first attempt substantive issue-linkage and withdraw to fragmented linkage when this becomes politic. State power is a factor in reaching an agreement, but not an essential one. The resulting regime, though including fewer issues than had been hoped, will nevertheless be fairly stable. It will also be capable of being adapted and adjusted so as to include additional issues later.

Regime stability implies several things. The norms, rules, and procedures that make up the regime will not be challenged by the members so as to throw the existence of the arrangement into doubt. The rights of the parties will be generally respected and obligations will be carried out. Challenges will take the form of conduct specified by the regime's procedures. The rewards and gains expected of the regime will in fact eventuate. In terms of efficiency and equity, the regime will perform as hoped. But even if we can agree on the meaning of stability, controversy remains as to which of the four hypotheses is the most persuasive.

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STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION OF CHANGE

Students of international regimes are in disagreement as to whether changes in the rules of collaborative games among nations are best explained in "structural" or in "cognitive" terms. While my explanation is cognitive, the burden of this section is to suggest that the differences can be reconciled with the help of the notion of the "national interest," albeit not a platonic ideal interest, but interest perceived by actors and identified by analysts.

In the structural explanation, we seek to identify deep-seated patterns or conditions in the international system and to ask whether these have or have not changed. We can then explain new institutional patterns in terms of such changes. The differential in power, influence, and stratification among states is the condition of greatest interest to the structuralist. He sees the world in terms of changing balances between "weak" (or new, or underdeveloped) states and "hegemonic" (or strong, industrialized, and—potentially or actually—militarily dominant) states. International regimes flourish when hegemonic states define them, operate them, and pay for them; they decline when hegemons change their minds. Naturally, the rules of a regime are tailored to the national interests of the hegemons. The law of the sea was dictated by those who owned big navies, merchant marines, and fishing fleets before 1967; monetary order was maintained by the economically most powerful: Britain before 1914, the United States between 1945 and 1971. When the relative power position of the hegemon eroded—for whatever reasons—the regime had to change. Structuralists do not worry about differences in *how* the national interest may be understood by various groups, bureaucracies, and individuals within a state. The strength of the state is taken as the key ingredient of the explanation, and the balance of power among states as the predictor of specific regimes.

This approach can be applied to our way of explaining regime construction. It explains fully the situation in which no new consensual knowledge enters the negotiating process. Interests are considered fixed. When a given state lacks the capability to make its interests prevail and new actors challenge its former primacy, the game changes. One may then say that international collaborative arrangements that reflect *static* knowledge of cause-and-effect patterns and *settled* views about the relationship of means to ends *are* a reflection of established stratification patterns. Since there are no influential ideas challenging the prevailing technical wisdom of how to manage money

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or fish stocks, choice is effectively constrained by prevalent schedules of opportunity costs. When the distribution of power and influence among states changes—as it surely has since 1960—national interests that had previously lacked the opportunity to be heard, now become very audible indeed. But since these "weak" states lack the ability to

FIGURE 2

EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL ISSUE-AREAS:
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION WITH TACTICAL LINKAGES



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challenge the prevailing technical knowledge they must seek a better deal on the basis of the negotiating processes we have identified with tactical and fragmented linkages. The weak must rely on their numerical strength and their ability to forge coalitions by granting or withholding benefits desired by the "strong." More voices mean more interests, more demands, and more complex negotiations; they are made more complicated still if, at the same time, changes within the hegemonic states undermine their ability to take a clear position. Expressed in terms of the cognitive modes presented above, the structural explanation of change is consistent with the skeptical and the eclectic types of process. The absence of new knowledge in the model forces reliance on less-than-substantive ways of linking issues. This sequence of events is summarized in Figure 2.

COGNITIVE EXPLANATION OF CHANGE

In the pragmatic and rational modes of negotiating, emphasis is put on the use of increasingly consensual new knowledge in making more ambitious policies. An explicit additional variable is introduced to explain change—a variable that accentuates new ways in which actors think. Since actors can be expected to make use of whatever help they can get in reducing their uncertainty about how to attain their increasingly complex and ambitious objectives, this knowledge will be put to use through cognitive means. In Figure 3, the addition of new knowledge is imagined to be associated with new communications channels, think tanks, international research institutes, and efforts to model "world systems" at national and international, public and private institutions. Substantive issue-linkage then prevails, though it may be mixed with fragmented linkage. State power remains in the picture to the extent that the pure rationalist style does not prevail.

LEARNING THROUGH NEGOTIATION

To students of international organizations condemned to follow the debates of United Nations bodies, it may seem odd to associate these discussions with the idea of learning. In fact, the iteration of familiar patterns of behavior suggests the analogy of the anthill rather than that of the academy. Hence, the comment of Lewis Thomas is comforting:

> It is not surprising that many analogies have been drawn between the social insects and human societies. Fundamentally, however, these are misleading or meaningless, for the behavior of insects is rigidly stereo-

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> typed and determined by innate instructive mechanisms; they show little or no insight or capacity for learning, and they lack the ability to develop a social tradition based on the accumulated experience of many generations.[17]

Insects cannot transcend stereotyped behavior without genetic change, but people can by drawing on experience. One kind of experience consists of making use of information that becomes available. Another kind integrates various bodies of information to construct theories and other intellectual aids. Such processes can be experienced by individuals, groups, organizations, and even states. Information and knowledge can be used to advance private as well as collective interests. We have stipulated that collaboration will not occur unless the opportunity costs of acting jointly are considered to be less than the costs of individual action. Learning, in the context of regime construction, is the cumulative recognition of knowledge necessary for realizing joint gains; learning must be Pareto-optimal. We know that learning has taken place when the actors adopt new rules of behavior that make use of new information and knowledge, or adopt ways for the search for such knowledge. If learning does not imply "the end of ideology," it certainly means that the prevailing dogmas are being relaxed sufficiently to allow for the introduction of new information considered relevant by the proponents of many ideologies. Learning occurs when communists, capitalists, totalitarians, and democrats agree that, in some issue-area, new information or knowledge compels the redefinition of past interests in the service of joint gains.

Actors who seek to use new knowledge to link issues substantively cannot be said to act contrary to their national interests. There is no need to assume the sudden victory of dispassionate wisdom over selfish interest. But why assume the contrary—that actors will continue to cut off their noses to spite their faces when it is within their power to enjoy both wisdom and self-interest? New knowledge, then, is used to redefine the content of the national interest. Awareness of newly understood causes of unwanted effects usually results in the adoption of different, and more effective, means to attain one's ends. A more complex understanding of what causes the malaise of industrial and developing societies usually results in the adoption of more ambitious and demanding governmental programs with new objectives. In making use of this knowledge—however fragmentary the carry-over into action may be—interests take on a different form. It used to be in the national inter-

[17] Thomas, *The Lives of a Cell* (New York: Viking, 1974), 57.

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FIGURE 3

EVOLUTION OF GLOBAL ISSUE-AREAS:
COGNITIVE EXPLANATION WITH SUBSTANTIVE LINKAGES



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est of the United States to maintain the three-mile limit of the territorial sea, and to guarantee the stability of other countries' currencies. It no longer is. If we adopt this perceptual notion of the national interest, we must discard the idea of "structurally necessary" regimes; nothing is *absolutely* necessary. Necessity is a function of perception, of knowledge; it is time-bound. What was considered necessary in one epistemological perspective becomes obsolete in another. What one set of politicians considered safe and settled knowledge as long as public administration meant running the night watchman's state, another set must discard in exchange for a more ambitious knowledge when the objective is to maintain the welfare state.

How can we conceptualize the process of learning to use new knowledge in the redefinition of national interests? Obviously, the impulse may come from many sources in domestic political systems and may be diffused through many international agencies, public and private. The knowledge, however, does not become politically relevant until it shows up as an ingredient in the formulation of national demands for altering the existing pattern of interdependence. The empirical locus for the next encounter is the process of negotiating new regimes.[18]

Hence, learning is a form of persuasion, and persuasion implies an initial disagreement among the parties, which is gradually resolved or settled by compromise. Learning through negotiation is more likely to take place in a setting in which *no single* cognitive style characterizes

[18] One cannot speak of "a theory" of negotiation—only of competing "theories" that differ from each other in *what* they attempt to predict and in *how* they view the process. See the special issue of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XXI (December 1977). A specification of givens that characterize negotiations relating to regime construction includes: (1) lack of a superordinate legal framework; (2) tacit acceptance of a procedure that is unstable because one or more of the parties may seek to upset it during the negotiations; (3) conviction that any resulting agreement will be sufficiently in the common interest to be implemented; (4) initial lack of accurate information in minds of negotiators with respect to the ranking of utilities in the minds of their opponents; (5) all negotiators are the instructed agents of governments and are rational actors in Schelling's sense; (6) no party has a veto power; (7) voting and adjudication cannot be used to break stalemate; (8) all parties have mixed motives because the utilities attaching to the good(s) being bargained over are not homogeneously distributed; (9) there are no deadlines; (10) mediators are active; their role is facilitated by the heterogeneous distribution of utilities; (11) non-agreement is a possibility accepted by all. Obviously, such characteristics differentiate these negotiations sharply from most game-theoretic models and all real situations that abstract from industrial relations. See also Zartman, ed., *The Negotiation Process* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978), 70-71.

The diffusion of new knowledge through various mechanisms is analyzed in Haas, Williams, and Babai (fn. 9), Part III; Jean Touscoz, *La Coopération Scientifique Internationale* (Paris: Éditions Techniques et Economiques, 1973). The literature on this subject is summarized and reviewed by Brigitte Schröder-Gudehus, in Derek de Sola Price and Ina Spiegel-Rösing, eds., *Science, Technology and Society* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977).

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the negotiators, but where pragmatists encounter skeptics or eclectics. Learning is associated with mixed cognitive settings rather than with the pure types hypothesized above. The knowledge is unevenly diffused and not completely consensual; there is conflict over goals; power is perceived to be asymmetrically distributed, though not concentrated in one country for purposes of all issues and sectors of concern. In the negotiations that ensue for resolving conflicts over clashing national interests so as to find a zone of joint gains, learning takes place if and when the bargaining positions of the parties begin to *converge* on the basis of consensual knowledge tied to consensual goals (or interests), and when the *concessions* that are exchanged by the parties are perceived as instrumental toward the realization of the joint gains.[19]

Must all knowledge in all circumstances have this effect? The experience of the LOS has demonstrated avoidance of issue-linkage; the Jamaica Agreement taught us the continued importance of tactical linkages in the creation of a regime; the still unsettled nature of the NIEO negotiations begs the question of the effectiveness of the process of learning. *Learning as conceptualized above occurs only when pragmatists and rationalists have the edge over their eclectic and skeptic colleagues.*

And when is this likely to occur? Negotiations toward a food regime suggest that the substantive knowledge incorporated into the bargaining is accepted by most experts and is admitted by politicians to be relevant to the attainment of their converging goals. Another condition has to do with empathy among negotiators—with their ability to grasp the opponent's hopes and fears. This condition implies overcoming, through continued negotiation, the initial situation in which one party *assesses incorrectly* the ranking of utilities in the mind of the other. Convergence then means an adjustment of mutual utilities in some rough common rank-order.[20] Once this breakthrough occurs,

[19] Zartman (fn. 18, 1978), 75ff., argues that the "convergence/concession" model of learning through negotiations is less powerful than the alternative "formula/detail" model. The latter, while still true to the constraints summarized in fn. 18, is said to capture more accurately the manner in which conflicts are gradually resolved; the hard negotiations are over finding a "formula" to "capture" the zone of joint gains while the details can be deduced less conflictually afterward. I would counter that this argument applies to the kinds of intra-regime negotiations carried on in adapting and maintaining the rules by incrementally tinkering with the norms, but not to the creation of a new regime where the new norm is essential.

[20] See John G. Cross, "Negotiation as a Learning Process," in Zartman (fn. 18, 1978), 29-54, for a formal model of this process. In the NIEO negotiations, neither the convergence of knowledge nor the agreement on mutual utilities has occurred. But there is a literature which, if more widely accepted, would contribute to both. On the knowledge side, see the studies in William R. Cline, ed., *Policy Alternatives for a New International Economic Order* (New York: Praeger, 1979). On the adjustment of

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bluffs and threats cease to be useful negotiating tactics. The resulting agreement makes it impossible to differentiate winners from losers; everybody is a winner on some dimension. After that, a second initial constraint—the unwillingness to accept a predetermined procedure for negotiating the regime—becomes less important; the conference can settle down to a bargaining process in which mediators become key actors.

But what if the pragmatists and rationalists are not successful? If no convergence occurs on any dimension, there will be no regime. The LOS is again our example, and it demonstrates the prevalence of a process that is just as much part of the creation and diffusion of new knowledge as the forging of substantive issue-linkages. New information may actually sensitize negotiators to possible future gains that are best realized without a regime. New knowledge on fisheries conservation, pollution control, and off-shore mining had the effect of making several Third-World governments determined to reap these advantages for themselves alone, to the exclusion of others. Their example was soon followed by all countries that espoused the formula of a 200-mile economic zone. New knowledge can also sensitize actors to costs, not just benefits. And if the character of the resource is such that it can be manipulated by excluding others so as to preserve benefits and limit costs, the packaging of issues will be considered harmful. That may be the fate in store for negotiations to fashion a regime for the nuclear fuel cycle. The failure of the Integrated Commodity Program of NIEO has been explained as resulting from the realization of the parties, after being exposed to the results of modeling commodity markets, that their interests are far less congruent than they had supposed. Learning to link issues substantively requires more than new scientific and technical information, and more than a formula that declares international equity to be the norm of order. It also requires a demonstration that *only by linking issues substantively* can everyone's goals be realized. If one is not an ecological holist, it may be impossible to sustain such a demonstration.

In the NIEO negotiations, we can characterize the Group of 77 as skeptics and the developed countries as eclectics. Since some new agreements of a collective kind (unlike the private-goods-dominant solution

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utilities, see the ingenious argument for reconciling the "graduation," "global reform," and "basic needs" scenarios embedded in the NIEO controversy, in Roger D. Hansen, *Beyond the North-South Stalemate* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For an interesting effort to define a consensus on both dimensions, see Christopher Freeman and Marie Jahoda, eds., *World Futures* (New York: Universe Books, 1978).

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to most LOS issues) were concluded and others remain on the agenda, we cannot declare the NIEO an outright failure. Nevertheless, it is clear that whatever issue-packaging occurred is quite fragmented and replete with efforts at tactical linkages. In fact, the process seems best characterized as *declining* issue-linkage: in 1974 the agenda appeared as a huge package; by 1980 it had been disaggregated into a number of issue-specific items (debt relief, technology transfer, commodities, etc.). Substantive linkages were more prominent in the organizational mind of UNCTAD than in the foreign ministries of the member states. Knowledge was used to sharpen an awareness of separate, not joint, gains. Even so, the agreements that did come about suggest that some rank-ordering of utilities has occurred since 1975—enough to have a fragmentary consensus, but not one that adds up to a new regime. And so the door remains ajar to some further cognitive changes which require that the fragments be reordered into a substantive package.[21]

The mixture of cognitive styles leads us to a second set of hypotheses about regime construction.[22]

1. If the negotiations are dominated by a conflict between rationalists and pragmatists, the solution will still feature the use of substan-

[21] The political reordering is described in Rothstein (fn. 5), chap. 7. It presupposes the kind of intellectual reordering found in Hansen (fn. 20). Rothstein argues that the parties must recognize that any single NIEO negotiating episode is merely a step in a continuing process that incorporates learning. There is evidence that the European countries and the United States do recognize this. However, the developed countries must also accept that their concern with "efficiency" cannot be squared with the emphasis placed by the G-77s on "equity," and that the issue must be fudged or reinterpreted in short-term versus long-term considerations. This, in turn, cannot be accomplished without re-linking issues that are now treated separately; whatever issue-specific agreements are now concluded must be seen in the context of overall welfare choices that will involve substantive issue-linkage later. The separate deals must be made to interlock so as to provide side-payments to countries (especially the poorest) that perceive only costs in extensive issue-packaging. But Rothstein sees a danger in a global regime that includes all the parts; he prefers separate regimes, all of which are committed to the norm of "dependability" in meeting the G-77's aspirations, and are thus coordinated normatively rather than in terms of rules and procedures. Thus, the G-77's reliance on the maximum common denominator can continue to hold the coalition together symbolically without infecting every item on the agenda.

[22] For evidence that there is some support for these hypotheses in the history of various multilateral scientific/technological programs (rather than regimes), see Haas, Williams, and Babai (fn. 9), chap. 10. The interaction of eclectics and rationalists is too farfetched to be credible. It resembles an encounter between representatives of basically different cultures. We also ignore the interaction between skeptics and rationalists, but for a different reason. Such an encounter prevails now if we take world-order modelers as rationalists and the governments of developing countries as skeptics; however, in terms of global negotiations they are on the same side! Moreover, they cannot meaningfully work together unless they agree on an integration of development strategies (means) with the goals on which both claim to be in agreement. And such integration depends on consensual knowledge of causation. The development of such knowledge is the link postulated in the skeptic-pragmatic interaction.

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tive issue-linkage dominated by consensual knowledge. There is no clear case that illustrates this pattern, though approximations to it are found in the U.N. Environmental Program. A relatively stable regime will result.

2. If the negotiations are dominated by a conflict between eclectics and pragmatists and the new information is unpersuasive with respect to joint gains, any issue-linkage will be purely tactical. That case is illustrated by the LOS negotiations. If there is a regime, it will be unstable.

3. If the negotiations are dominated by conflict between skeptics and eclectics, fragmented issue-linkage will dominate, and various partial regimes will be built. None will be stable because the controversy over goals to be achieved continues even if knowledge does not become more consensual. The NIEO is in this situation now.

4. If the negotiations are dominated by conflict between skeptics and pragmatists, the possibility exists that fragmented issue-linkage will yield to substantive linkages, though these may well be temporary and dependent on the next turn of the screw of knowledge. Regimes will be more stable than in case 3 and less stable than in case 1 because this hypothesis incorporates the notion of learning-by-negotiation; skeptics respect new knowledge though they do not wish to wait for it. The food regime comes close to presenting a current example.

V. Regimes and Organizations

The concept of an "international regime" is almost as old as international law itself. In common legal parlance, a "regime" is a recognized set of *rules* devised by governments (or non-governmental actors) for regulating conflict-prone behavior. Political analysis adds several components to this definition. If there were no potential conflict, there would be no need for rules. A regime thus creates a set of mutual expectations among the actors that each will go about his business without getting in the other's way; the regime will provide *procedures* for avoiding conflict. Rules and procedures, however, must be inspired by some sense of common purpose, some agreement on the character and value of the subject singled out for regulation. We call these the *norms* inspiring the regime. In international regimes, these norms are always an expression of some idea of order and predictability, of a regularity or a pattern to be encouraged. Norms are formalized preferences for a particular "world order."[23]

[23] The lawyers' simpler meaning of the word "regime" is captured in the exhaustive

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Historically, regimes have been created for regulating single issues rather than issue-areas. Hence, lawyers speak of regimes for fishing, allocation of radio frequencies, pure food and drugs, money, or foreign investment. Norms, rules, and procedures—centralized in international organizations or left to the decentralized network of national officials—have existed for many years. Such arrangements are not of interest here. The term "regime" as used here is reserved to the situation in which rapid changes in scientific knowledge and political expectations combine to produce the types of visions represented in the contemporary debate about the global economic order.

Regimes are norms, procedures, and rules agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area. Norms tell us *why* states collaborate; rules tell us *what*, substantively speaking, the collaboration is about; procedures answer the question of *how* the collaboration is to be carried out. Procedures, therefore, involve the choice of whether specific administrative arrangements should be set up to regulate the issue-area. Administration involves organization.

These thoughts on the character of regimes are now applied to the strategy of nondependent industrial development. With respect to technology, what are the possible and imaginable norms, rules, and procedures relating to international collaboration? Why would actors wish to collaborate? What kinds of activities would the collaboration entail? Would there be need for organizations?

NORMS

Why would states wish to collaborate with respect to managing and regulating the process of improving their technological positions? The purposes of those who demand a regime—and hence the norms underlying collective action—can be summarized as the *acquisition of a capability* to act in a specific domain, either nationally or collectively. This includes creating the ability to make decisions, to analyze a situation, to set up new relationships, as well as to fashion physical goods, and perfect, adjust, or change decision-making norms or manufacturing fa-

study by David M. Leive, *International Regulatory Regimes* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976). Leive describes the workings of treaties and organizations dealing with health, food, and the weather. He isolates the rules in each field and analyzes the procedures for implementing them. He pays little attention to underlying norms, and none to the changing expectations of the parties, which might tell us something about the linking of old issues at a more complex level of understanding. Whether the activities discussed constitute a "regime" in my sense is not apparent from this study. On the other hand, L. N. Rangarajan, in *Commodity Conflict* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), analyzes the conditions under which multi-commodity management is feasible; in doing so, he describes the preconditions for a regime in precisely the sense here advocated, even though he does not use the term.

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cilities or habits of action so as to better exploit something already in place.

The acquisition of a technological capability thus involves a great deal more than simply importing or manufacturing hardware. It takes in the entire range of activities involved in *choosing* the type and rate of industrialization a country desires. Substantive linkages among issues are part of the norm. However, the tightness and the finality of the linkages depend on the type of industrialization process chosen.

Our norm does not enjoy a firm consensus. Neither all of the developing countries nor the industrial countries called upon to help them acquire modern technology are fully committed to a crisp and clear purpose. The developed countries show continued reluctance to accept the norm on the terms defined by the underdeveloped. But the poor are by no means agreed among themselves. The tightness of the substantive linkage among issues of technological and economic development depends on whether the development strategy is export-led, import-substituting, or self-reliant. An import-substituting approach can afford to link issues loosely because the emphasis is placed on trickling-down effects considered to be largely automatic. Self-reliance discards faith in automatic economic processes, and features forecasting or planning; it requires a tighter linking of issues.

This difference is reflected in the debate over investment/technology regimes. The foreign-investment regime of the past was concerned exclusively with the sanctity of private property and the conditions under which it could be infringed. Today, foreign investment is considered as a part of a cluster of activities that include the selection and siting of new technology; the mixture of public and private, national and multinational finance; effects on employment, trade, and the balance of payments. These issues are now substantively linked to the negotiation of technology transfers.

PROCEDURES

Whatever the strength of the norm, the next question must be: *How* shall the norm be implemented? I distinguish between four procedural modes. (1) A *common framework* seeks to affect national behavior through exchanges of information and common rules of reporting and record-keeping. In the language of organization theory, the division of labor sought here is confined to "pooling" separate capabilities without re-arranging them in the search for a common product. (2) A *joint facility* is a more ambitious and demanding way of pooling capabilities by seeking to harmonize and standardize the behavior of the partici-

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pants through the imposition of common routines. The actors agree to a loose division of labor, not merely by keeping each other informed but by changing routinized ways of doing things so as to meet an agreed standard. (3) A *common policy* is more demanding still. It calls for the ordering and scheduling of national behavior in such a way that the participants agree to adjust their action to the planned needs of the collectivity by re-arranging prior patterns—a type of division of labor called "sequencing" in organization theory. (4) A *single policy* substitutes a centralized set of plans and objectives for the national ones. Since in doing so it absorbs the pre-existing commitments of the national actors, the resulting pattern of interaction (and the division of labor among the parts) is far more complex than in the other instrumentalities: the interaction is "reciprocal."

The pooling of instrumentalities of action through a common framework calls for very simple coordinating bodies. Interbureaucratic committees of high civil servants suffice. When a joint facility is to be operated, however, a research staff may be necessary to devise the appropriate standards and norms; the staff need be no more than a working party of independent experts, convened when necessary. But it often develops into an international secretariat, which then comes to service the interbureaucratic committee. These institutions are sufficient for setting out common ground rules for national action. Sequencing is more ambitious, since priorities for action must be established. Some parts of the whole must act before others; some kinds of previously legitimate action will become illicit. Creation of a common policy thus demands a capacity to make joint commitments; that is the task of councils of ministers and summit conferences, aided by lower-level committees of national civil servants and rudimentary international staffs. It must be understood, however, that these lower-level bodies are incapable of making commitments without the agreement of their superiors. A single policy, and the relationships of reciprocity it implies, calls for a full-fledged "government," whether in the federal tradition or in some other approximation. In short, there is no need for a formal organization if the actors opt merely for a common framework; but there is need for a very elaborate organization if a single policy is deemed necessary.[24]

[24] The typology and the rationale on which it is based are adapted from John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," *International Organization*, XXIX (Summer 1975), 570-74. For various ways of matching the typology with cognitive modes in explaining institutional variation, see Haas, Williams, and Babai (fn. 9), chap. 6.

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RULES

Rules are injunctions to the member governments committed to some norm. They tell the participants *what* to do under specified circumstances, and what not to do. Rules mediate between the purpose of a regime and the procedures selected for implementing the purpose. For example, the rules of the monetary regime before 1976 specified when member states were allowed to change the value of their currency, and by how much. Since the Jamaica amendments to the IMF agreement, these rules have lost their relevance: the purpose of the regime is no longer the maintenance of fixed exchange rates. Few rules remain in the monetary regime; they include understandings among the members that poor countries must be compensated for exchange losses under certain conditions and that, in order to qualify for assistance, countries must follow domestic deflationary policies. The law of the sea, prior to the current negotiations, had rules governing the right to fish and to mine. The evolving rules suggest, among other things, that half of all manganese nodules must be mined by an international public agency and that fishing within the 200-mile economic zone is subject to the consent of the coastal state. These alternatives appear as possible rules for a technological regime: all contracts with sellers of technology must be subject to the law of the importing state; contracts are valid irrespective of local law.

The foregoing examples only illustrate one type of rules—injunctions designed to *channel or foreclose action.* Although these are the most prominent type, they do not exhaust the possibilities. Rules may be designed merely to *increase information* available to the members of the regime, such as commitments to furnish standardized data to consult on their meaning. More ambitiously, rules may also be designed to *increase the body of consensual knowledge* considered relevant to the issue-area. Participation in modeling exercises or other activities intended to increase the analytical capacities of the members fall into this category. Since the core norm is the acquisition of the capability to choose technologies, the rules can then be classified as (1) increasing information, (2) increasing interdisciplinary knowledge, and (3) channeling and/or foreclosing action.

TYPES OF REGIMES

When the norm is accepted with roughly equal fervor among all participants in a regime, the varieties of rules and procedures give us the types presented in Figure 4.

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FIGURE 4

TYPES OF REGIMES

Procedures	*Rules*		
	Share Information	*Increase Knowledge*	*Channel/Foreclose Action*
COMMON FRAMEWORK	yes (1)	no	no
JOINT FACILITY	yes	yes (2)	no
COMMON POLICY	yes	yes (3)	yes (4)
SINGLE POLICY	yes	yes	yes (5)

The five possible regimes are labelled in conformity with what organization theory has to say about the character of the activities: pooling/aiding, standardizing/scheduling, forecasting, targeting, and planning. (1) Actors proceeding within a common framework engage essentially in collecting and exchanging information. Their pooling of information is supplemented with technical assistance from the better- to the poorer-endowed countries when existing capabilities are unevenly distributed among the members. (2) If they wish to do more than share information, they must choose a joint facility. If they so choose, information is not only pooled, but new information requested and the substantive area of concern is subjected to standardized monitoring procedures. The standardization of information processing amounts to "shaping" the information into accepted bodies of knowledge used in making policies. If capabilities are unevenly distributed, the richer are expected to aid the poorer by allocating a disproportionate share of common resources to them. Allocation implies that joint action is "scheduled"; there has to be some understanding on who is to give whom how much before the activity can be carried out effectively.

A common policy also requires the sharing of information and the increasing of knowledge. In addition, it carries with it understandings that each actor will seek to attain a desirable outcome by a certain time. The outcome is decided collectively, but each participant remains in charge of implementing the decision. (3) One way of accomplishing this involves forecasting without setting targets for achievement. The collective forecasting of the future is an exercise in increasing knowledge, but the forecasts need not call for action. (4) If action is desired, the results of the forecasts are translated into targets for each of the participants. Targeting without forecasting and the sharing of information is not conceivable. (5) Finally, a single policy for a set of states

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presupposes all of the above, plus commitment to a firm plan of action which is implemented by the central organization.

Before drawing any conclusions from the discussion, we must show that the typology fits—more or less—the historical experience with key regimes. The monetary regime, between 1945 and 1958, conforms to our "forecasting" type; it became a "targeting" arrangement during the period 1959-1971, with the acceptance of convertibility, fixed exchange rates subject to central authorization, pre-arranged liquidity and support measures, and continuous monitoring of economic trends and national monetary policies. After 1973, however, the remaining responsibilities of the IMF became more a "standardizing/scheduling" arrangement; channeling of action is now confined to economic measures imposed by the IMF on governments wishing to avail themselves of the emergency lending facilities.

There is no comprehensive regime for the oceans, only separate arrangements for the various activities on and under the water. These arrangements are summarized in Figure 5. The purpose of the Law of the Sea Conference was to bring all these diffuse global and regional, centralized and decentralized, private and public arrangements within the purview of a single norm—treating the ocean as the common heritage of mankind—and within a set of rules that would channel action in the future so as to conform to that norm. It is easy to see why the purpose could not be achieved.

Similar questions arise with respect to the transfer of technology for industrialization. Globally, the only binding arrangement in existence is the law dealing with industrial and intellectual property, patents, and trademarks. It covers just over half of the U.N. membership and "protects" only about 10 percent of technology actually transferred by placing restrictions on licensees and purchasers of patents. Still, the work of the World Industrial Property Organization amounts to a "targeting" regime for those who accept it. Regional arrangements, however, are much more elaborate. In the Andean Common Market, they cover the siting of new plants, ownership equity, the protection of national entrepreneurs as opposed to foreign investors, the type of technological innovations to be encouraged, taxation, and the repatriation of earnings. Less sweeping regimes are under consideration in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean. The regional norm is technological self-determination so as to overcome dependency. Whether this norm is to become universal depends on the outcome of negotiations now being conducted in the United Nations over various codes of conduct and a

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FIGURE 5

MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR OCEAN-RELATED ACTIVITIES

Activity	*Organizations/Mandate*	*Regime*
Fishing	FAO: technical assistance	No global regime; rules made nationally and bilaterally
	Regional commissions: quotas, conservation, research	
Shipping	IMCO: safety, pollution	Forecasting; action foreclosed only if conventions are ratified and implemented nationally
	Private liner conferences: commercial access	Targeting
	Physical access to territorial waters and straits	No regime; determined by general international law and national action
Mining	No organization	No regime; determined by general international law and national action
Oceanographic Research	IOC: technical assistance, coordination	Pooling/aiding
	UNEP/WMO/IMCO: monitoring environmental conditions, research	Standardizing/scheduling
Warfare	UN: limitations on certain weapons	No regime; action foreclosed only on basis of national policy

number of complex information systems. A global regime would have to have the same "targeting" characteristics as the Andean regime in order to be effective. But what if the emerging global regime is merely of the "standardizing/scheduling" variety, while various more elaborate regional regimes coexist with it? Can the same norm be served by conflicting rules and procedures? The answer is far from obvious.

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HOW TO CHOOSE REGIMES

In choosing among the possibilities, a decision maker must weigh a number of factors. What is his cognitive stance? What is the stance of the opposing coalition? How should evolving knowledge be incorporated into his political strategy or ideology? What is the norm? Should the regime "freeze" norms, rules, and procedures in line with such a strategy, or should there be enough flexibility to allow for the evolution of one type of regime into another without the kind of institutional breakdown that occurred in the monetary field?

These questions can be combined in one overarching concern: what is the appropriate membership for a regime? The choice is between centralization and decentralization. One can think in terms of a uniform and global regime, with procedures placed under the guardianship of a single organization, as opposed to the coexistence of several regionally diverse regimes, with a diffuse set of rules binding different types of states to different obligations, and a congeries of overlapping organizations. Moreover, diverse regional regimes can also coexist within global arrangements. Everything still depends on the norm selected and the cognitive stance associated with it.

The committed rationalist must opt for a planning regime: he depends on increasingly consensual knowledge—obtained by way of pooling, standardizing, and allocating informational resources—to attain his social and economic goals. Targeting, forecasting, and planning presuppose the success of increasing and managing knowledge. The skeptic, though depending on whatever knowledge is currently at hand, wants to attain his complexly linked social goals without waiting for an increased consensus on knowledge. His choice would then be a standardizing-scheduling regime. The pragmatist will swing back and forth between the forecasting and targeting regimes, attempting at first to choose as the rationalist would, but compelled to fall back on the less powerful regimes if he is unable to arrive at a satisfactory method of connecting the issues calling for collaboration. For the eclectic, only a pooling-aiding regime is appropriate.

In terms of the more familiar organizational dynamics, we must conclude that the rationalist will seek institutional solutions that are centralized in a single organization integrating all activities thought germane to the issue-area. His desire for institutional coherence suggests no other solution. Skeptics and pragmatists, however, are compelled to sacrifice institutional coherence to less precise arrangements. Skeptics may well prefer to forgo the creation of formal organizations

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altogether, as may eclectics. When confronted with the possibility that a no-organization regime will fail to attain the objectives suggested by its norm, the skeptic and the pragmatist will agree to hit-or-miss institutional tinkering that may take a multi-organizational and multi-level format. They therefore face the practical problem of how to achieve coherence among the programs and norms of the multiple organizations that they will spawn.

Even if all our hypotheses were shown to be correct, and if all the typologies found universal acceptance, we would not be able to predict which regime would be chosen. But we *are* able to advise the policy maker which regime he ought *not* to select, by excluding possibilities and limiting choice.

It makes no sense to design a regime that forecloses action if it does not also provide for increasing knowledge. Nor does it make sense to increase knowledge in the absence of appropriate basic information. There is no point in negotiating global regimes when regional norms are more highly developed and in mutual opposition. It is self-defeating to attempt issue-linkages that fly in the face of competing visions of connectedness, until the futility of the prevailing visions is recognized. We should not rely on learning when the subject matter under discussion favors unlearning.

Proposals that fail to recognize these strictures may be found on many agendas. Prominent among the suggestions for a new international monetary regime are formulas for multi-tiered arrangements that create different rights and obligations for different types of states, such as the Bretton Woods rules for the rich, and less stringent compensatory rules for the poorest. Deep-sea mining is to be organized so as to balance the technological advances of the rich by subsidizing the overall economic demands of the poor. Collective self-reliance among the poor is to govern their trade and investment policies; stringent codes of conduct negotiated by the U.N. are to bind the multinational firms of the rich and force them to transfer technology on terms defined by the poor. But what if the poor disagree among themselves as to whether self-reliance, export-led industrialization, subsidies from the rich, or import-substitution should define the catching-up process? Then lack of an agreed norm *among* themselves prevents the choice of a single regime that is optimal *for* them, without answering the questions about optimal global regimes that also require the agreement of the rich.

The best service to be expected from an ideal-typical discussion of regimes is to make people pause and think.

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Review Articles

CLIO ON THE COUCH

By H. N. HIRSCH

David Abrahamsen, *Nixon vs. Nixon: An Emotional Tragedy*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1977, xvi, 267 pp., $10.95.
Fawn M. Brodie, *Thomas Jefferson: An Intimate History*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1974, 591 pp., $12.50.
James T. Flexner, *The Young Hamilton*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978, xiv, 497 pp., $15.00.
Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream*. New York: Harper & Row, 1976, xii, 432 pp., $12.95.
Michael Paul Rogin, *Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian*. New York: Knopf, 1975, xviii, 373 pp., $13.95.
Peter Shaw, *The Character of John Adams*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976, ix, 324 pp., $12.95.

> The attempt to rescue Clio from pitiable maidenhood by artificial insemination . . . is nothing new.
>
> —*Jacques Barzun*[1]

"PSYCHOHISTORY" as a method of biographical explanation will not go away. Since its modern inception in the 1950s,[2] the number of full-length biographical works devoting space—and attributing pivotal significance—to their subject's psychological characteristics has increased steadily. "Psychohistory" has become a self-conscious and pervasive genre. To whatever factors one attributes this phenomenon—the growth and maturation of clinical psychology as an academic field; the loosening of taboos concerning the frank discussion of sexual behavior; the popular success of the work of Erik Erikson; the presence of obviously disturbed occupants in the White House—a trend is clearly discernible over the past two decades. "Psychohistory" has invaded every discipline in the social sciences. It is controversial, difficult to carry off successfully, plagued by methodological and theoreti-

[1] Barzun, *Clio and the Doctors* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 14.
[2] I am dating "modern" psychohistory from the publication of two seminal works: Alexander and Juliette George's *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* in 1956, and Erikson's *Young Man Luther* in 1958. In this review essay, I am limiting myself to work dealing with figures in American politics.

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cal controversies—but, to the consternation of some and the delight of a few, here to stay.

A major difficulty with "psychohistory" is the problem of pinning down exactly what it is, and the six works under review here demonstrate this difficulty practitioners have had with understanding the nature of their enterprise. From Abrahamsen's orthodox, Freudian, determinist interpretation of Richard Nixon, to Flexner's careful and unobtrusive observations concerning Hamilton's personality, to Rogin's attempt to understand the entire development of early American history in psychoanalytic terms—and to cast Andrew Jackson as a representative figure—there are major and complex methodological differences. It is almost difficult to believe that all six works under review here fall into the same category.

This confusion concerning the purpose and nature of the enterprise is, in fact, a major pitfall of the field. Simply put, many "psychobiographers" do not seem to know exactly what it is they are supposed to be doing, much less how. Different levels of explanation are sometimes confused; overly ambitious explanations fall flat; hypotheses commonly are not stated clearly or demonstrated conclusively; and the problem of evidence is often left undiscussed.

I would like to suggest that there are four different levels of "psychohistorical" explanation, and that some of the problems with the field could be brought under control if these categories were kept distinct and if authors would let their readers know exactly what they are attempting to prove. The categories are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they tend to overlap. Nevertheless, there is something to be gained from separating them for the purpose of analysis. The four levels I propose are the following:

I. *Biographical explanation*. At this level, the author simply attempts to demonstrate that the subject's personality structure had profound consequences for his adult political behavior. Much attention is usually given to analysis of the childhood origins of that personality structure, although, as will become clear below, that is not always necessary and does, in fact, sometimes lead to overly speculative hypotheses.

II. *Ideological projection*. Here, the author makes a special argument; he claims that the sources of the subject's adult ideology can be traced to personal dilemmas. That is, the ideological system created by the adult is seen as a projection and, in some cases, as a working-through of the individual's personal psychic situation.

III. *Historical representation*. Here, the author claims that the sub-

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ject is placed in such a pivotal time and place that his personality structure, and the behavior it creates, become decisive at an important turning point in history. There are two subcategories here: the subject as representative man, and the subject as heroic transformer. In the first case, the subject's psychology is somehow representative of an era or a particularly important historical problem; in the second, he is, in Erikson's classic description, a great man because his own resolution of a personal trauma becomes a quantum leap for his culture.[3]

IV. *Psychohistorical explication.* At this level, the author is no longer engaged in biographical analysis; he is, instead, attempting to recast and understand general cultural phenomena and broad historical trends in psychological terms.

These levels of analysis can be cumulative; that is, an author engaged in an analysis at level III often presents a hypothesis at level II; an analysis at level IV usually contains hypotheses at levels III and II; and any psychological explanation begins with level I. If the field is broken down into these component parts, only level-IV hypotheses deserve the label "psychohistorical"; hypotheses at levels I and II are more properly termed "psychobiographical." Level-III hypotheses fall in between. As an author progresses up this ladder, the difficulties of creating a convincing argument increase, and the danger of letting different interpretations slide into each other also increases dramatically. The works under review here contain some of the best—and some of the worst—the field has to offer in each category.

I

Both Abrahamsen and Flexner present straightforward biographical analyses of their subjects, but the differences between these two works demonstrate that, even at the level of simple explanation, psychobiography is plagued with difficulty.

The two works could not be more different. Abrahamsen, a practicing psychoanalyst, presents an orthodox Freudian interpretation of Nixon. Treating him solely as a psychiatric case history, and virtually ignoring the content of his politics, Abrahamsen diagnoses Nixon to be both orally and anally fixated, and traces his entire behavior pattern to these origins. Flexner, on the other hand, uses no single personality theory overtly, and instead casually inserts some keen observations about Hamilton's personality into an otherwise traditional biographical narrative of Hamilton's early life which at many points reads like a

[3] See esp. Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth* (New York: Norton, 1969), 266.

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military history of the Revolutionary War. These two works represent opposite dangers in adhering to clinical theory in political biography: Abrahamsen clings too closely to Freud, and the result is psychological reductionism; Flexner clings to no one, and the result is overly speculative and unclear hypotheses.

Abrahamsen does present some valuable insights into Nixon's childhood, particularly concerning the emotional chaos of the Nixon household and the personalities of Nixon's strange parents: his weak, angry, violent father, and his repressed, "saintly" mother. The lack of stability that Abrahamsen traces back through several generations of Nixon's family could plausibly have produced the stunted development the author finds at the core of Nixon's personality. The analysis of Nixon's boyhood is thorough and well done, although Abrahamsen sometimes overinterprets rather minor events or characteristics, such as his by now famous comments about Nixon's vigorous style of potato-mashing (p. 58). Although Abrahamsen's description of the oedipal situation of the Nixon household is convincing—Nixon's fear of his father and his identification with his mother are well documented—the attempt to make abrupt transitions from these traits to Nixon's *political* personality falls flat. Thus when we read that "Richard's closeness to his mother . . . resulted in a syndrome centered on absolute loyalty" (p. 29) we become suspicious; many sons are close to their mothers, but not every President organizes the White House around sycophantic yes-men. Similarly, Abrahamsen strains when he attributes Nixon's interest in politics to an oedipal desire to compete with his father—whose interest in politics was, at best, only mild (pp. 66-68).

When Abrahamsen turns from Nixon's childhood to his adult development and political career, the analysis begins to disintegrate altogether. The tone of the work shifts; while the earlier chapters have been quite low-key, the later chapters are pervaded by innuendo, as the author rather melodramatically relies on anonymous sources. What is most striking, however, is that Abrahamsen provides absolutely no analysis of the content of Nixon's politics; he makes no effort to consider political events as anything other than the expression of Nixon's warped personality structure. Thus we are whisked from the Hiss case in 1950 to the White House in 1968 in a mere twenty pages; once we get to the White House, we are presented with a completely inadequate analysis of the Nixon presidency. One example will have to suffice; Nixon's failure to use his Cabinet, we are told, is a simple manifestation of "his hidden fear of being controlled" (p. 184). There is no analysis here of the complex interaction of man and events, nor any

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consideration of the ideological and situational determinants of Nixon's political behavior.

The failure of Abrahamsen's work is not due to his choice of Freudian theory as his theoretical base; the failure results from his total and complete surrender to it. As Alexander George has persuasively argued, "typing" a political figure is the beginning, not the end, of a biographer's task.[4] Furthermore, "the fact that an individual strives for or achieves gratification of personal needs or motives in his performance of a political role does not automatically bestow *decisive* causal importance to this variable. Performance in executive positions such as the Presidency is sensitive to a variety of constraints."[5] In many of his writings, George has emphasized the importance of ego controls—that is, the subject's "ability to control and regulate the expression of personal needs, anxieties, and defenses in order to prevent them from distorting his effort to appraise situations realistically and deal with them effectively."[6] In a few paragraphs and footnotes, George is able to provide a more thorough and convincing account of Nixon's behavior in the White House[7] than Abrahamsen does in his entire book. Elsewhere, George has discussed the general usefulness of personality types in political biography, and has pointed out that such types must be viewed as "general constructs, or ideal types. Though derived from empirical observation, they abstract and deliberately oversimplify reality. Accordingly, their value to the biographer is necessarily limited, since his task is to describe and explain a particular individual in all his concreteness and complexity."[8]

Abrahamsen's failure to account for Nixon's political behavior in any meaningful way also points to another essential methodological issue lost to many psychobiographers: the different levels of analysis embedded in even the simplest biographical explanation. As Fred Greenstein has described them, these levels of biographical analysis are phenomenology, dynamics, and genesis.[9]

Phenomenology refers to the simple examination of the subject's personality traits: the fact that he is stubborn, for example. A phenomeno-

[4] George, "Assessing Presidential Character," review of James David Barber, *The Presidential Character*, in *World Politics*, XXVI (January 1974), 234-82.

[5] *Ibid.*, 253; emphasis added.

[6] *Ibid.* See also Alexander L. George, "Some Uses of Dynamic Psychology in Political Biography: Case Materials on Woodrow Wilson," in Fred I. Greenstein and Michael Lerner, eds., *A Sourcebook for the Study of Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1971).

[7] George (fn. 4), 263 ff.

[8] George (fn. 6), 80; emphasis and footnote omitted.

[9] Greenstein, *Personality and Politics: Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization* (New York: Norton, 1975), 65 ff.

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logical analysis simply lists symptoms. When the analyst goes beyond the cataloging of traits and begins to diagnose the nature of the subject's personality, he is engaging in dynamic analysis. "The analyst," Greenstein writes, "begins to ask *why* the individual . . . exhibits a particular syndrome: this question leads the analyst to advance a theory of the intrapsychic processes which 'must' be responsible for holding together the disparate elements of the syndrome."[10] Thus, the analyst moves from "stubborn" to "compulsive." Genesis, the deepest level of biographical explanation, presents a theory concerning the origins of the subject's personality dynamics. "Having observed and explained an individual . . . in terms of contemporary functioning, the analyst frequently is led to search for the aspects of inborn structure, maturation, and experience that culminated in the observed presenting features [i.e., the phenomenology] and the inferred underlying dynamics."[11] Thus after moving from "stubborn" to "compulsive," the analyst may find the origins of his subject's compulsiveness in, for example, an unresolved oedipal dilemma.

Abrahamsen fails in part because he skips the first two of these levels of biographical explanation and provides us with only a genetic explanation of Nixon's personality. But providing a genetic hypothesis should be the last rather than the first task of the psychobiographer. The key to a successful psychobiographical explanation lies at the level of personality *dynamics*. "Whatever creates a given personality dynamism," George writes, "the dynamism itself . . . is what interests the biographer the most. . . ."[12] The failure to separate these three levels of biographical explanation—and to limit the explanation to the available data—accounts for at least some of the fuzziness in many psychobiographies.

Flexner's biography of Hamilton is in some ways the mirror image of Abrahamsen's work. Although throughout the book the author sprinkles material suggesting the outlines of a coherent explanation of Hamilton's personality dynamics and genesis, he does so without reference to any single theory of personality; moreover, he abandons coherent theory throughout most of the work and contents himself with occasional descriptions of Hamilton's personality traits; in Greenstein's terminology, he presents us with phenomenological analysis, a list of symptoms.

The symptomology he presents and the evidence he has uncovered is, to be sure, fascinating: Hamilton's aggressiveness, his ambition for

[10] *Ibid.*, 66; emphasis added.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] George (fn. 6), 85.

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recognition and power, his love-hate relationship with Washington, his impulsive behavior and sudden rages, are all well documented, and come closer to reaching the bone of this strangest of the Founding Fathers than any previous biography. But Flexner never "diagnoses" Hamilton; he does not give us the explanatory key—the dynamic hypothesis—that would link these details, interesting as they are, into a coherent whole. We are told that Hamilton was "impulsive" (p. 181) and "calculating" (p. 279); that he was dissatisfied with his physical appearance (p. 314); that he disliked being dependent upon people (p. 334); that he had strains of "megalomania" in his character (p. 335); that he needed recognition (p. 366); that he had "the determination of a fanatic, a prophet, or a martyr" (p. 432); that he desired power (p. 449). But, after 451 pages of truly meticulous historical research, we really do not have a theory that puts all of this together. If we fault Abrahamsen for "typing" Nixon and then not examining the details, we must fault Flexner for examining the details and then failing to "type"—or even to describe—the core of Hamilton's personality.

What Flexner *does* present us with is a genetic hypothesis: Hamilton was the way he was (whatever that was) because of his traumatic childhood in the West Indies. It was, indeed, a childhood most psychobiographers can only dream of. Hamilton was illegitimate. His mother Rachel was "sexually wayward" (p. 12) and jailed for adultery by her husband; he let her out of jail, but she ran away, and eventually "pass[ed] herself off as the wife of a Scot called James Hamilton . . ." (p. 15). James, the product of an aristocratic family, failed miserably to provide a comfortable life for Rachel and their two sons, and Rachel left him. She set up housekeeping on her own and abandoned the Hamilton name; "The two Hamilton children," Flexner writes, "must have felt in their mother's willful repudiation of their name a repudiation of themselves" (p. 26). She died early; her estate was inherited by the only legitimate son from her marriage. Alexander was, at the age of eleven, abandoned and destitute.

Flexner has little trouble convincing us that Hamilton did not cherish the memory of his mother: "In no known work that Hamilton ever wrote did he express affection for his mother" (p. 27). His childhood could not have been more unstable. We can agree with Flexner when he writes that, "if he had not been uneasy for the remainder of his life, that would have been a miracle" (p. 33). But "uneasy" is not a psychological diagnosis, and nowhere does Flexner present a simple, coherent

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estimation of the effect of this childhood upon his subject. The closest he comes to such a statement is the following passage:

> A mother's betrayal is the worst blow a son can receive. "You know," Hamilton wrote his friend John Laurens in 1788, "the opinion I entertain of mankind, and how it is my desire to preserve myself free from particular attachments, and to keep my happiness independent on the caprices of others."
>
> Hamilton's low opinion of mankind, his aloofness, his inability to feel with his fellowmen, was to be the great statesman's Achilles' heel (p. 27).

Elsewhere, however, Flexner documents Hamilton's genuine search for companionship, which played a major role in his willing service to Washington. Indeed, Flexner comments at one point: "Hamilton had carried from his childhood *two opposite desires*. One was to prove himself completely self-reliant, proudly independent of the outside world. The other was to merge his identity with some potent force outside himself" (p. 141; emphasis added).

These two passages (which are, on their face, contradictory) are as close as Flexner comes to a dynamic explanation of Hamilton's personality. Elsewhere he simply catalogs psychological aberrations which only cloud the picture further. There is strong evidence of latent homosexuality (p. 316), as well as fantasies concerning his relationships with women (p. 448); there are rages at insults (p. 294), and obsessive preoccupations.[13] But Flexner does not tell us how all this fascinating information fits together. Was Hamilton a compulsive personality? A narcissistic personality? A self-hating neurotic? We are left with a picture of a deeply "disturbed" man; we understand the causes of the disturbance, but not its precise dynamics. Flexner, in a sense, has missed a step; he has provided a level-I analysis that skips the most important of the three elements of a psychobiographical interpretation.

Flexner's biography is unsatisfactory for a second reason: he ventures briefly into an analysis at level II without providing any evidence to demonstrate the validity of his hypothesis. He would have us believe that the Hamiltonian ideology, so profoundly significant to the origins of the Republic, was a projection of Hamilton's emotions toward his parents, particularly his father. James Hamilton was a fallen nobleman, "an exile from a wealthy, aristocratic world" (p. 16). He was the youngest of four sons, and the reasons for his abandonment of his

[13] For example, see p. 396: "When Hamilton passionately sought an objective, he moved like a missile that pulls all air currents into patterns that will serve its flight."

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family are unclear.[14] On the basis of extremely meager evidence,[15] Flexner concludes that Alexander loved his father; he furthermore attributes the son's later aristocratic ideology to the father's aristocratic background and financial ruin.

> There can be little doubt that Alexander imbibed from his father an aristocratic ideal held the more passionately because in the little household where the statesman spent his most formative years that ideal was so demeaned and imperiled (pp. 21-22).

From this brief passage, Flexner jumps directly to a discussion of Hamilton's actions as Secretary of the Treasury, including policies that allowed men to become rich through speculation—although he himself did not take advantage of the opportunities he opened to others. Flexner then jumps back to Alexander as a child:

> Why did Hamilton open the way to such speculations? If, as a child, he did not (as there is good reason to adduce) blame the family poverty on his father, he needed an outside explanation, and such outside explanations run to denouncing "the system." The ancient castle in Ayreshire, which figured in his father's memory, was to the son unknown or insubstantial. He wished to bring order to the world as he saw it. The contrast between the West Indian reality in which his father suffered and his aristocratic dream encouraged Hamilton to conclude at the very start that most men were beasts who could be most easily ruled by their appetites. Like a man who trains seals by tossing them fish, Hamilton was glad to use the cupidity of others to create order in the financial affairs of the commonwealth. But he felt himself to be above such paltry rewards (p. 22).

Although there may be something to this, this bald statement of inference—and no more—does not prove a point; in fact, it barely states it in coherent language.

Similarly, Flexner implies several times in his narrative that Hamilton's adult distrust of human nature—expressed in ideological terms—was a function of his abandonment by his mother and the traumatic experiences of his childhood:

[14] Flexner writes:
That James Hamilton had broken with his family and was exiled from his birthright seems clear. Did he depart as a gesture of independence that left him subsequently too proud to ask for help? Had he fled from a disastrous love affair, a hated marriage, conduct considered unbecoming a gentleman, an irreconcilable difference with his father and brothers, debts he could not pay, or a yawning of prison gates? If little Alexander was ever told, he never recorded what he knew (p. 18).

[15] Flexner seems to base his interpretation largely on a single letter. See pp. 21-22.

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> Hamilton had brought with him from the Leeward Islands an attitude that was fundamental to his thinking but not shared by any of the founding fathers: the conviction that the human race was not only untrustworthy, but to him a personal enemy that must be fought and conquered (p. 437).

Again, there may be something here, but more than a few sentences are required to demonstrate the validity of this kind of level-II hypothesis—the translation of personal trauma into ideological pattern. Flexner devotes 435 out of 451 pages to the first 26 years of Hamilton's life, and only a short concluding chapter to his entire adulthood and political career. He does not even begin to examine the ideological development and complexity of Hamilton's mind as a mature political thinker.

What Flexner has failed to provide for Hamilton, Peter Shaw has provided for John Adams. In this superb biography, little known among political scientists, Shaw presents a brilliant example of level-II psychobiography. At the center of John Adams's personal life was what Shaw calls the "conundrum of fame"; Shaw demonstrates how Adams's psychological struggle with fame, ambition, and self-interest were projected into his ideological system. The opposite side of this psychological concern with fame was Adams's personal struggle with defiance of authority; Shaw demonstrates that, in both his life and his political theory, Adams reconciled defiance of authority "by carrying its demands further than they were intended" (p. 39).

What Shaw does, and Flexner does not, is to trace patterns of conduct and thought throughout his subject's life, from his young adulthood through his death. As a young lawyer, "Adams began to work out a psychological system with the puzzle of fame at its center" (p. 20). It was this same psychological pattern, and its ideological expression, that carried Adams through his years as a revolutionary, as his government's representative in the courts of Europe, as a political thinker, and as President of the United States.

As the product of Puritan culture, Adams was vigilantly concerned with the process of self-justification: "He would be tempted to deny himself the great objects of his ambition and would devise a political philosophy calling on each class of men to be restrained by self-doubt and self-denial similar to his own" (p. 39). He hated his own ambition and vanity, but sought to justify his actions by service to the common good; his political creed followed the same formula. In Europe, as a diplomat for the infant Republic, Adams devised a commercial theory that

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> took its place with the rest of his solutions to psychological and political questions. It accepted as given the existence of a basic individual or national passion, in this case commercial greed, and attempted to harness it to the good. The hated ambition of his diary he translated into the "virtue" of seeking eminence in a republic, the form of government he labored to install during the Revolution. Similarly, he took the morality-sapping, New England love of commerce, which he had denounced for years, and made it a virtue in an institutional scheme of free trade. As always, self-interest was his ruling principle of action. . . . The exception to Adams's theory of self-interest in human nature continued to be himself, the one man who acted naturally from ethical motives. . . . In international relations Adams erected a self-interest theory with a similar exception, the United States of America . . . (p. 145).

Later, as a mature political theorist, Adams again projected self onto society. His emphasis on "balance" in government, his defense of mixed constitutions, was, Shaw finds, a projection of his lifelong assessment of human nature, which was itself based upon his own self-image. "For Adams, balance in government, like the balance of power among nations, represented a logical extension of his lifelong attempt to harness self-interest" (p. 206). Adams's advocacy of tripartite government, which had such a profound influence upon the Constitutional Convention, had as its base a view of human nature—and his own—as essentially driven by ambition. His thought on this theme matured; "in the course of years his own ambition . . . had progressed from concern with the psychology of striving to the question of recognition" (pp. 232-33). Again, self-concern was expressed in political ideology; in his later works of political theory, "Adams made a universal principle of the passion for distinction, offering an exclusive emphasis on it as his contribution to the great eighteenth-century discussion on the nature of man" (p. 233). Shaw is able to trace every important twist and turn of Adams's mature political thought back to the young lawyer in Boston, struggling to justify his own ambitions, torturing himself in his diary with a ruthless dissection of his own character.

The second major projection that Shaw traces throughout Adams's life is his pattern of defying authority while incorporating its demands. This begins when he defies his father's wish that he enter the ministry, as his father himself had done; although he did not become a minister, the young Adams subjected himself to the strictest Puritan self-examination and patterned his ambition after the character of his ancestors:

> His aspiration for personal greatness was not in the main worldly. Indeed, it resembled the state of grace sought after by his ancestors, and it involved him in doubts and guilts far more like theirs than the mis-

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> givings of the successful merchants and professional men among whom he began to make his way. The Adamses, with their ministers who had aspired to and achieved only modest success of a worldly kind, left Adams a tradition of required public service different from the obligations of wealth handed down to his neighbors . . . (p. 11).

Again, this personal pattern was projected into politics: "Later, when as a revolutionary Adams came to defy the paternal authority of the crown, he similarly regarded himself as a better upholder of the British constitution than the king" (pp. 39-40). This pattern of defying authority had profound psychological ramifications: in each case guilt followed by aggression, and often physical collapse.[16]

Shaw's achievement in documenting these patterns is, remarkably, achieved in a relatively short, beautifully written work, free of psychological jargon and any tone of innuendo. Of the works under review here, it is by far the most satisfying.

II

The two works that fall under the category of level III, by Brodie and Kearns, are, on the other hand, quite unsatisfying, although each contains some important insights into the characters of their subjects.

Brodie's analysis of Thomas Jefferson is subtitled "An Intimate History," and the author spends most of her nearly 500 pages discussing Jefferson's sex life. Her major efforts are devoted to proving that Jefferson kept his slave Sally Hemmings as his mistress, and she does an admirable job of gathering evidence to demonstrate her point. Although a number of Jefferson scholars remain unconvinced, I find her argument compelling.

What Brodie does not do, however, is demonstrate her point that Jefferson's lust for a slave made him into a "representative man," living out in his personal life the racial trauma of the nation. "It was in his private life," Brodie writes, "that Jefferson defined the relationship between blacks and whites in America, acting out in the most specific sense the psychosexual dilemma of the whole nation" (p. 467). This Brodie does not begin to demonstrate. The author attempts to argue that Jefferson vacillated in his attitude toward slavery; that, in the end, he could not bring himself to express a racially tolerant attitude because of his own dependence upon Sally Hemmings. Even if we grant that Jefferson was ambivalent on the enormously complex question of

[16] See esp. pp. 73-74. For another example of Adams's incorporation of the principles of an authority figure he had rejected, see the discussion of Thomas Hutchinson on p. 228.

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emancipation—a point many scholars are not willing to concede[17]—Brodie fails to provide any evidence that his ambivalence was linked to his groin. Her first step toward proving her hypothesis would have been to consider, and reject, alternative hypotheses: that, for example, Jefferson was merely acting and thinking in the manner typical of his class; that his sexual behavior and political ideology with reference to slavery were the result of his cultural milieu rather than a contributing cause.[18] Brodie's comprehension of the tortured nuances of race relations in the South is rudimentary. She finds ambivalence where there is none; she writes, for example, that despite his

> early sense of racial injustice, Jefferson as a small child somehow developed a feeling he was never able wholly to escape, that blacks and whites must be kept carefully separate. One of the many evidences of his ambivalences about blacks as an adult is that along with his proposal for black education he also proposed black colonization (p. 50).

Many would say there is no ambivalence here, but rather liberal humanism combined with pragmatic politics.[19]

As a level-III psychobiographer, Brodie fails. Her level-I hypotheses, concerning the genesis and dynamics of Jefferson's personality structure, are flawed as well. Lacking firm evidence about the relationship of Jefferson to his parents, the author is forced to rely upon the shakiest kind of psychological inference concerning Jefferson's childhood. We find the following tortured logic about Jefferson's parents:

> All the letters Jefferson exchanged with his family were destroyed. . . . Because, however, most adults in bringing up their children cannot avoid imitating the cautionary devices of their own parents, and because even those who despise their own upbringing often inadvertently fall into the ancient maternal and paternal patterns, we may look to the letters of Jefferson to his own children for clues to the kind of admonitions he got from his mother, and possibly from his father, during these formative years (p. 51).

From this kind of "evidence," Brodie deduces that Jefferson was subjected to a pattern of conditional love as a child, from which, in a sense, he never recovered. "Any child so subtly tormented is likely to develop a continuing hunger for love that is never quite fulfilled, and also to

[17] For a recent example, see Garry Wills, *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978).

[18] Indeed, Brodie herself points to such a conclusion. See pp. 92 and 234-35.

[19] For a brief but excellent discussion of Jefferson's attitude toward race, see Merrill D. Peterson, *Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 256-65. "Jefferson's basic assumptions toward race were liberal and enlightened," Peterson writes, "but they were upset by his observation from the post of a Virginia planter."

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confuse affection with esteem. So it would be with Jefferson" (p. 52). But Brodie has here turned what is at best conjecture into a solid psychological inference. As is unfortunately often the case in psychobiography, the qualifying adjectives—the phrases like "usually" and "possibly"—drop away, and the analyst carries on as if there were solid proof for what is at best a good guess. Along with her failure to provide an adequate analysis of the genesis of Jefferson's personality, Brodie fails to provide a coherent dynamic hypothesis. Although she hints at a diagnosis—that Jefferson was an "obsessive" (see esp. p. 63)—she nowhere presents a succinct statement of her findings, nor does she ground them in any explicitly stated personality theory, although she does briefly mention and clearly draw upon Erikson.

Brodie also presents us with an astounding level-II hypothesis. In her discussion of Jefferson as a revolutionary, she states blandly that the Founding Fathers were projecting their guilt about slavery onto the British: "In confronting their guilt about their own slaveholding, they found a solution in the simple psychological device of projection. 'It is the British who are the enslavers,' they told themselves and others" (p. 96). To encapsulate the American revolution into such a simplistic formula is precisely the type of analysis that gives psychohistory a bad name.

To be sure, there is material to admire in Brodie's work, particularly her portrayal of the relationship between Jefferson and his wife and daughters, and her description of his ambivalence toward involvement in politics and his constant longing to return to the peace of Monticello. Brodie does succeed in humanizing Jefferson; unfortunately, her analysis does not stop where her evidence does.

In her biography of Lyndon Johnson, Doris Kearns comes closer than Brodie to a fully realized level-III psychobiography. But Kearns's work—the subject of more publicity, gossip, and tangled publishing history than perhaps any other work of nonfiction in recent years—is flawed in several major respects.

The chief flaw of Kearns's analysis is that she does not spell it out clearly enough. In the formation of Johnson's character Kearns finds conflict—conflict between Johnson's cultured, refined, and demanding mother, and his boisterous, crude, he-man father. Kearns thus finds at the core of Johnson's personality structure a fear of conflict and a drive for compromise, rooted in his need to steer a middle course between his parents.

Kearns finds the same striving for compromise and fear of choice to be the key determinants of Johnson's most important political deci-

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sion as President—to escalate the war in Vietnam and simultaneously pursue Great Society programs, without taking the harsh decisions, such as a tax increase, that such a course of action required. Lyndon, who had been psychologically incapable of "choosing" between his mother and his father, became President Johnson, who could not "choose" between guns and butter. He was, indeed, a representative man—a man who thought he could have everything while presiding over a society that thought it could have everything, without sacrifice or choice.

It is one of the strengths of Kearns's work that she traces this pattern —"his tendency to resolve conflict instead of accepting it" (p. 393)— throughout Johnson's life, finding it in every role he occupied, particularly in the Senate. And it is equally a strength of her work that she is sensitive to the fact that, as she puts it, "different institutions reward different qualities" (p. 395). Kearns makes us understand why Johnson, perhaps the most successful Senator of the century, was a failure in the White House.

But Kearns's work is ultimately disappointing, because she never spells out her major hypotheses; nor does she indicate where she is going. Her narrative is a jumble;[20] biographical data are thrown together with psychological interpretation in an awkward fashion; dynamic and genetic hypotheses are not separated or stated clearly. We are told that Johnson's mother's love was strong, but conditional upon his good behavior; that he identified with his father to "protect" himself from his mother (see esp. p. 371); that he feared his father; that he feared the withdrawal of his mother's love, but also that he reacted against her manipulations (see esp. p. 41). Kearns does not sort this all out into a coherent interpretation. Her major point—Johnson's fear of conflict and his psychological need for compromise—is, I think, quite valid; but it has to be teased out of her somewhat wooden prose and confused narrative.

There is a second major methodological difficulty with Kearns's work as well. As probably everyone but a few Eskimos knows, Johnson took Kearns into his confidence and related to her his dreams. There is a profound danger here, for—as Kearns herself points out—Johnson was a man who could tell people exactly what they wanted to hear. For a moment—but only a moment—Kearns steps back and considers this dilemma; after relating one of his dreams, she comments:

[20] In a recent article, Kearns has indicated that she has had second thoughts about her organization of the book. See *The New Republic*, March 3, 1979, pp. 27-29.

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> The dream is almost too good, too easy to fit into the pattern of his other dreams. It is without jagged edges, the false doors, blank spaces, and swerves that usually complicate our memories of dreams. I wondered as Johnson described it to me whether he was telling it in part for my sake. Perhaps the obvious interest I had shown in his earlier dream provoked him to construct an additional one. Perhaps he said to himself: "You intellectuals, you like dreams? I'll give you all you like." There is no way of knowing (pp. 40-41).

But this momentary skepticism does not prevent Kearns from constructing interpretations based upon the evidence Johnson fed her. Indeed, Kearns seems finally to have concluded that she could rely on what he was telling her because, he told her, she reminded him of his mother (pp. 17-18). Perhaps. But perhaps not. Perhaps Kearns was the last victim of the Johnson treatment.

III

Michael Rogin's analysis of Andrew Jackson is a complex and difficult work. It is an inclusive level-IV psychohistory; that is, it also contains hypotheses at levels I and III. The author finds in the history of westward expansion in early America a form of psychic regression; he sees in the policy of Indian removal a process in which white men projected "primitive rage" over "separation anxiety" onto Indians, who were "at once symbols of a lost childhood bliss and, as bad children, repositories of murderous, negative fantasies" (p. 9). Rogin attempts to tie this psychoanalytic hypothesis to a general attack upon liberal political culture:

> Indian dispossession, as experienced by the whites who justified it and carried it out, belongs to the pathology of human development. Indians remained, in the white fantasy, in the earliest period of childhood, unseparated from "the exuberant bosom of the common mother." . . . Psychoanalytic theory suggests that the infant at the breast and the small child experience world-destroying rage at separation from the mother, dependence upon her, and fear of her loss. Culture affects the resolution of separation anxiety, and liberal culture lacked libidinal ties to replace those forsaken in childhood. Suspicious of the pleasure principle, it inhibited the mature enjoyments which sustain loving interdependence and quiet primitive rage. Liberalism accentuated regressive pressures on the mature, isolated ego. The encounter with Indians and the virgin land returned America to the natural world. Projecting primitive rage onto Indians, independent adult whites revenged themselves for their own early loss. The Indian's tie with nature was broken, literally by uprooting him, figuratively by civilizing him, finally by killing him (p. 9).

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Rogin does an excellent job of presenting evidence to support this ambitious theory, particularly in his analysis of the language used by whites to describe Indian culture (see esp. pp. 114 ff.). And his efforts to cast Andrew Jackson as a representative figure of this general cultural phenomenon are also, on the whole, quite convincing. He explicitly states his proposition that he sees Jackson as a representative man in the Eriksonian sense:

> The study of an individual life roots cultural myth in concrete personal experience. It brings floating symbols down to earth. Disembodied cultural myths do not act; individual men living out myths do. . . . A great man embodies in extreme form the central cultural tensions of his time (p. 13).

The level-I interpretations Rogin presents are quite convincing. Jackson's father died before he was born. His mother—who, according to Jackson's own testimony and that of others, had been a violent woman—died when he was 14. Throughout his life, Jackson drooled and experienced speech difficulties and violent rages. "Jackson had moods of manic omnipotence, paranoid rage, and occasional deep depression. Such moods are common in personalities which remain dominated by the early maternal relationship" (p. 45). Rogin infers—correctly, I think—that Jackson did not develop what Erikson calls "basic trust" in the oral stage of his infancy, and that he suffered "separation anxiety" of the most profound sort. It is one of Rogin's strengths that he carefully grounds these interpretations in clinical theory.

The key hypothesis of the biographical portion of Rogin's work is that Jackson was able to sublimate his separation anxiety, primarily through the subjugation of Indians:

> A man in the grip of primitive rage wants vengeance for wounds to the core of the self. Sources of rage deriving from separation anxiety are intense, fantasy-ridden, and ego-destructive. They devour the self, and express fears of being devoured. The self experiences primitive rages as ego- and world-destroying; such rages are often called maddened. They characterized Jackson, and he gained his mature political power from his ability to sublimate them (p. 45).

Rogin is careful to portray the uncertainty connected to his inferences concerning the genesis of Jackson's personality.

> We have, of course, no clinical evidence to root Jackson's rages in early childhood experience. Certain facts are suggestive, however. Jackson was a posthumous child; did his father's death affect his mother during his infancy? Problems in infancy, involving feeding, weaning, or holding the child, often intensify infantile rage and accentuate later difficulties

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> in the struggle of the child to break securely free of the mother. Jackson's slobbering suggests early problems with speech, mouth, and aggression. Speech difficulties often indicate a problematic oral relationship. Jackson wrote repetitive, incoherent, vengeful letters as an adult, and often expressed himself in metaphors of devouring violence.
>
> Disturbances in the parasympathetic nervous system, like slobbering, commonly derive from tensions in the early maternal tie. Jackson was plagued throughout his life with other disturbances of the parasympathetic system. He suffered recurrently from dysentery and constipation. He had a bad chronic cough, and worried that spitting up phlegm drained his body of a valuable substance. His illnesses may not have been psychosomatic at all. Nevertheless, combined with recurrent fevers, rheumatism, and hemorrhaging, they contributed, in the words of one doctor, to Jackson's "frantic bellicosity." Rage against and triumph over his body . . . fed Jackson's public performance (p. 45).

All of this is carefully drawn and convincing; Rogin's biographical evidence and analysis are excellent. He goes awry, however, when he attempts to expand his analysis to encompass the entire political development of early American society. The work becomes, in the end, not a psychobiography or even a psychohistory, but a work of political theory; the author attempts to attack liberal capitalism with psychoanalytic tools, and the result is a jumble.

Thus, Jackson's war agains the National Bank of the United States becomes a war against "the Mother Bank" (p. 280 f.): "A logic of the psyche led from children to mothers, from debt to the Bank, from Indian removal to removal of the federal deposits" (p. 280). Rogin finds a key to Jackson's hostility to the Bank in the President's personal fear of debt which, he conjectures, "may also have had roots in anxieties over bodily control" (p. 285). Moreover, "the Bank symbolized the bad mother returning to dominate her children. Insistent self-reliance contains elements of rage against the lost mother . . ." (p. 288). Level of explanation is being piled atop level of explanation. Jackson first attacked the Bank six months after the death of his wife: "Perhaps her death helped turn him against the Bank. Mourning activates early grief over separation from the mother; it stimulates regressive, melancholic identification with her" (p. 289).

All of this, for Rogin, is tied together somehow with the market revolution and the political structure generated by Jacksonian Democracy. Jackson's Indian removal policy opened the frontier for land speculation and activated the cycle of boom and bust; as President, Jackson attempted to create an "abstract nationalism" to replace the republican virtue of the Founding Fathers. Jackson distrusted both

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local associations and independent agrarian protest because he "invalidat[ed] the capacities of the popular ego [and] perceived a barren landscape where repressive superego warred with chaotic id" (p. 278). Thus, Jackson's Imperial Presidency—his "Napoleonic agrarianism" (p. 278)—is to be understood as flowing from the psyche. Rogin's level-IV analysis simply falls flat; his explanations get tangled up with one another; they are overly ambitious and insufficiently demonstrated.

One of the most striking aspects of Rogin's work, and of some of the other works reviewed here, is an unevenness—the combination of the very best and the very worst kinds of analysis in a single volume. Although it is perhaps dangerous to generalize, this observation seems to point to the conclusion that many psychobiographers feel compelled to present a more ambitious analysis than the available information can support. If my division of the field into four levels of analysis has any validity, it is striking to note that the only work without major flaws is Shaw's—a work that sticks to a single, biographical level of analysis and does not attempt to bridge the gap between psychobiography and psychohistory. The allure of finding the secrets of a historical epoch locked in the psyche of a single individual is great; it is a temptation that few biographers seem to be able to resist. But it simply must be resisted when the data are insufficient for the conclusions drawn. When a biographer attempts a level-III or level-IV analysis, it must be presented with extreme caution. Alternative, nonpsychological explanations must be considered for the behavior in question; the social context simply cannot be ignored.[21] Nor can the biographer be content with sprinkling psychological insights throughout his work. He must state his hypotheses clearly; he must indicate the theoretical framework he has chosen; he must point out every step in the logic of his argument. A work of psychohistory must be utterly self-conscious; otherwise, it will continue to resemble Barzun's apt metaphor of artificial insemination.

[21] On the need to consider alternative hypotheses, see Greenstein (fn. 9).

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THEORIES OF REVOLUTION: The Third Generation

By JACK A. GOLDSTONE*

S. N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations*. New York: Free Press, 1978, xv, 348 pp., $15.95.

Jeffrey M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World*. New York: Free Press, 1975, xiv, 435 pp., $15.95.

Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, xvii, 407 pp., $29.95; $7.95 paper.

Kay Ellen Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978, viii, 196 pp., $14.95.

IN this century, attempts in American social science to explain the nature and origins of revolutions have gone through three distinct phases, or "generations." The first generation, falling roughly between 1900 and 1940, and including the work of LeBon, Ellwood, Sorokin, Edwards, Lederer, Pettee, and Brinton, carefully investigated the pattern of events found in revolutions, but lacked a broad theoretical perspective.[1] The second generation, falling roughly between 1940 and 1975, has dominated the recent study of revolutions; it included Davies, Gurr, Johnson, Smelser, Huntington, and Tilly, and drew heavily on broad theories from psychology (cognitive psychology and frustration-aggression theory), sociology (structural-functionalist theory), and political science (the pluralist theory of interest-group competition).[2]

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[1] Gustave LeBon, *The Psychology of Revolutions* (New York: Ernest Benn Limited, 1913); Charles A. Ellwood, "A Psychological Theory of Revolutions," *American Journal of Sociology*, XI (July 1905), 49-59; Pitrim A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1925); Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); Emil Lederer, "On Revolutions," *Social Research*, III (February 1936), 1-18; George S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York: Harper, 1938); Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1938).

[2] James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February 1962), 5-19; Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Neil Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press,

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Applying these perspectives to the study of revolutions, this second generation of writers developed a fairly sophisticated body of theoretical analysis. In recent years, a number of critical studies (e.g., Eckstein, Oberschall, Muller, Salert, and Skocpol) have uncovered serious weaknesses in the second generation's work.[3] Thus, a third generation of writers—Paige, Trimberger, Skocpol, and Eisenstadt—has, roughly since 1975, presented alternative analyses of revolutions.[4] The general approach of these writers differs in two major respects from that of previous theorists. They are far better grounded historically: their analyses arise from a detailed examination of a greater variety of revolutions than had been studied by previous analysts. Furthermore, they are more holistic, seeking not only to explain why revolutions occur, but also to account for their diverse outcomes.

In this essay, I shall review briefly the recent criticisms of the second generation of writers on revolution, and discuss in some detail the approach of the third generation, touching on their new points of analytical emphasis and on some of the problems that, despite the advances they have made, still remain.

I. From the First to the Second Generation

The first-generation theorists, though developing many insights that are still useful to students of revolutions, were primarily descriptive in their approach. They sought to identify the major stages of the revolu-

1963); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Charles Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, III (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 483-555. An updated version of Tilly's views is *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

[3] Harry Eckstein, "The Etiology of Internal War," *History and Theory*, IV, No. 2 (1965), 133-63; Anthony Oberschall, "Rising Expectations and Political Turmoil," *Journal of Development Studies*, VI (October 1969), 5-22; Edward N. Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66 (September 1972), 928-59; Barbara Salert, *Revolutions and Revolutionaries: Four Theories* (New York: Elsevier, 1976); Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions: In Quest of a Social-Structural Approach," in Lewis Coser and Otto N. Larsen, eds., *The Uses of Controversy in Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1976), 155-75. A more recent and comprehensive critique of several second-generation theories can be found in Roderick Aya, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered," *Theory and Society*, VIII (July 1979), 39-99.

[4] Since Professor Eisenstadt is some 25 years senior to the other members of this group, to label all of them as a single "generation" is not quite correct chronologically. However, Eisenstadt's writings on revolution have appeared at the same time, and, more importantly, share a similar outlook and structure, with the work of his younger contemporaries; I therefore wish to treat all these theorists as forming a single "generation" of writers on revolutions in order to stress their collective departure from the outlook and models of earlier writers.

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tionary process or to describe the social and demographic changes that revolutions produced. But their analyses lacked solid theoretical underpinnings. Such theories of the causes of revolutions as were employed were generally an eclectic group of weakly specified or *ad hoc* psychological schemata, e.g., mob psychology (LeBon), the breakdown of "social habits" (Ellwood), or the "repression of basic instinctual needs" (Sorokin). In contrast, second-generation analysts sought to develop explicit theories of why and when revolutionary situations arise, grounded in fairly well-developed theories of social behavior drawn from psychology, sociology, and political science.

A number of excellent review essays have appeared, including those by Stone, Krammick, and Zagorin, that summarize the work of the second generation of theorists.[5] Thus my restatement of the second generation's perspective will be brief. Roughly speaking, their work may be divided into three classes, according to the three theoretical traditions on which they drew.[6]

1. *Analyses based on cognitive psychology and frustration-aggression theory.* The work of Davies, Gurr, the Feierabends and their collaborators, Schwartz, Geschwender, and Morrison falls in this class.[7] These theorists saw the roots of revolution in the state of mind of the masses; they considered revolutions to be likely only when the masses enter a cognitive state of "frustration" or "deprivation" relative to some set of goals. The suggested sources of such frustration or relative deprivation were varied; they included the long-term effects of modernization and urbanization (Feierabend and Feierabend), short-term economic re-

[5] Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics*, XVIII (January 1966), 159-76; Isaac Krammick, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship," *History and Theory*, XI, No. 1 (1972), 26-63; Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 88 (March 1973), 23-52.

[6] This division follows Skocpol (fn. 3).

[7] Davies (fn. 2); Gurr (fn. 2); Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (December 1968), 1104-24; Ivo K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Systematic Conditions of Political Aggression: An Application of Frustration-Aggression Theory," in Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 136-83; Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr, eds., *Violence in America* (New York: Signet, 1969), 606-88; David C. Schwartz, "Political Alienation: The Psychology of Revolution's First Stage," in Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr, *op. cit.*, 58-66; Denton E. Morrison, "Some Notes Towards a Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change," *American Behavioral Scientist*, XIV (May/June 1971), 675-90; James A. Geschwender, "Explorations in the Theory of Social Movements and Revolution," *Social Forces*, XLVII (December 1968), 127-35.

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versals (Davies), and the systematic closure of political or economic opportunities to selected ethnic or economic groups (Gurr). The authors agreed, however, that the essential, defining factor in a revolutionary situation is widespread frustration with the current political-economic milieu, and that the primary task of a theory of revolutions is to uncover those patterns of events that cause or influence such cognitive attitudes.

2. *Analyses based on sociological (structural-functionalist) theory.* In this class are the studies by Johnson, Smelser, Jessop, Hart, Tiryakian, and Hagopian.[8] These authors, drawing on the tradition of sociological analysis developed by Talcott Parsons and his school, approached societies as *systems* whose smooth functioning depends on maintaining an equilibrium both in the total flow of demands and resources between the system and its environment, and between the various subsystems—polity, economy, status, and culture (or value system)—that make up the social system. Thus, any disturbance that severely impairs the equilibrium of demand and resource flows in a society leaves that society in a state of "disequilibrium" (Hagopian), or "dysfunction" (Johnson), in which it is unstable, or prone to revolution. As in the psychological school, a number of different sources of dysfunction were suggested, such as the uneven impact of technology and modernization on the demands and resources of the various subsystems, or exogenous changes in values—e.g., the growth of a new religion or ideology (Johnson); changes in the distribution of power among the elites in the various subsystems (Jessop); or merely dissynchronous changes in the various subsystems (Hagopian). However, all the authors in this school agreed that the essential, defining factor of a revolutionary situation is a state of severe disequilibrium in the society. Hence, the aim of their analyses was to identify and explicate those events that cause or influence systemic stress.

3. *Analyses based on political science (pluralist, interest-group conflict theory).* The analyses of Tilly, Huntington, Amman, and Stinchcombe fall in this class.[9] These writers drew on the tradition of pluralist

[8] Johnson (fn. 2); Smelser (fn. 2); Bob Jessop, *Social Order, Reform, and Revolution* (New York: Macmillan, 1972); Mark Hart, *The Dynamics of Revolution* (Stockholm: Rotobeckman, 1971); Edward A. Tiryakian, "A Model of Societal Change and Its Lead Indicators," in Samuel Z. Klausner, ed., *The Study of Total Societies* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 69-97; Mark Hagopian, *The Phenomenon of Revolution* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974).

[9] Tilly (fn. 2); Huntington (fn. 2); Peter Amman, "Revolution: A Redefinition," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 77 (March 1962), 36-53; Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Stratification Among Organizations and the Sociology of Revolution," in James March, ed., *Handbook of Organizations* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 169-80.

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theory in political science, which sees events as the outcome of conflict between competing interest groups. Revolution was treated as the "ultimate" political conflict, in which the normal struggle between interest groups is escalated—by both the intensity of the conflict and the magnitude of resources that interest groups bring to bear—to the point where normal political processes for conflict mediation and resolution fail, and the political system is violently split apart. Thus, the defining concept in this approach is the notion of "multiple sovereignty"; that is, a situation in which (1) competing interest groups are so violently opposed on highly salient issues that their differences cannot be reconciled within the current political system, and (2) two or more competing groups have sufficient resources—political, financial, organizational, military—to establish "sovereignty" over a substantial political or military base, and thus to seek to achieve their goals by force.

Again, many patterns of events may give rise to such conditions: Tilly, for instance, noted that wars, economic modernization, urbanization, or changes in value systems or ideologies may all give rise to new interest groups, as well as change the balance of resources among competing groups. For all these authors, the essential, defining factor of a revolutionary situation was a combination of interest-group conflict and resource control that exceeded the capabilities for conflict mediation of the current political institutions.

The preceding severe simplifications unfortunately understate the sophisticated and often brilliant manner in which the links between certain patterns of events and the situation of potential revolution are detailed. However, they allow us a quick grasp of the structural similarity in all the analyses of the second generation, as revealed in Figure 1.

The second-generation theorists, though their models varied in the degree of sophistication and complexity with which the interconnections pictured in Figure 1 are detailed, saw the development of revolutionary situations as basically a two-step process.[10] First a pattern of events arises that somehow marks a break or change from previous patterns. This change then affects some critical variable—the cognitive state of the masses, the equilibrium of the system, or the magnitude of conflict and resource control of competing interest groups. If the effect

[10] Gurr, in particular, offers an extremely complex version of this analysis—with coercion, past violence, legitimation, institutions, and other factors all influencing the psychological deprivation-revolutionary situation nexus. Nonetheless, psychological deprivation remains the driving force of his analysis; other factors are added primarily to moderate the way in which changes in the critical variable lead to political violence.

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on the critical variable is of sufficient magnitude, a potentially revolutionary situation occurs.

All these authors agreed that, once a potentially revolutionary situation occurs, a variety of incidental events that a society could ordinarily absorb without collapsing—such as a war, a foolish action by the authorities, a riot, or a bad harvest—may precipitate a revolution. Yet the majority of these writers, including the most sophisticated exponents of each approach (i.e., Gurr, Johnson, and Tilly) also believed that even when a potentially revolutionary situation arises, revolution is not inevitable. Rather, prompt action by elites to manipulate the level of the critical variable—by reform or repression—can still forestall a full-fledged revolution.

FIGURE 1
SECOND-GENERATION ANALYSES OF REVOLUTION



II. CRITICISMS OF THE SECOND GENERATION

Criticisms of the second-generation theorists have developed in two modes. First, weaknesses in their analyses have been extensively cited. Second, several points of analytic emphasis, neglected by these theorists, have been developed by a number of authors in a manner that points out the incompleteness of these analyses. I shall briefly comment here on some of these weaknesses. The development of new points of analytic emphasis is in large part an accomplishment of the third-generation theorists, and will be discussed below.

In Figure 1, several shortcomings of the second-generation analyses are immediately evident. First, the pattern of events taken as possible initiating causes is extremely vague. Almost any kind of social change—economic, cultural, technological, military, demographic, or-

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ganizational—may give rise to a potentially revolutionary situation. As Eisenstadt has remarked, such an array of causes has also been cited as leading to the decline of the great historical empires of Rome, Byzantium, the Indian Moguls, and others.[11] Why these causes should lead to revolution in the case of some empires—for instance Russia, France, and China—rather than to gradual decline and decay is unspecified by the analyses. Moreover, as Eckstein has noted, the array of changes is so great that these analyses seem to allow that revolutions may happen at any time, in any society undergoing rapid change.[12] Since rapid change has been endemic to the West since 1750 and, spreading with European contact, to the rest of the world since roughly 1850, these theories are generally powerless to explain why, in fact, revolutions have been so rare. They cannot, for example, help us determine why some societies undergoing rapid change—e.g., Britain since 1700, Japan since 1875, or India since 1750—did not experience episodes of revolution. In sum, since the range of occurrences cited as possible initiators of potentially revolutionary situations is so loosely and broadly specified, the explanatory power of these analyses is correspondingly weak.

Second, in all theories the critical variable is extremely difficult to observe in practice. Because one cannot readily measure either the cognitive state of mind of large masses of individuals, or the strain or disequilibrium of a social system, or the magnitude of goal conflict and resources of all competing groups, it is difficult to obtain a correlation between broadly defined "social change" and changes in the level of the critical variables. That is not to say that empirical tests of the response of the critical variables to changing social conditions have not been made. However, these tests have generally relied on using an indicator variable to represent the critical variable, rather than on attempting to measure the critical variable itself. For example, the most sophisticated empirical testing of second-generation theories has been in the class of psychological theories—specifically, the work of Gurr and the Feierabends. However, the indicators for changes in the cognitive frustration variable have been education (Feierabends), or economic stress, religious cleavages, and other macro-social rather than individual cognitive variables (Gurr). Thus, the correlations between violence and the critical variable presented by Gurr and the Feierabends could as well be correlations between general macro-social changes and increased civil conflict, adding little to either the specificity or the empiri-

[11] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Sociological Theory and an Analysis of the Dynamics of Civilizations and of Revolutions," *Daedalus*, Vol. 106 (Fall 1977), 59-78.

[12] Eckstein (fn. 3).

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cal weight of their analyses. More limited attempts to measure directly the correlations between personal cognitive states and social changes in America, Nigeria, and Uganda,[13] using interviews and psychological scaling questionnaires, have failed to find the expected correlations between cognitive dissatisfaction and *either* prior social dislocation and modernization *or* a revolutionary, anti-regime orientation. Thus, the only direct attempts to uncover the predicted correlations have yielded negative results.

Although no comparable empirical tests have been made of the analysis of social disequilibrium, similar problems of measurement would arise. Tiryakian has suggested that urbanization, non-institutional religious movements, and promiscuity would provide useful "lead indicators" of social strain. However, as in the macro-social indicators of Gurr and the Feierabends, the connection with the critical variable—system equilibrium—may be questioned. For example, if an increase in urbanization were found to correlate with revolutions, it would imply only that urbanization is associated with revolutionary situations; any connection with system equilibrium would remain hypothetical. To date, no system theorist has developed or tested a reliable measure for social disequilibrium; indeed, given the vagueness of this variable, none is likely to succeed in doing so.

The political conflict analysis has been the subject of considerable testing by Tilly and his collaborators.[14] Yet the measures of the critical conditions—the intensity of conflict and the resources mobilized by competing groups—are simply correlated with episodes of civil violence, not revolution. For example, Tilly's methods of study would certainly class as situations of multiple sovereignty the periodic wars of succession in the Ottoman and Mogul empires, the English War of the Roses, and the American and Nigerian civil wars. None of these situations, however, is considered to be a revolution in the sense of the French, Russian, Chinese, or Mexican Revolutions. Thus, some factor that bridges the gap between mere *violence* and *revolution* is required for Tilly's measures of multiple sovereignty to be useful in explicating the occurrence of revolution, rather than merely domestic turmoil.[15]

[13] Muller (fn. 3); Oberschall (fn. 3).

[14] Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, *Strikes in France 1830-1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

[15] Tilly's latest work, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (fn. 2), defines revolutions in terms of both the level of political violence *and* the extent of displacement of the political elite. Though Tilly has not yet done any empirical work based on this slightly revised definition, the problem remains. That is, even with this refinement, such violent but non-revolutionary episodes as the War of the Roses and various wars of succession would still be classed as revolutions by Tilly's measures.

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In sum, for all second-generation theorists, the critical variable is extremely difficult to observe. Attempts to do so have led to negative findings, or to correlations that fail to link the critical variable convincingly either to prior social changes or to specifically revolutionary situations.

The third weakness of these analyses follows largely from the preceding one. If the critical variable is difficult to measure, it is almost impossible to specify the *level* that portends a potentially revolutionary situation. In fact, none of the second-generation theorists was able to go beyond a qualitative specification—that is, a "high level" of cognitive frustration, or of social strain, or of political conflict and resource mobilization. Thus, these analyses are incapable of denoting exactly when a potentially revolutionary situation has arisen. Again, the explanatory precision and power of these theories is hamstrung by their inability to specify precisely how changes in the critical variable may be observed.

A fourth reservation involves the conclusion, drawn by most of the second-generation theorists, that a revolution can be forestalled by the actions of the ruling elites. In fact, these writers often stated that the inaction, or "intransigence" of elites (in Johnson's words), was requisite to the transformation of a potentially revolutionary situation into a full-fledged revolution. Insofar as these theorists required changes in the critical variable to be abetted by the blindness or inaction of the ruling elites, their analyses seem to rest on a weak foundation. The elites of France and Russia, prior to the revolutions, were not intransigent or inactive; both, but especially the Russian authorities, were largely *reforming* elites, seeking to implement modern agricultural and economic practices.[16] And, as de Tocqueville first noted, the reforms instituted by the French monarchy appeared to accelerate, rather than to retard, the transformation of a potentially revolutionary situation into a revolution.[17]

The occurrence of revolutions despite the reforming efforts by elites implies that there are good reasons why elites in those specific situations were incapable of, or severely hindered from, taking action to avert their own downfall. The second-generation theorists failed to give any attention to such hindrances or obstructions to elite action. Instead, contrary to historical fact, the intransigence of elites is often cited as a factor in the outbreak of full-fledged revolutions.

Finally, the second-generation theorists failed to account effectively

[16] Geroid Tanquary Robinson, *Rural Russia Under the Old Regime* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 208-42.

[17] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. by Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1955), 180-202.

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for the variations in outcomes of different revolutions. For example, there is no basis in any of their analyses for explaining why in some revolutions—that is, the American, English, and French—the outcome was a pluralist, open polity, while in others—that is, the Russian, Chinese, and Vietnamese—the outcome was a one-party, socialist, authoritarian regime.

III. The Third Generation

The development of new points of analytic emphasis, in addition to the weaknesses described above, has provided materials for constructing new analyses of revolutions. Some of these points have been most forcefully developed by the third-generation theorists, but many were introduced over the preceding twenty years by scholars writing in the fields of international conflict, development and modernization, anthropology and peasant studies, as well as specifically on revolutions. Chief among them were Barrington Moore, Jr. and Eric Wolf.[18] Important contributions were also made by Gillis, Neumann, Rosenau, Kelly and Miller, Hermassi, Migdal, Landsberger, Linz, Prosterman, Russell, and Chorley.[19] These writers did not advance theories of revolution *per se*; however, they raised specific issues and achieved major insights which have formed the basis for the third generation's theorizing.

A. NEW POINTS OF ANALYTIC EMPHASIS

There are five main points that were omitted from the second genera-

[18] Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Wolf, "Peasant Rebellion and Revolution," in Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World* (New York: Free Press, 1971).

[19] John R. Gillis, "Political Decay and the European Revolutions, 1789-1948," *World Politics*, XXII (April 1970), 344-70; Sigmund Neumann, "The International Civil War," *World Politics*, I (April 1949), 333-50; James Rosenau, "Internal War as an International Event," in George A. Kelly and Clifford W. Brown, eds., *Struggles in the State: Sources and Patterns of World Revolution* (New York: Wiley, 1970), 196-222; George A. Kelly and Linda B. Miller, "Internal War and International Systems: Perspectives on Method," *ibid.*, 223-60; Elbaki Hermassi, "Toward a Comparative Study of Revolutions," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XVIII (April 1976), 211-35; Joel S. Migdal, *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures Toward Political and Social Change in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); Henry Landsberger, ed., *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973); Juan Linz, "Patterns of Land Tenure, Division of Labor, and Voting Behavior in Europe," *Comparative Politics*, VIII (April 1976), 365-430; Roy Prosterman, "IRI: A Simplified Predictive Index of Rural Instability," *Comparative Politics*, VIII (April 1976), 339-54; D.E.H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Katharine Chorley, *Armies and the Art of Revolution* (London: Faber and Faber, 1943).

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tion's analyses. They are: (1) the variable goals and structures of states; (2) the systematic intrusion, over time, of international political and economic pressures on the domestic political and economic organization of societies; (3) the structure of peasant communities; (4) the coherence or weakness of the armed forces; and (5) the variables affecting elite behavior.

1. *The variable goals and structures of states.* Second-generation theorists—with the partial exceptions of Tilly and Huntington—paid little attention to the structural details or specific government programs of different states. These theorists often saw the state—the government and the administrative and institutional machinery it wields—simply as the arena for the expression and resolution of conflict among varied groups, or sometimes more starkly as the means for the coercion of certain elements of society by others. However, third-generation theorists have emphasized that the state is not merely an arena for conflict or a means of coercion, but an autonomous entity, and that there exists among states a diversity of goals as well as of structures, which affects the possibilities for revolutionary change. Eisenstadt, in particular, has argued that only a certain kind of state—the feudal-imperial state—is prone to revolutionary transformation. Only this kind of state, he maintains, combines the kind of goals that seek "not only to extract resources from [the society] but also to permeate it, to reconstruct it symbolically, and structurally to mobilize it" (p. 86) and the kind of structure—relatively inaccessible, elite-monopolized political and cultural-religious institutions—that make revolutionary change likely. Skocpol and Trimberger have emphasized that the goals of certain states—such as the goal of modernization of the industrial base in prerevolutionary China, Russia, Turkey, and Japan—were in conflict with the resource capabilities, or elite class privileges, of those societies. In these cases, the incompatibility of the states' goals with aspects of the societies' political or economic structures became a source of the revolutionary crisis.

2. *The intrusion of international political and economic pressures.* A great many writers, including Neumann, Rosenau, Kelly and Miller, Hermassi, Wolf, Moore, and Paige, have noted that social change, and revolution in particular, is often triggered by international political conflicts or by the impingement of international capitalist markets on previously local agriculture and trade systems. Second-generation theorists noted that wars could push unstable societies over the brink of revolution; yet they often neglected to consider the long-term destabilizing

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effects of other international pressures. Third-generation theorists have systematically pointed out that, as states are drawn into international military and economic competition, substantial changes are engendered in a variety of aspects of domestic organization. For example, states faced with increasing military competition may seek greater centralized control of resources, or attempt to raise their extraction of resources from the society; in addition, as capitalist markets intrude on local markets, landlords may seek to rationalize peasant production, or attempt to secure greater cash benefits instead of in-kind payments from their tenants. In short, the intrusion of international political and economic pressures may introduce incentives—or imperative needs—that bring states and landlords into opposition with basic aspects of the agrarian, economic, and political organization of their society, thus creating an impetus to revolutionary change.

3. *The structure of peasant communities.* Although peasants have often played a decisive role in revolutions, the variables determining the nature of peasant participation have proven extremely complex and difficult to decipher. The studies by Wolf, Moore, Migdal, Landsberger, Linz, Paige, and Prosterman have shown that the nature of peasant revolutionary activity depends on the relation of peasants to landlords and to the state, on the type of crops and agricultural techniques used, on the mode of village organization, on the degree of landholding or landlessness, whether production is for local or for market sale, and whether taxes and other obligations are paid in cash, in labor, or in kind. Since peasant participation often determines the course of revolutions, these variables have become a vital concern in third-generation theories.

4. *The coherence of the armed forces.* Russell's fascinating study of the role of the armed forces in revolutionary crises, building on the pathbreaking work of Chorley, has demonstrated that revolution is impossible where the armed forces of a state are intact and effectively used. While second-generation authors generally agreed that coercion and the use of armed force is crucial in determining whether or not a potentially revolutionary situation yields to full-fledged revolution, they did not study the variables that affect the ability of a state to utilize its armed forces in domestic crises. Thus, the conditions of military coherence and of structural constraints on the state's use of armed force remain key issues for third-generation theorists.

5. *Variables affecting elite behavior.* The second-generation theorists

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noted the importance of elite behavior, but their treatment was generally rudimentary, simply stating that the intransigence of the elite often abetted revolution. However, as Eisenstadt, Skocpol, and Trimberger have shown, the range of elite behaviors is great, and is significantly determined by structural conditions. Eisenstadt has noted that revolutionary elites with close ties to other elites are more likely to build relatively pluralist, "open," postrevolutionary polities, while isolated elites, if victorious in a revolutionary situation, will tend to form coercive, "closed" regimes. Moreover, Skocpol has found that isolated or "marginal" elites are likely to have the greatest inclination, as well as the greatest tactical mobility, to pursue radical revolutionary policies, while traditional landed elites—such as the French aristocracy and the Chinese gentry—are likely to obstruct the state's attempts to achieve even modest reforms, particularly if such reforms involve greater state centralization and diminution of the elite's control of resources. Finally, Trimberger has argued that elites with few ties to landholding groups —such as the Japanese and Turkish civil/military elites—are quite capable of bringing about revolutionary social change by concerted government action. In sum, the range of elite behavior and the factors influencing elite actions form a further key point in the third-generation analyses of revolution.

B. THEORIES OF REVOLUTION—THE THIRD GENERATION

Though all of the third-generation theorists pay careful attention to the new analytical points of emphasis discussed above, their scope ranges from Paige's fairly limited analysis to Eisenstadt's ambitious cross-civilization survey.

In *Agrarian Revolution*, Paige concentrates his analysis upon the effects of agrarian social structure on the potential for revolution. He develops a theory of rural conflict in which the structure of peasant/landlord relations—namely, whether peasants and landlords derive their income from land ownership, from wages and capital, or from diverse combinations—determines the type of rural conflict that occurs. Specifically, a mass peasant revolution is likely only where landlords draw their wealth and income from land ownership, but peasants gain their livelihood from a form of wage payment—either sharecropping or migratory labor. Where peasants and landlords *both* depend on land ownership, peasant/landlord conflict is more likely to take the form of spontaneous peasant *jacqueries*; where landlords depend primarily on income from commercial capital (that is, capital-intensive plantations),

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peasant/landlord conflict is likely to be resolved through labor movements or commodity reform.

The root of Paige's argument is that landlords whose wealth depends primarily on the possession of land tend to have few options for maintaining their income and privileges; moreover, such landlords generally need state support to protect their holdings. The combination of land-dependent upper classes with wage-earning or sharecropping cultivators

> combine[s] the inflexible behavior of the cultivators of a landed estate with the strong cultivator organizations of the corporate plantation. When both conditions exist simultaneously, the result is likely to be an agrarian revolution in which a strong peasant-based guerilla movement organized by a nationalist or communist party attempts to destroy both the rural upper class and the institutions of the state and establish a new society (pp. 358-59).

The theory is developed through in-depth case studies of historical patterns of rural conflict and agrarian structure in Peru, Angola, and Vietnam. Paige adds considerable detail to demonstrate how the impingement of international markets contributes to conditions of rural conflict, and how the basic theory may be modified by the influence of various crop and technology parameters. Moreover, Paige supports his theory with an impressive array of data, including a crossnational study of rural conflict and agrarian structure in 135 export sectors of 70 developing countries.

Yet Paige's work is limited in its aims. For example, he neglects the interaction of rural class conflict with urban and intra-elite conflicts; nor does he seek to specify the circumstances in which rural conflicts can lead to the transformation of political and cultural institutions which constitutes a successful revolution. In all, Paige's work is an original, detailed analysis of the ways in which agrarian structure affects the possibilities for revolution, though it is not—nor does it claim to be—a full analysis of revolutions.[20]

On the other hand, Trimberger, in *Revolution from Above*, seeks to give a rather full explanation of one kind of revolution. She analyzes four cases—Ataturk's takeover of Turkey in 1923, the Meiji Restoration of Japan in 1868, and the coups by Nasser in Egypt (1952) and Velasco

[20] The omissions in Paige's work, and their consequences for his theory, have provoked a lively debate; recent review essays include Eric Wolf, "Why Cultivators Rebel," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 83 (November 1977), 742-50; Arne Disch, "Peasants and Revolts," *Theory and Society*, VII (March 1979), 243-52; and Margaret R. Somers and Walter L. Goldfrank, "The Limits of Agronomic Determinism: A Critique of Paige's *Agrarian Revolution*," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XXI (July 1979), 443-58.

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in Peru (1968)—in which high military and civil bureaucrats overthrew traditional rulers and instituted programs of modernization incorporating substantial social and economic reforms. She presents an explanation of when such revolutions from above are likely, and of the probable outcomes of such revolutions.

The critical factor in the genesis of revolution from above is a distinctive kind of elite structure, namely, the separation of bureaucratic and military officials from the landlord and merchant classes. Trimberger argues that in a centralized, bureaucratic state, where the officialdom is a solidary professional body with a service tradition but without great personal landholdings or ties to landlord classes, the reaction to international political and economic pressures is likely to be a revolution from above. Leading officials, by seizing control of the central civil/military administrative apparatus, will seek to reshape the pattern of resource distribution and extraction so as to meet the military and economic pressures that threaten the state. Lacking a vested interest in the current economic structure, such officials are free to respond to international pressures by implementing radical reforms—including land reform, abolition of traditional status distinctions, and rapid industrialization.

Yet, in examining the outcomes of such revolutions, Trimberger finds that they have generally met with limited success. Catching up with Western economies requires the diversion of large surpluses from agriculture for capital investment. However, since the revolutions from above attempted to achieve modernization without mobilization of the masses, such surpluses could only be extracted with the cooperation of local landlords. As a result, officials were forced into alliances with local landlords to maintain the flow of agricultural surpluses required to finance their ambitious modernization plans. Trimberger argues that, while the initial phases of modernization may have been successful, the unavoidable alliance of officials with local landlords, and the consequent entrenchment of those landlords, ruled out the emergence of domestic capitalist economies that were not heavily dependent on the more advanced Western economies.

For example, 27 years after Ataturk's takeover, local landlords in Turkey succeeded in wresting control of the government from the bureaucratic reformers, and in abolishing taxes on agriculture. State-led modernization was thus halted, and Turkey has since then remained severely dependent on foreign capital for its development. By contrast, landlords in Japan were unable to keep the state from draining surpluses from agriculture for industrialization; however, they were able

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to hold the exploited peasantry in a relatively depressed and destitute state. While they thereby maintained their status, Japan was for decades deprived of an internal market for its industrial products. Japanese industry therefore had to be geared to export markets, resulting in a dependency on penetrating foreign markets that still marks the Japanese economy.

Trimberger concludes that in any revolution from above, such a need for an alliance between reforming bureaucrats and local landlords is likely to arise, and that the entrenchment of local landlords will follow —with the result that modernization will soon become dependent either on foreign capital, as in Turkey, or on foreign markets, as in Japan. In sum, revolution from above will occur only when a state with a centralized, bureaucratic government and a particular kind of elite structure—a separation of state officials from landed and merchant classes—is confronted with strong international pressures. Moreover, the outcome of such a revolution is likely to be a drive for modernization that is blunted by the need to enlist the support of local landlords, and an economy that is still dependent on more advanced foreign economies.

Skocpol's analytical scheme in *States and Social Revolutions* is presented in Figure 2. It is in many respects similar to those of Paige and Trimberger, emphasizing the role of specific agrarian and elite structures as preconditions, and international pressures as catalysts, of revolution. Yet Skocpol aims at far greater generality. In her words, by studying "the specific interrelations of class and state structures, and the complex interplay . . . of domestic and international developments," she hopes to illuminate "relationships that remain . . . useful for describing the logic of social revolutionary causes and outcomes, from France in the 1790's to Ethiopia in the 1970's" (p. 292). She succeeds to an impressive degree.

Skocpol begins by noting that social revolutions have only occurred in "agrarian-bureaucratic" societies. These are societies in which a more or less centralized bureaucracy, with the aid of locally powerful landlords, subsists on the surplus of a predominantly agricultural economy. The weaknesses of such societies are three-fold: first, conflicts can develop between the central bureaucratic government and the landlords over the division of the surplus; second, the vast peasant population can form a well of discontent and potential revolt; third, since the surplus that supports the bureaucracy and the landlords is derived from traditional agriculture, it cannot be readily increased if external pressures

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FIGURE 2
SKOCPOL'S ANALYSIS OF REVOLUTIONS



(war, or foreign economic invasion of domestic markets) threaten to absorb or reduce the surplus.

As Skocpol notes, such weaknesses are present in all agrarian bureaucratic societies; yet not all such societies experience social revolutions. Thus Skocpol spends the first half of her book studying, in masterful detail, why social revolutions occurred in France, Russia, and China, but not in Prussia, Japan, or England, during similar periods of stress.

Skocpol's answer is that the intensity of bureaucratic/landed class conflict and of peasant revolts is influenced by specific structural factors —namely, agrarian social structure and elite structure. Thus, structural differences between France, Russia, and China on the one hand, and Prussia, Japan, and England on the other—together with differences in international pressures—account for the fact that successful social revolutions occurred in the former, but not in the latter.

First, Skocpol argues that the intensity of peasant revolts depended on the autonomy and organizational strength of peasant communities. For example, French and Russian peasants lived in relatively autono-

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mous villages with a substantial political structure. Such conditions gave the peasants a base for organized, concerted revolts against landlords. By contrast, the peasantries of eastern Prussia and 17th-century England were fragmented; they were closely supervised by landlords and lacked any autonomy or organization. This was in large part due to the early transition to capitalist agriculture in these societies, which broke up traditional peasant and manorial communities, giving rise instead to closely supervised agricultural laborers. Thus, in the Prussian revolution of 1848, and in the English Civil War, no peasant risings on the scale of those in France in 1789 or Russia in 1917 shook the state.

Second, the intensity of conflict between the monarchy and the landed class depended on the extent to which that class had leverage within the bureaucratic machinery, and the extent to which it controlled resources that could be used against that machinery. For example, the Chinese monarchy recruited its bureaucratic personnel primarily from the landed class. And the French administration, though drawing personnel from all classes, retained the noble-controlled *parlements*, which were used by the nobility to block and challenge the directives issued by the crown. In both societies, cooperation of the landed classes with the monarchy was essential to the operation of the central government. Thus, when differences between the monarchy and the landed class arose—as in China after Western penetration, and in France in the 18th century—the landed classes were able to paralyze the central government, opening the way for peasant revolts to blossom into full-scale revolutions. On the other hand, the central governments of Japan and Prussia were largely independent of landlords, who had strictly local power. Thus, conflicts between the central government and the landed class, though leading to reforms in the relations between them, did not destroy the effectiveness of the central bureaucracy.

Finally, international pressures may vary according to the differences in economic advancement and military power between competing nations. Here Russia presents an extreme case. Since Russia was both economically and militarily far behind Imperial Germany, the tsar's government was unable to mobilize sufficient resources to meet the German threat in World War I. The resulting widespread military defeats crushed the organization and effectiveness of the Russian army. When the peasants, facing the exactions of a war economy in a country barely able to sustain itself in peacetime, seized the landed estates, the tsar could raise no force to challenge them. By contrast, Prussia faced far less external pressure in the revolution of 1848. The army was still

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intact, and could readily be used by the king to suppress the urban disorders threatening his reign.

Skocpol further highlights the factors affecting the outcomes of social revolutions, through comparisons of Russia, China, and France. Here the main factors are the resources of revolutionary contenders, both political and economic, and international pressures.

Skocpol contends that if the revolutionary regime cannot control large-scale industries on a centralized basis (as, for example, in France in 1789), a regime based on private control of property is likely to develop. On the other hand, where the rudiments of a centralized industrial base exist as a legacy from the old regime—for instance, in Russia's industrial centers and China's Manchuria—a centralized state-socialist regime becomes a possible, and likely, outcome.

In addition, the social base of the revolutionary regime constrains its actions. The French National Assembly, based on the support of peasants seeking private property in land, and of artisans, merchants, and proprietors of small businesses, could not mount an attack on private property. The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), though in a position to direct much of the economy centrally, were also constrained. The Bolsheviks lacked ties to the peasantry; resting on the support of an industrial proletariat, they had to wage "war" against the peasants to secure grain for their urban economic and political base. The CCP, however, was strongly tied to a rural, peasant base, and proceeded with a more balanced effort at industrialization, focusing on the development of rural industry and improved peasant agriculture, as well as on urban-based industrialization. In sum, differing economic legacies from the old regimes and the differing social bases of the post-revolutionary elites led to significant differences in outcomes among the cases studied.

But Skocpol points out important similarities as well; here international pressures are the key. In each society, the revolutionary crisis was in part due to foreign threats which the old regime could not meet because of inadequate resources. These threats do not go away when the old regime falls. Thus, in France, Russia, and China, the outcome of the revolutions was a highly centralized, coercive, bureaucratic, mass-mobilizing government. By abolishing the special privileges of the landed class, these governments were able to free resources and to provide the administrative machinery to utilize them. The Committee on Public Safety, the Bolsheviks, and the CCP had in common their willingness to use tight discipline and force to meet the challenges

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facing their societies from abroad. Only such groups can consolidate a social revolution successfully, and their stamp is left on the postrevolutionary government in every case.

The above sketch fails to do justice to the richness of Skocpol's in-depth studies of the particulars of each case. However, the logic of her argument, as depicted in Figure 2, is elegant and straightforward.

Three facets of Skocpol's analysis should be noted: first, her causal explanation of different revolutions is *not* uniform. She maintains that a social revolution is only possible where an organized peasantry exists, and a crisis arises that incapacitates the state's ability to suppress that peasantry. Yet peasant organization may originate either in the traditional village community, as in France and Russia, or in a mass-mobilizing party, as in China. And an incapacitating crisis may arise from overwhelming external pressures (as in Russia), or from less severe pressures that precipitate a struggle for resources between the central government and landed classes with leverage against the government (as in China and France). In sum, Skocpol notes that various combinations of structural patterns and international pressures can lead to revolutions; a specific array of structural factors must be studied in each case.

Second, Skocpol places very little emphasis on urban revolts as contributors to social revolution; she does not consider them to be sufficient to determine the outbreak or the outcome of social revolutions. Urban revolts often occur in highly unsuccessful revolutions, such as the Paris Commune or the revolutions of 1848 in Germany and Austria. Moreover, the major outcome of social revolution is a diminution of the power of landlords over the peasantry (that is, a change in agrarian social relations) rather than any change in the social organization of the cities. Thus, for Skocpol it is primarily the combination of peasant revolts with the breakdown of central government that precipitates social revolution.

Finally, Skocpol's treatment of the rise of capitalism and its contribution to revolution is rather unusual. Many analysts, particularly Eric Wolf, have suggested that the rise of capitalism destabilizes traditional economies, and is thus a factor leading to revolution. Skocpol argues just the reverse; namely, that in those countries which made a transition to capitalist agriculture, such as England and Prussia, the conversion of the peasantry into supervised agricultural laborers markedly reduced their revolutionary potential. Only the societies that incubated highly traditional peasantries, with strong village organization, found themselves faced with massive peasant revolts. According to Skocpol,

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the destabilizing effects of the rise of capitalism operate more powerfully in the international sphere. There, the more advanced countries—such as England and, later, Germany—posed major military and economic threats to less advanced countries, such as France and Russia; it is this competition with more advanced states that can lead to severe external pressures and political breakdown.

In many respects, Eisenstadt, whose analysis is schematically shown in Figure 3, takes an approach analogous to Skocpol's.

FIGURE 3
EISENSTADT'S ANALYSIS OF REVOLUTIONS



In *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies*, he notes that certain preconditions of state and elite structure must be present for a revolutionary situation to arise. Specifically, there must be a marked differentiation of the society's political and symbolic center from the rest of the society (the "periphery"), as well as active attempts by the center to influence the periphery; the center must be fairly closed, and elite-dominated; and the elites must be divided and competing rather than unitary. Moreover, the elites must control sufficient "free" resources—

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that is, resources that are not completely tied up in subsistence or in fully prescribed tasks—to be able to exercise a substantial degree of autonomy. Eisenstadt also notes that intensifying international pressures, and the resulting fiscal and military exigencies, are primary causes of the downfall of traditional regimes; they open the way for competing elites, with recruited mass support, to attempt to build new regimes. However, Eisenstadt goes beyond these observations to make a profound and original contribution: the role of "cultural orientations" in the genesis of revolutions.

In the first portion of his book, Eisenstadt examines patterns of change in traditional patrimonial, tribal, imperial, and city-state societies. He notes that, while many of the structural preconditions for revolutions existed in these societies, no revolutions occurred. Change *did* occur, at various times, in the political, social, and cultural/religious spheres; but it was not the sudden, simultaneous, all-embracing change in all these spheres that is typical of true revolutions. Eisenstadt thus distinguishes between *segregative* change—unconnected changes in the various cultural and institutional spheres at various times—and *coalescent* change, in which religious heterodoxy, political rebellion, and demands for social change tend to combine in seeking far-reaching transformation of the existing political and social regime. Only when the cultural orientation of a society predisposes it to such coalescent patterns of change is revolution likely.

What are the requisite cultural orientations? Eisenstadt states that the tendency toward coalescence is likely to be greatest in societies characterized by a cultural order that recognizes "a high level of tension between the transcendental and the mundane order, a relatively strong this-worldly orientation for resolution of this tension, and/or a high level of commitment to these orders, which are not taken as given." Conversely, "tendencies toward a relative segregation of movements of rebellion, heterodoxy, institution-building and political protest" are pronounced in cultures where there is "either a low level of distinction and tension between the transcendental and the mundane order or a high level of distinction combined with otherworldly resolution of tension between the orders; and a low level of commitment to the sociopolitical and even the cultural order and a tendency to accept them as given" (p. 101).

Thus, for example, the great patrimonial empires and city-state societies lacked the strong tension between the transcendental and mundane orders that could generate a movement for a total restructuring of the mundane order on transcendentally "ideal" lines. Similarly,

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Japan, which lacked such transcendental/mundane tension, has exhibited a strong tendency to conservative change: substantial political and social changes have occurred, but without the concomitant growth of a revolutionary ideology. Rather, traditional symbols of legitimacy and continuity with the past have been emphasized.

Eisenstadt also discusses factors influencing the outcome of revolutions. In addition to noting the impact of elites' resources and of international pressures on the outcome of inter-elite struggles and the process of postrevolutionary institution-building, he observes that the structure of the competing revolutionary elites also influences outcomes. Where the successful revolutionary elite had, prior to the revolution, solidary ties to other elite elements and to peripheral groups, the postrevolutionary regime tended to be more open and less coercive—as in America, England, and the Netherlands. On the other hand, where the successful revolutionary elite was an "isolated elite" (the Bolsheviks in Russia and the CCP in China) a greater degree of coerciveness and monopolization of power is likely in reconstructing postrevolutionary society.

The richness of Eisenstadt's insight into the effect of cultural orientations on political change is manifest, but a significant defect of his book should be mentioned. Eisenstadt discusses patterns of change in societies ranging from ancient empires to modern Vietnam, with commentaries on Hebrew tribal politics and on all of Asia, Europe, and Latin America. The result is necessarily a somewhat discursive, illustrative approach, with dozens of powerful and fascinating insights; but few cases of revolution are probed in depth. Despite the enormous historical learning that Eisenstadt brings to his work, the argument thus remains at a fairly abstract level. The richness of the analytical scheme and the range of cases touched on are exciting, but the reader remains curious to see how the structural and cultural elements of the scheme would be applied in an extended analysis—for example, to explain the success of the English and French Revolutions in contrast to the unsuccessful revolutions of 1848 and 1918 in Germany.

In sum, Eisenstadt's book is rich and provocative, and makes an enormous contribution to the theory of revolution in pointing out the impact of cultural orientations. Still, a more detailed application of these ideas in one or two in-depth case studies would be of benefit, particularly elaborating the interconnection between the structural and cultural preconditions of revolution.

The process of revolution as depicted in these analyses may be con-

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trasted with that of second-generation theorists. For the latter, pressures on the society from any of a number of sources created a situation of instability—widespread cognitive frustration, system disequilibrium, or intense conflict between interest groups. In such an unstable situation, elite action may stabilize the society, or a chance incident—a riot or a bad harvest—may trigger a revolution.

The third-generation theorists, however, do not consider instability as developing simply from a broad pattern of social change or events. Rather, certain structural conditions must exist prior to any pressures or social change. Then, when political and economic competition with other states places special demands or incentives on states and landlords —such as the need for increased extraction of resources, or rationalization of economic organization—such goals will be incompatible with agrarian and elite structures that restrict the state's access to resources and constrain administrative action. In short, a "contradiction" develops between the needs of states and landlords to respond to the pressures of the international system and the range of options allowed by the agrarian and elite structures. When the crisis becomes sufficiently acute, continued resource extraction and administrative actions by the state may be sufficiently obstructed for the state to lose effective control of its armed forces. At this point—depending on the variables of peasant community structure, elite structure, and cultural orientation—the old regime may fall through decay and segregative change, or through elite and/or agrarian revolts that precipitate a full-fledged revolution.

The advantages of the third generation's analyses vis-à-vis those of the second generation are fairly clear. First, the former has no difficulty in explaining the comparative rarity of revolutions. Though the pressures of the international political-economic system are widespread, only states with certain kinds of agrarian, state, and elite structures are likely to respond to these pressures by revolution.

Second, these structural preconditions are not as vague or as difficult to measure as the amorphous critical variables of the second-generation theorists. Paige has shown that types of agrarian structure can be utilized as a variable in the analysis of crossnational data. Moreover, elements of elite structure—such as whether or not elites have landholding interests—are simple categorical variables, subject to empirical determination. The coherence and reliability of the armed forces can also be studied quantitatively, as Russell has demonstrated. Even factors such as the resource bases of elites can be simplified, in the framework of these analyses, to categorical variables—whether or not centralized resource bases (e.g., centers of heavy industry and rail networks) exist or

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not, or whether elites draw their wealth from land (e.g., England, France, China) or solely from service in state administration (e.g., Turkey and Japan). In sum, the variables of the third-generation analyses, though in some cases perhaps still in need of greater specification (e.g., "cultural orientation"), are, on the whole, much more amenable to observation than the critical variables of the second-generation analyses.

Third, the question of the timing of revolutions is greatly simplified. For the second-generation analysts, revolutions are possible any time the level of the critical variable is "too high." Thus, a sensitive indicator of *when* such high levels in the critical variables arise is required in order to determine when and where a revolution is likely to occur; such an indicator, as noted, has proven extremely difficult to develop. No such problem exists in the third-generation analyses. Instead of a possible brief period of instability, they stipulate that continued pressure from the international system, conjoined with certain structural characteristics, precipitates revolution. Thus, if one were to suggest (though the third-generation theorists do not explicitly do so) that, when a society has the structural preconditions for revolution and is subjected to direct military or economic pressure from more advanced states, revolution is likely to occur within fifty to a hundred years, then the timing of the major revolutions—in England in the 17th century, in America and France in the 18th century, in Central Europe in the 19th century, and in the Third World (including Russia), in the 20th century—becomes comprehensible as corresponding to the order in which these nations were confronted with sustained military-economic competition from more advanced capitalist nations.

Moreover, the problem of the elite's blindness or intransigence as an essential, abetting factor in revolutions is eliminated. Preconditions such as the agrarian social structure and the elite's privileges and control of resources have generally been in place for centuries; the goals that bring states and landlords into conflict with these structures—including increased centralization and resource extraction by states, and increased rationalization and profit-taking by landlords—are responses required by the pressures of the international political-economic system. There is no easy way out. When the states' and the landlords' responses to these pressures become incompatible with the basic elite and agrarian structures of the society, no action short of revolution is likely to resolve the crisis. Hence, the elite is not capable of forestalling revolution; depending on its resources and tactical position, it can either institute revolution from above, as in Turkey and Japan, or contend

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for power during the revolutionary crisis that arises when the state loses the ability to marshal sufficient resources and coercive force to meet its financial, military, and domestic exigencies.

Finally, the range of outcomes of revolutions is not, as it is for the second-generation theorists, left unspecified, but is included as a basic part of the third-generation theorists' analyses of revolutions.

IV. The Third Generation—Criticism and Challenges

Although the analyses of the third generation provide a more sophisticated and empirically useful theory of revolutions than those of their predecessors, a number of key problems and challenges remain. The following five major challenges to the third-generation theories are not meant to constitute a comprehensive list of criticisms, but to enumerate the most active areas of controversy, as well as the most fruitful areas for further research.

1. *When is a social transformation a "revolution"?* Despite the schematic similarities of third-generation analyses, the theorists are sharply divided on the issue of which instances of social transformation are in fact revolutions. Skocpol lists the Chinese, French, Russian, and Mexican Revolutions. Eisenstadt, however, does not consider the Mexican Revolution to be a "true" revolution in the same sense as the French, Russian, and Chinese. Rather, he classes the Mexican Revolution as a special variant of social transformation labeled "neo-patrimonial revolutions." Trimberger regards both the Japanese Meiji Restoration and the Turkish Revolution as "revolutions from above," to be differentiated from the French, Russian, and Chinese "revolutions from below." Yet Eisenstadt views the Turkish Revolution as essentially akin to the French, Russian, and Chinese, while he considers the Meiji Restoration to be an instance of *non*-revolutionary change. The third-generation theorists, including Paige, further differ on whether or not the Cuban, Egyptian, and Peruvian experiences of social change are instances of "true" revolution. Additional work is clearly needed to develop classifications or typologies of social and political transformations that can be widely accepted as a basis for research. Without further clarification of the defining characteristics of revolutions, the third-generation analyses of revolution will be difficult to apply to, and test against, varied instances of social change.

2. *The range of cases dealt with by third-generation theorists is extremely limited.* Most of the third generation's work, with the partial

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exception of Eisenstadt's, has been based on very few cases. Skocpol builds her analysis mainly on comparative study of five instances of social change: the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions, the Meiji Restoration, and the abortive German revolution of 1848. Trimberger explicates only four cases—Egypt, Peru, Turkey, and Japan. And Paige, though offering an excellent crossnational test of one aspect of his theory, presents case analyses only for Peru, Angola, and Vietnam. Eisenstadt does attempt to deal with a wide range of social change in the West and in non-Western civilization; but his treatments of specific cases are so brief as to fail to be true tests of his analytical scheme.

Examination of other revolutions, such as those in Bolivia, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Algeria, and recently in Nicaragua and Iran, would be useful. The study of revolutions would also gain greatly from sharp comparisons of the causes and effects of the revolutions examined by these theorists with those of other kinds of political and institutional changes—such as coups, or the communist-led revolutions "from without" in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and Korea. Susan Eckstein and Peter Evans, in an all too brief comparison of the effects of the Mexican Revolution and the Brazilian coups of 1930 and 1964, have demonstrated the value of such studies.[21]

Undoubtedly, broadening the empirical base for such analyses will require a substantial amount of time. However, in recent years historians and anthropologists have produced a number of excellent comparative studies of revolution, covering early modern, late modern, and non-Western revolutions, from the Netherlands Revolt to the Algerian and Cuban Revolutions.[22] In addition, historians have provided a substantial literature on political and social transformations in the premodern world, including ancient Greece,[23] Rome,[24] Byzantium,[25] and

[21] Eckstein and Evans, "Revolution as Cataclysm and Coup: Political Transformation and Economic Development in Mexico and Brazil," *Comparative Studies in Sociology*, I (1978), 129-56. An effort to test the value of second- and third-generation theories in explaining the Mexican Revolution has also recently appeared in Walter Goldfrank's excellent essay "Theories of Revolution and Revolution without Theory: Mexico," *Theory and Society*, VII (March 1979), 135-65.

[22] Robert Forster and Jack P. Greene, eds., *Preconditions of Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); Wolf (fn. 18, 1969); Lawrence Kaplan, ed., *Revolutions: A Comparative Study, From Cromwell to Castro* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973); John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

[23] Alexander Fuks, "Patterns and Types of Social-Economic Revolution in Greece from the Fourth to the Second Century B.C.," *Ancient Society*, V (1974), 51-81; W. G. Forrest, *The Emergence of Greek Democracy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

[24] Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1939); P. A. Brunt, *Social Conflict in the Roman Republic* (New York: Norton, 1971).

[25] George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1969).

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Islam.[26] If the range and validity of their analyses is to be thoroughly tested, it is incumbent upon third-generation theorists to draw upon such resources in order to provide a significant expansion of the cases subjected to detailed study.

3. *Studies of the impact of agrarian structure on peasant revolutionary participation have yielded contradictory results.* Although agrarian social structure is regarded by third-generation theorists as a key variable in determining the participation of peasants in revolutions, the effect of a given aspect of agrarian structure on peasant revolutionary activity is viewed differently by different authors. Paige, for example, asserts that landless peasants, not middle peasants, are most likely to engage in revolutionary action. His empirical work is further abetted in the studies by Prosterman and by Linz, which correlate landlessness with radical political behavior.[27] Wolf and Denitch argue the opposite: their case studies of revolution in Russia, China, Algeria, Vietnam, Mexico, Cuba, and Yugoslavia show that it was precisely the middle peasants, with modest landholdings, who were the primary base for revolutionary action.[28] Skocpol, drawing on the cases of France, Russia, and China, argues that it is *not* landholding that determines revolutionary action, but the structure of the peasant community as a whole. Peasant communities may have a sphere of autonomy in which peasant leaders have traditionally organized them for communal tasks, subject to coercive sanctions only from central authorities; or they may lack autonomy, and be held in check by local, landlord-maintained militia and police. According to Skocpol, the former type of community structure is conducive to revolutionary activity; the latter is not. Thus, considerable dispute exists over the elements of agrarian structure that are the critical determinants of peasant action, and on how particular structural elements—for instance, landlessness—influence peasant behavior.

4. *Third-generation analyses fail to account for common features in the unfolding of the revolutionary process.* Although the "natural history" school of writers on revolution from the first generation (e.g., Edwards, Brinton) did not have a broad theoretical perspective, they noted several patterns of events that seem common to revolutions: the development of an "alternative government," such as the Jacobin clubs, Soviets, CCP, Irish Sinn Fein, during the revolutionary struggle; the

[26] Muhammad A. Shaban, *The Abassid Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

[27] Prosterman (fn. 19); Linz (fn. 19).

[28] Wolf (fn. 18); Bogdan Denitch, "Violence and Social Change in the Yugoslav Revolution," *Comparative Politics*, VII (April 1976), 465-78.

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presence of successive "moderate" and "radical" phases of the revolution; and the emergence of a charismatic, authoritarian leader—Cromwell, Napoleon, Lenin, Ataturk, Mao, Castro. Phenomena that occur so often in the course of revolutions seem to call for some explanation of their frequency and likelihood. The third generation largely fails to provide such explanations.

5. *Neglect of demographic data.* In Sorokin's early work on revolution, he made a fairly thorough examination of the impact of the French and Russian Revolutions on mobility, marriage and divorce rates, birth and death rates, abortions, serious crimes, etc. All of these demographic variables were found to have been profoundly altered by the revolutions. Thus, several questions are raised: What are the effects of revolutions on the major demographic characteristics of a society? Are there any demographic trends that predict revolutions—such as trends that correlate with the increasing pressure of capitalist markets and military competition on societies? Are there any patterns of demographic characteristics associated with revolutionary crises? Wolf, for example, notes that population growth is strongly associated with the development of revolutionary situations. His data demonstrate that the population doubled and in many cases tripled over the three generations immediately preceding the revolutions in Russia, China, Algeria, Cuba, Mexico, and Vietnam.[29] Aside from this tantalizing hint, however, there have been no attempts by recent students of revolution to link their theoretical analyses to changes in demographic variables.

Lawrence Stone once remarked that "the more historically minded of the social scientists have a great deal to offer. . . . They can ask new questions and suggest new ways of looking at old ones. They can supply new categories, and as a result may suggest new ideas."[30] His comments aptly describe the third-generation theorists of revolution.

[29] Wolf (fn. 18, 1969), 281.
[30] Stone (fn. 5), 175-76.

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MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

By H. JEFFREY LEONARD*

David Apter and Louis Wolf Goodman, eds., *The Multinational Corporation and Social Change*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976, 236 pp., $21.95; $8.95 paper.

Charles T. Goodsell, *American Corporations and Peruvian Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974, 272 pp., $14.00.

Theodore H. Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974, 286 pp., $15.50; $4.95 paper.

Adalberto J. Pinelo, *The Multinational Corporation as a Force in Latin American Politics: A Case Study of the International Petroleum Company in Peru*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, 171 pp., $15.00.

Richard L. Sklar, *Corporate Power in an African State: The Political Impact of Multinational Mining Companies in Zambia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, 245 pp., $19.00.

Franklin Tugwell, *The Politics of Oil in Venezuela*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1975, 210 pp., $8.95.

INCREASINGLY, events around the world have prompted students of politics to look at the multinational corporation (MNC) as an actor in national and international political systems. This relatively recent development reflects the fact that political science has no generally accepted conceptual frameworks which outline the variety of roles that transnational corporations play in world politics.[1]

To analysts of politics in developing countries, it is especially clear that multinationals deserve to be studied both as political and as economic forces. The blatant political manipulations undertaken by some

* I am grateful to John Cavanagh and Carolyn Pisano Leonard for comments on an earlier draft.

[1] Some theoretical attempts have been made to view the corporation as an actor in domestic political processes, mostly with regard to the American experience. See, for instance, Edwin M. Epstein, *The Corporation in American Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets* (New York: Basic Books, 1977); and Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966). On the international level, the efforts to put the multinational enterprise in a political context have been significantly advanced in recent years by, among others, Benjamin Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics*, XXV (April 1973), 333-68; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972); Joseph Nye, Jr. "Multinational Corporations and World Order," in George W. Ball, ed., *Global Companies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975).

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companies in developing countries, the growing scope and intensity of the debate about their economic impact, and the popularity of Marxist and dependency analyses have shattered almost all illusions about the nonpolitical nature of the multinational corporation.[2] Even many liberals who see the corporation as apolitical in motivation concede that the presence of MNCs can have significant, if inadvertent, political consequences.[3] It is curious, therefore, that there have been few systematic attempts to study how multinationals may affect domestic political processes. The political consequences of direct foreign investments in developing countries remain largely a question of ideological disputation.

All of the works under review here are products of a first generation of efforts by comparative political scientists to fit the multinational corporation into the study of domestic politics in developing countries. In this article, I will draw on the perspectives provided by these six studies to distinguish some of the political problems that relate to multinational corporations. I will then outline and criticize the different levels of political analysis that have been brought to bear on these problems. Finally, I will suggest some fruitful areas and methods of future research for political scientists who are concerned with the comparative study of multinationals and the politics of developing countries.

Corporations as Political Actors

In the economic sphere, there is considerable disagreement about whether the ultimate impact of multinational companies is beneficial or harmful for the economy of a developing country. Actually, as many observers have pointed out, the controversy over foreign corporations in Third-World economies goes far deeper than the unresolved question of how conventional economic aggregates are affected. The debate often centers on the fundamental meaning and the nature and character of a desirable process of economic development. The investigator's definition of economic development therefore tends to determine how

[2] For whatever reasons, the seminal works on politics in developing countries during the 1960s made no reference to the influences of foreign corporations. Note the absence of multinational corporations in, among others, Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Lucien W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

[3] See, for instance, Peter F. Drucker, "Multinationals and Developing Countries: Myths and Realities," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 53 (October 1974), 121-34; or Lawrence B. Krause, "The International Economic System and the Multinational Corporation," in Edwin Mansfield, ed., *Economics: Readings, Issues, and Cases* (2d ed.; New York: Norton, 1977), 383-90.

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he judges the economic impact of foreign corporations in developing countries. Unfortunately, these definitions also tend to color his view of the nature of the political impacts of the multinationals.

The political and economic issues raised by the presence of multinational corporations are undoubtedly related; but it does not follow that the effects which foreign corporations have on domestic political processes are derived exclusively from the economic relationships. Even though the present interest in political economy and the primacy of economic issues in world politics have broken down an earlier reluctance to study the politics of economic phenomena, political scientists have been slow to develop their own tools and methods for analyzing the multinational corporation in developing countries. Many scholars have ended up attempting, more or less, to assess the economic costs and benefits, reiterating economic arguments in nontechnical terms, or inferring political relationships from economic statistics.[4] These observations should be starting points, not conclusions.

The analysis of the political "side effects" that accompany the presence of multinational corporations does not depend upon resolution of the economic debates. No matter where one stands on the economic questions, it is clear that foreign-owned corporations in many developing countries are large enough and important enough so that changes in their operations can affect the levels of income, employment, and general standard of living in the entire country either positively or negatively. The MNCs thus command a powerful political lever by means of which they may seek to influence governmental decisions. Multinationals also stimulate certain patterns or processes of economic development that may have long-term political reverberations for a developing country. They tend to promote economic development primarily in the modern sector, thereby reinforcing existing dualisms in society. They produce certain products, stimulate certain patterns of consumption, and utilize certain technologies—all of which may help to further distinguish the life-style of the rich from that of the poor, the urban from the rural. As a matter of self-interest, multinational corporations will use their economic power in bargaining to extract concessions from governments on such matters as protection, tax rebates, investment allowances, choice of factory sites, and access to resources. Because they deal primarily with elite groups in the business and governmental sectors, they may encourage patterns of external orientation

[4] See the chapters on multinational corporations in David H. Blake and Robert S. Walters, *The Politics of Global Economic Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976); also Joan Edelman Spero, *The Politics of International Economic Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977).

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that may alienate these groups from the wants and needs of the masses. Moreover, multinational corporations may well tie a developing country into international networks of mutual interdependence that will narrow social choices within as well as between countries.

To note these potential influences does not necessarily imply a moral or a value judgment. The fact is that multinational corporations, by virtue of their normal conduct of business, can help shape the broader social forces that influence how a government relates to its constituents, the relationships between elite groups and the populace, power relationships within and between elite groups, the relationships between the rural and urban sectors, and the ability of a developing country to pursue autonomous development strategies. One need not take a cynical view of corporate intentions or fall back on past legacies of sinister corporate conduct to conclude that multinationals—by affecting a society's capacity to control the rate, direction, and beneficiaries of change—are a significant force in a country's political development. Whether intentionally or not, the multinational corporation is a distinct political actor in the domestic politics of any state within which it operates.

The basic nature of the economic relationships between MNCs and developing countries has been evolving rapidly. During the 1970s, many governments have gained the knowledge and technical expertise to assess the economic issues involved in dealing with foreign business. New forms of relationships—such as service contracts, turnkey arrangements, and joint ownership—have in many instances replaced wholly owned and controlled subsidiaries. Increasingly, countries have sought to work together (more or less successfully) through regional and commodity associations in order to restrict and channel multinational economic activities. In short, developing countries have learned in the 1970s to assert themselves more, and are trying to calculate the economic benefits they can derive from foreign investors and to devise better ways to contain or minimize economic costs. Numerous technical and economic challenges remain for any Third-World country whose development strategy relies upon multinational corporations—particularly in areas such as technology and transfer pricing. These problems appear to be far more complex for manufacturing companies than for those dealing in raw materials.[5] Although the economic controversy over the multinational corporation in developing countries is by no

[5] For a discussion of some of the added difficulties of regulating multinationals in the manufacturing sector, see Raymond Vernon, *Storm Over the Multinationals: The Real Issues* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), 71-72, 394-96; C. Fred Bergsten, Theodore H. Moran, and Thomas Horst, *American Multinationals and American Interests* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978), 130-40, 377-80.

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means settled, states have a least made progress in recent years in trying to make foreign companies serve their national goals of economic development.

At the same time, few scholarly attempts have been made to assess the potential political repercussions that may result from the mere presence of multinational enterprises in host countries. A developing country's technocrats may be able to set out *economic* costs and benefits on a rough balance sheet, but—polemics aside—there are few bases for outlining the range of *political* costs and benefits. In an era when developing countries are cautiously attempting to manipulate corporations and when growing numbers are turning to export-platform development strategies that depend heavily on multinationals, the investigation of the political consequences of multinational corporations is more important than ever.

Even some of the most basic questions about corporations and politics remain open. Do multinationals routinely interfere in or warp domestic politics in host countries? What role does the MNC play in shaping the agenda and influencing the actors in the politics of developing countries? Are there subtle and cumulative implications for a country's long-range political development, which may result from the presence of multinational corporations?

The answers cannot be gleaned from the economic statistics. Nor are these questions likely to be resolved by theories that predict generalized political outcomes regardless of historical, political, economic, and social contexts. Too many variables within each individual country preclude the application of deterministic models—Marxist or behavioral—to the political analysis of multinational corporations in developing countries. For one thing, it makes a fundamental difference what kind of industry is involved. For another, political outcomes may vary as a result of past and present relationships between country and company, and according to how the corporation has conducted its business elsewhere. The level of economic development within a country is likely to affect the impact of MNCs on the polity, as are its existing patterns of domestic political alliances and cleavages. The indigenous resources offered by a country and the capital resources offered by foreign companies, as well as international economic conditions, will also determine just how profoundly multinationals may alter or influence domestic political factors. Thus, solid political analyses will have to go beyond aggregate economic statistics, economic development theory, and broad speculative theories of stereotyped political impacts.

On the basis of a number of comprehensive studies, it might be

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possible to build a better composite picture of how multinational corporations fit into the politics of developing countries. In that way, a better understanding of the potential political roles of the military in developing countries has emerged since the 1960s. There are several general and middle-range theories that purport to explain the role of MNCs in developing countries, but few have been adequately tested against empirical evidence. Apter's article in *The Multinational Corporation and Social Change*,[6] for instance, presents both a general theory and a series of middle-level hypotheses about the political roles of multinationals according to a country's stage of modernization. The falsification or revision of the early theories on the military indicates that Apter's postulates and other overarching theories on the corporation in politics are unlikely to withstand the tests of time and actual events. For this reason, the studies by Moran on Chile, Tugwell on Venezuela, Sklar on Zambia, and Goodsell and Pinelo on Peru serve a double purpose. They help to test pre-existing theories, and they contribute to the still small store of comparative knowledge about how MNCs influence politics in developing countries.

Levels of Analysis

GENERAL THEORIES

In the contemporary economic debate about multinational corporations, there are two opposing schools—the dependency school and the liberal school. Each has a general theory about how foreign enterprise affects domestic political processes and long-term political development in developing countries. These political frameworks are derived from the schools' conclusions about the economic impact of the MNCs. In addition, several students of modernization and political development have recently attempted to set out a comprehensive framework for predicting how multinational corporations influence domestic political systems in developing countries.

1. The early representatives of the dependency school offered a very explicit theory of how and why multinational corporations intervene in the domestic political processes of developing countries.[7] They

[6] Although the entire book is listed on the masthead, only Apter's article is relevant to the subject of this review. Therefore, the other articles in Apter and Goodman are not dealt with in this essay.

[7] For the "classical" view on dependency and underdevelopment see, among many others, Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), and André Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (Monthly Review Press, 1969).

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viewed the political influence wielded by multinationals as integral to the perpetuation of center capitalism's economic exploitation of the peripheral countries. Corporations were said to enlist the political support of domestic *compradors*—including merchants who supplied goods and services to foreigners, industrial monopolists who thrived in the absence of a diversified self-sufficient economy, and powerful rural interests who stood to lose by the growth of competitive industrial capitalism.

This political and social coalition of foreign companies, powerful monopolists, and wealthy landowners was dedicated to the defense of the existing feudal-mercantile order. The coalition employed whatever political means it deemed necessary in order to stifle the rise of political or economic trends that could undermine its power and privilege. Because such a coalition had no political base among the rural or urban masses, it would increasingly have to rely on a praetorian guard to maintain political order and stability. It was thought that corporations would not hesitate to use their tremendous powers to prop up *comprador* regimes, to disrupt and corrupt social and political movements that opposed them, and to overthrow any progressive government that might rise to power and refuse to do the bidding of the imperialist overlords. If the impressive resources of the MNCs were not enough to keep matters under control, it was assumed by the dependency school that they could call upon the home country to utilize its diplomatic, financial, and military power on their behalf. Thus, the symbiotic political relationship that apparently developed between multinational firms and indigenous groups which prospered under the feudal order would ensure the continuation of foreign exploitation, the stifling of social and economic development, and the suppression of progressive or liberation movements.

In recent years, a new wave of dependency analysts has sought to explain why multinational corporations have been actively fostering industrial expansion in a number of developing countries.[8] This new dependent development school views the industrial development of Third-World countries as merely a new form of economic exploitation by corporations from center capitalist countries. It regards development

[8] Three examples of the still emerging "dependent development school" are Fernando Enrique Cardoso, "Associated Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Colin Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).

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as being fostered by an alliance of the state, domestic capitalists, and multinational corporations (all of whom prosper), which excludes the masses from the benefits of such development. At the same time, this still emerging school tends to view the state as an autonomous political actor—in contrast to the earlier dependency analysts who considered it to be merely the handmaiden of foreign capitalists. As a result, much of the parsimony of the earlier dependency theory about political behavior of MNCs has been lost.

2. The liberal school generally begins with the assumption that corporate participation and manipulation in politics is neither necessary nor good for business. However, enlightened liberals, including Raymond Vernon and Jack N. Behrman,[9] have theorized about the political "side effects" which they acknowledge to be a possible result of corporate economic activities in developing countries.

Vernon, seeking the sources of the "imperfect fit" between multinational corporations and host countries, has offered a political explanation of the tension often generated by foreign enterprises.[10] This tension, he emphasizes, cannot be explained in economic terms; he maintains that if the objective performance of MNCs were judged for Latin America in recent years, the levels of tension would be decreasing rather than increasing.[11] Rather, he would explain it as the result of three forces set in motion by multinational corporations in developing countries: a rivalry among elites; a clash of ideologies; and a clash of cultures.

The presence of foreign investment in any local economy is likely to bolster certain elite groups and to threaten others. For the most part, elites in Latin America, Africa, and Asia went through a prolonged period in which they perceived foreign investors as more supportive than threatening to their objectives. Signs of disaffection have grown everywhere in recent years, even where multinationals appear to be furthering the specific economic interests of elites. Vernon points out the hostile reactions of groups identified with the old order, such as rural landowners and the military; but he also postulates growing hostility among groups whose rise in status is often in large part facili-

[9] See Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay* (New York: Basic Books, 1971); Behrman, *National Interests and the Multinational Enterprise* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

[10] "National Elites, Ideologies and Cultures," in Vernon (fn. 9). See also Vernon, "Multinational Business and National Economic Goals," in Keohane and Nye (fn. 1), 343-55; and Vernon, "The Power of Multinational Enterprises in Developing Countries," in Carl H. Madden, ed., *The Case for the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Praeger, 1977).

[11] Vernon, in Keohane and Nye (fn. 1), 354.

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tated by the presence of foreign companies. Thus, he notes the waxing and waning of support for MNCs among three distinct groups: government bureaucrats, as they seek to maintain power and control over the expanding economy; local businessmen, as they desire to move from the role of supplier and customer to that of competitor of multinational enterprises; and intellectuals, seeking to develop and promote an ideology that is antithetical to the interests of MNCs.[12]

In addition, Vernon maintains that hostility toward multinationals appears to spring at least as much from ideology as from the elites' considerations of self-interest. Finally—although this factor may be more relevant in advanced industrial states than in developing ones—Vernon notes that tension is exacerbated in countries where attitudes and expectations about business are different from those prevalent in the United States.

3. Several well-known students of the politics of developing countries have attempted to generalize concerning the political impact of multinationals in recent years.[13] Broadly speaking, they have all sought to explain the role of foreign corporations in political development. I have singled out Apter's article because it is the most elaborate recent attempt by a political scientist to lay out a general theory of multinational corporations within the political context of developing countries.

Apter starts from the proposition that the MNC is an exceptionally dynamic political instrument because: (1) in contemporary life, modernization facilitates role transfers from metropole to periphery; (2) roles generate institutional linkage; (3) in the more advanced stages of modernization, multinationals become very important means of role transfers and institution building; (4) the creation of other role and institutional networks is thereby stimulated (i.e., educational, commercial, fiscal, and technical); and (5) this process reinforces networks between host country and metropole (p. 8). Apter goes on to argue that the specific political impacts of multinational corporations will depend on the stage of development that a country has attained.

In countries at the primary stage of modernization, the multinational involvement is characterized by "enclaving," since the importation of role networks does not affect the vast majority of the local population. In contrast to models of dependency that consider countries as extremely vulnerable at this stage, Apter maintains that the economic power of corporations does not give them enormous influence over

[12] Vernon (fn. 9), 193-201.

[13] In addition to Apter, these include Huntington (fn. 1), and Nye (fn. 1).

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primary modernizing societies because most people are unaffected by the enclaves. Controlling the policies and actions of multinationals at this stage is primarily a matter of political determination: the corporation has not yet effected role transfers that thoroughly intermesh the role networks of metropole and periphery. According to Apter, most African nations remain primary modernizers; he offers Zaire, Zambia, and Guinea as examples of countries that have successfully manipulated national enclaves (pp. 21-23).

Most countries are now in the intermediate modernizing stage, in which the role of the multinational corporation is characterized by "sectoring." The impact of MNCs is far more pervasive here, although they are involved mainly in a few key sectors of the economy. In these circumstances, Apter says, the multinational corporation becomes an instrument of underdevelopment. The social effects of modernization (i.e., role transfer) are difficult to control. By helping to create conditions for which it takes no responsibility, an MNC produces vast inequalities of income, wealth, and power: it caters to the needs of a *comprador* class; it helps stimulate massive rural-to-urban flows that impose high social overhead costs; it skews a large portion of the economy in socially disruptive directions. The only solution to these problems lies in more modernization, more industry, and greater technical infrastructure. Thus, multinationals establish the very conditions that lead to an increase in their functions. Although their effects on development may be so harmful that a "radicalization from above" is needed, such a solution is not easily accomplished at this stage: dependency is built into intermediate modernization. A country that is host to many multinational enterprises has become dependent on international markets and metropole networks (pp. 23-25).

Countries in the tertiary stage of modernization are most vulnerable to the political impact of multinational corporations; but, if they could muster the political resolve, they would be economically able to escape the grasp of high capitalism and the MNCs. Apter argues that such states as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil could make economic progress and benefit from socialist revolutions, but that they are unlikely to seek this solution because the multinationals are so thoroughly intermeshed in the prevailing social and political networks. Most significantly, their large and growing middle class is dependent on the intermediate roles supported by multinationals (pp. 25-27).

At this stage, the inequities and social costs fostered by MNCs are so widespread that both the corporations and the government must become oriented toward preventing radical movements and controlling

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violence and conflict: "This is why so many political regimes in tertiary stage of modernization tend not only to act on behalf of the multinational corporation, but sharing in the common desire for political security, opt for some form of corporatism" (p. 27). Thus, in this stage, the agenda-setting capability of multinational corporations is so pervasive in the political sphere that it actually dictates the type of regime.

MIDDLE-RANGE HYPOTHESES

Apter's model leads him to state several hypotheses about multinationals and developing countries:

—The greater the degree of modernization in a society, the more vulnerable it is to the influence of advanced industrial societies, and most particularly to the multinational corporation.
—The greater the degree of modernization and multinational presence, the higher political instability will be.
—The political meddling of corporations is not simply ideological: it becomes necessary in the tertiary stage of modernization if a corporation is to protect and enlarge its investment.
—The multinational corporation under high modernization opens the way to corporatism and military regimes. A large consuming class and a high degree of political conflict and corruption are likely to produce a military ruler who is a modernizing oligarch and provides the political control that makes investment more attractive to multinational firms.
—Multinationals cannot be controlled by international cooperation. Only strong national governments can control the multinational corporation. Thus, the higher the degree of modernization, the greater the likelihood of either socialist (China) or neomercantilist regimes (Brazil).

Another attempt at middle-level theorizing about the political impact of multinationals has been made by Peter B. Evans. His hypothesis is that policies favoring foreign investors preclude policies stressing a higher level of mass participation in a developing country.[14] There is evidence that seems to corroborate this hypothesis. Evans cites a study of Brazilian entrepreneurs which has shown that those linked with foreign corporations believe that the proper functioning of society requires only an alliance among upper-class groups, while independent entrepreneurs think that workers and middle-class groups should have a share in political power.[15] Past policies in many developing countries

[14] Evans, "National Autonomy and Economic Development," in Keohane and Nye (fn. 1), 339.
[15] Vilmar Foria, "Dependéncia e ideologia empresarial," paper presented at the 9th Latin American Congress of Sociology (Mexico City, November 1969), cited by Evans, *ibid.*

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also seem to suggest an inverse relationship between mass participation and foreign investment. In Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration of 1967 had two major objectives: the nationalization of foreign investments and an increase in economic and political cooperation and self-reliance. In Brazil, the military government moved quickly to improve the climate for foreign investors, but sought to head off any manifestations of broad political participation. Chile cut off multinational ties and moved to increase participation under Salvador Allende; the opposite happened under the junta. South Korea and Taiwan have both favored foreign ties while stifling mass participation.

CASE-BY-CASE STUDIES

With the exception of Apter, all of the authors whose works are under review seek to analyze the political relationship between MNCs and developing countries from the level of a single case study. Although the circumstances within each country vary considerably and the agenda differs from author to author, all five of these case studies share a concern with assessing the ability of a particular political system to absorb and to counter the political forces set in motion by the multinational corporation. Each investigator begins with the assumption that such assessments can only be made by gathering the facts and understanding the nature of politics in the particular country of his concern.

Moran's study of multinational corporations in Chile attempts to evaluate the interaction between foreign copper companies and a political system under great pressure for change. His primary concern is the behavior of Chilean political parties and numerous interest groups, and their efforts "to push, pull, and shove the foreign copper companies into contributing more and more to the nation's welfare" (p. 55). Sklar sets out to investigate the political capabilities of the multinational mining companies in the face of Zambia's hostile ideological environment. Viewing the MNC as a repository of values and interests that might alter the ideological configurations molding the political order of a newly sovereign state, Sklar tries to determine how Zambia's political environment is being influenced according to the long-run business interests of the transnational corporations. Tugwell focuses on the political struggle between the Venezuelan government and the multinational-controlled oil industry. Primarily, his study is intended to describe "the interdependence of the domestic political process, petroleum policy, and rapid, oil-tied change; and the extent and efficacy of multinational corporate intervention in Venezuelan domestic affairs" (p. 4).

Both Pinelo and Goodsell organize their inquiries around the ques-

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tion of how and whether multinationals have altered Peruvian politics. Pinelo looks at the political maneuvers undertaken by the International Petroleum Company, examining the possibility that a giant corporation such as I.P.C. could "distort the precarious balance of power that might exist within a relatively underdeveloped nation" (p. xi). Goodsell frames his agenda more explicitly, studying the capacity of corporations to wield power, the political actions of the corporations and their allies, and the political outcomes of policy issues that concern the corporations. To evaluate how the MNCs have taken advantage of these potential forms of political power, Goodsell examines their role in national and local politics in Peru, and tries to identify the ways in which foreign companies may have contributed to Peruvian political integration.

Testing General and Middle-Range Theories

One of the most significant contributions made by the five case studies is that they illustrate the serious drawbacks inherent in all general theories that profess to predict how multinational corporations will affect domestic political processes. The range of relationships is too wide and the variations in domestic political circumstances too numerous—even among the four countries examined in these five books—to fit into the format of any single predictive model. On the other hand, a reading of these five preliminary case studies shows that the hypothetical situations posed in the dependency, liberal, and Apterian theories could potentially be applicable at some time, in some country, under certain circumstances.

There is virtually no doubt that multinational corporations in Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and Zambia have sought to cultivate the kinds of relationships predicted by early dependency theorists. In Venezuela, according to Tugwell, the foreign oil companies have done their utmost to identify their own interests with those of domestic interest groups and to foster conflicts between the government and the private sector by which their interests will benefit. Tugwell concludes, "In fact, since 1958 alliance with domestic economic elites has been a key defensive strategy of the oil companies" (p. 32). Moran describes how the system of relations between Chile as an exporter of raw materials and the industrial countries as exporters of manufactured goods, with the MNC in the middle, "seemed to work coherently and perhaps even intentionally to frustrate Chilean efforts to build its own industrial base, provide for its own national welfare, and promote the broad process of development" (p. 63). In the case of Peru, both Goodsell

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and Pinelo detail numerous examples going back to the early 1900s, of corporations relying on the diplomatic and economic support of the American government to preserve their privileged status and economic advantages.

All these studies make clear how dismally the multinationals have failed in many of their attempts to foster neocolonialism, particularly in recent years. Moran concludes that in Chile, the continuing decline of political support for the U.S. copper companies among domestic groups of the center and the right was one of the major reasons nationalization took place (p. 121)—a view corroborated by Tugwell in the case of Venezuela. Further, Moran illustrates how, by insisting on agrarian reform, a program sponsored by the United States government—the Alliance for Progress—crystallized conservative reaction against the American copper companies in Chile (pp. 131, 197 ff.). Ultimately, "despite widely advanced hypotheses to the contrary, as the foreign copper companies expanded operations in Chile over time they did not gain power, or influence, or allies on the domestic scene. Rather, their power became attenuated, their position became more precarious, their alliances proved most fragile" (p. 10). To Moran, the Chilean experience suggests that foreign investors have few permanent domestic allies (p. 247).

Tugwell shows how the oil wealth that the multinational corporations helped to generate enabled the Venezuelan government to gain increased knowledge, strength, and independence with which to confront both the companies and the traditional elite groups. Thus, foreign corporate complicity paradoxically contributed to the maintenance of Venezuela's "rough and tumble" democracy (p. 3), spurred the Venezuelan government to take control of petroleum policies, and helped sustain a system of political parties relatively "uncorrupted" by private foreign economic interests (p. 31).

Pinelo argues that in Peru, too, efforts to behave according to the neoimperialist prescription were, in the long run, counterproductive to the interests of the International Petroleum Company:

> [I.P.C.] contributed to the development and national consciousness of Peru. It provided a common enemy against which Peruvians who might otherwise have had nothing in common united to fight on behalf of their nation. Unwittingly, I.P.C. bestowed on Peru a modern petroleum industry, a competent work force, and a national unity that has brought together the most unlikely alliance of intellectuals, technicians, soldiers, and middle-class elements ever to grace that country (p. 157).

Goodsell notes that even though the U.S. government had previously

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intervened "flagrantly and aggressively" to support American business, it did not enforce the Hickenlooper Amendment after Peru expropriated I.P.C. and took sanctions against other American companies (General Motors, Anderson-Clayton, Morrison-Knudson); Washington thereby showed that it was no longer an "errand boy" for American companies (pp. 216-17). He argues that, if American corporations constitute a "potent and self-seeking" foreign force in the national policy, the "lesson of the Velasco regime is that it is possible" to design strategies to counteract this force (p. 219).

This point suggests a contradiction in dependency theory: it fails to account for the fact that domestic political groups can and will, under certain circumstances, fight back effectively.

> Such theories predict that the Chilean experience could never have taken place. None of them can account for the slow but cumulative shift in the balance of power during twenty-five years, away from the foreign companies and toward the host country. Over the long term, the national interest in development and the national concern for sovereignty propelled successive administrations to close in on the foreign-dominated industry and bring it under tighter control (Moran, 154).

Even Sklar, who adopts a modified version of dependency theory in his analysis of Zambia, admits that the "revolution from above" effected by President Kenneth Kaunda has enabled the Zambian managerial bourgeoisie to control the conditions of partnership with foreign corporations and to consolidate its autonomous power (p. 208).

The five case studies highlight another problem with dependency theory—one that they share with Apter's approach. It is the failure to distinguish adequately between dependence on an international trade and marketing system and dependence on the multinational corporation. The latter, all the studies make clear, may be manageable—especially in raw-materials sectors—with creative strategies pursued by a government oriented to nationalistic goals. The former may not be manageable. For a country that relies primarily on the export of raw materials, there may be no choice but dependence on international market conditions. Dependence, "unless it is defined away by theoretical gymnastics, is usually a function of rather enduring geopolitical circumstances" (Tugwell, 7).

Chilean resentment and fear of dependency led inexorably to the nationalization of the foreign copper companies, but it also dictated national strategy vis-à-vis the semi-integrated global copper economy (Moran, 12-14). As a result, serious misjudgments about pricing, revenue from copper, and market factors imposed major economic prob-

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lems for Chile and contributed indirectly to the political instability of the Allende regime. The Chileans failed to realize that, in spite of having nationalized their copper production, they were still dependent on international markets. On the other hand, Venezuela—in part because of the more inelastic world demand for petroleum—was able to assert its sovereignty over the multinational corporations while linking up with corporate marketing networks at the international level to "exploit" international interdependence. Moran advises that "the new national producers must carefully learn to exploit the consumers in the industrial countries exactly the way the multinationals do" (p. 247). Venezuela was able to learn this lesson, but Allende's Chile was not. Zambia, according to Sklar's analysis, also assessed the need to link up with international trade networks more realistically than Chile did. Thus, even with drastic reductions in the world price, Zambia was better able to maximize its revenue from copper than Chile was during the early 1970s.

Reference to first-hand case studies undermines Apter's theory that the political impact of multinationals may be predicted from a country's stage of modernization. Each study indicates that the matrix of possibilities is far too complicated to fit into such a schematized prescription. There is more scope for action by a determined government and more variation according to industry and domestic political circumstances than Apter suggests. In many respects, Apter's model is almost mind-boggling in its sweeping conclusions. It is doubtful, for instance, that corporatism in South American governments is really a phenomenon induced primarily by multinational corporations.[16] Yet, this is the implication left by the all-encompassing nature of Apter's model. He has gone from one extreme—no cognizance of the multinational firm as an agent in political modernization—to the other: the MNC as the supreme catalyst in every stage of modernization.

Sklar's study of Zambia casts doubt on Apter's middle-range assertion that blatant political interference by corporations is increasingly prevalent in rapidly industrializing societies. Sklar details numerous adaptations on the part of the multinational mining companies to demands generated by the government and domestic interest groups such as African workers, trade union leaders, and party leaders (pp. 96-133). He concludes that the corporations have reconciled their aims "with the

[16] A more realistic and complicated view of South American corporatism, and of the role that multinational corporations have played in its development, is found in the writings of Guillermo A. O'Donnell. For a discussion of O'Donnell's general views, see David Collier, "Industrial Modernization and Political Change: A Latin American Perspective," *World Politics*, XXX (July 1978), 593-614.

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public moralities of an enlightened age," adapting quickly to new domestic demands and rapid political and social change (p. 96). Admittedly, these adaptations have resulted from motivations of self-interest; but Apter's framework does not even allow for the possibility that a corporation can exist in a rapidly modernizing country without engaging in gross political manipulations.

While the case studies indicate that Apter and the dependency theorists have failed to account for numerous domestic political variables within individual countries, they also show very clearly that Vernon's framework for judging the overall political impact of multinationals on host countries is seriously deficient. At best, it represents only one side of the political picture: it assumes that the "rational" corporation will not participate in politics and that any concrete political repercussions derive from the fact that the wealth generated by corporations touches off domestic rivalries. By ignoring the fact that foreign firms may shape political outcomes and circumstances, both overtly and covertly, Vernon's model fails to capture the *realpolitik* of the multinational corporation. When survival is at stake for an MNC, there may indeed be few limits to its political cunning. Moran, for instance, outlines the strategy pursued by Kennecott Copper to guard against a sudden seizure by the Chilean government. Through a series of loan agreements, supply contracts, and business deals, Kennecott wove together a network to "insure that nobody expropriates Kennecott without upsetting relations to customers, creditors, and governments on three continents" (p. 136). Such a strategy was hardly designed by an apolitical economic organization. It was intensely political and had potentially serious ramifications for political decisions about nationalization.

In spite of its one-sidedness, Vernon's general theory is significant because of its view that the political implications of the multinational presence result from domestic political circumstances as much as from any external economic factors or the country's level of economic development. Although he glosses over the political manipulations of the multinational corporation, Vernon does make a point that is strongly emphasized in the five case studies, but largely ignored by Apter and the dependency theorists: political tension resulting from multinationals "is often a manifestation of powerful psychic and social needs on the parts of elites in host countries. These needs include the desire for control and status and the desire to avoid a sense of dependence on outsiders."[17] Contrary to the contentions of dependency theorists, eco-

[17] Vernon (fn. 9), 249.

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nomic co-optation and covert political manipulations may prove to be weak in the face of domestic elites' desires for control and status.

Evans's formulation of the relationship between mass participation and foreign investment may be useful as an expression of a broad historical correlation, but it does little to increase the understanding of the potential influences of MNCs in the politics of developing countries. The question that is not answered is whether it is possible to increase both participation and multinational corporate investment simultaneously. Venezuela's experience from 1958 to 1976 might indicate that it is, although the more recent nationalization of the oil companies has reduced their presence in Venezuela. In fact, the case studies disagree about the validity of Evans's hypothesis; they suggest that the relationship between the corporate presence and mass participation is not nearly as clear-cut as Evans maintains. Can a developing country, by some combination of adept policy maneuvers and fortuitous circumstances, manage to have both foreign firms and mass participation? Is there any record of success or failure by regimes attempting to steer a middle course? Without careful case studies, Evans's formulation contributes little to these increasingly vital questions.

The five case studies thus do not provide much evidence to support any of the existing theories about the relationship between multinational corporations and the political processes of developing countries. The experiences of Peru, Chile, Venezuela, and Zambia illustrate how little is really known about the politics of MNCs and how complicated the relationships are among corporate operations, domestic political circumstances, and international variables. Pinelo, Moran, Tugwell, Goodsell, and Sklar are united by the strong conviction that the particular significance of the multinational corporation in the politics of a developing country is grossly misrepresented by any of the existing general or middle-range theories.

Evaluating the Case Studies

It is one thing to begin with the assumption that the multinational corporation can be associated with significant political consequences in developing countries, and quite another to devise adequate tools of analysis for establishing causal links. Since all the authors (except Apter) presumed that the answers could not be derived from inferences about the economic powers of multinationals or the economic stage of development of the country, they were burdened with the same fundamental methodological problem: how to show a cause-and-effect relationship for the potential consequences they identify. As might be ex-

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pected, the authors chose a wide range of issues as the focal points of the five case studies. The variation in questions formulated, methodologies pursued, and conclusions reached makes it difficult to arrive at an explicit comparative evaluation of the case studies. The successes and failures of each study must be assessed primarily within the confines of the particular mission and methodology pursued by each author.

Among the five case studies, Sklar's is the most conscious effort to apply one specific methodology to the study of how multinational mining companies affect domestic politics in Zambia. Rejecting approaches that emphasize the institutional bargaining strengths and weaknesses as well as the interest-group capabilities of the corporations, Sklar sets out to demonstrate the efficacy of class analysis in the study of MNCs in Zambia. In this case, the choice of methodology has a profound effect upon the major questions shaping Sklar's analysis. He is compelled to go beyond an assessment of the institutional powers of the corporation to negotiate with, persuade, and contradict Zambian officials. Instead, he seeks to determine whether apparent subservience to domestic political forces masks the fact that corporations possess social powers that do not depend upon the exercise of their institutional powers.

The analysis represents a refinement of conventional dependency theory: it does not ignore, but instead accounts for, the fact that multinational corporations have readily adapted to Zambian economic sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia, and have generally behaved as good citizens in refraining from political interference in domestic polities.[18] Sklar thus promulgates a "doctrine of domicile": the notion that the corporations are able to show "uncompromising loyalty" to the Zambian government and are truly able to conform to the policies and national interests of host governments, irrespective of the policies and interests of their subsidiaries in other countries or of their home governments (p. 185). The corporations can remain neutral and subservient in domestic politics because real corporate political power is rooted in and wielded by class interests that shape the long-run political environment in accordance with the best corporate interests.

Sklar maintains that at the time of independence, Zambia's contin-

[18] Sklar notes that the willingness of the mining companies to assist Zambian national leaders in their drive for economic disengagement from white-ruled Southern Africa does not affect the companies' conduct in other national jurisdictions. Thus, he finds that the corporations make no concession to Zambia's long-term ideological goal of liberation for all of Southern Africa. The mining companies participate substantially in the economies of both South Africa and Zambia, abiding by the morality and rules within each country, but not allowing either country to affect their dealings with the other (pp. 176-78).

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ued reliance upon multinational corporations was the result of President Kenneth Kaunda's realistic understanding that the country needed the revenue from the exploitation of its mineral resources and that it had neither the expertise nor the capital to go it alone. However, the Zambian program relying on parastatals and "Zambianization" in combination with multinational corporations has failed to build the humanist socialism Kaunda envisioned. Instead it has fostered an entrenched managerial bourgeoisie, a class which has attained the best of all worlds—a firm power base in the parastatals, significant benefits from the Zambianization employment policies in strategic mining sectors, and the support and sponsorship of the major multinational corporations. In concluding that real domestic political power rests with this managerial bourgeoisie, Sklar essentially adopts the viewpoint of many other observers of political development in Africa: "a nondoctrinaire strategy of development, which relies upon a combination of private, cooperative and state enterprise, under a managerial bourgeoisie and in partnership with multinational corporations will stop short of social revolution and result in bureaucratic rule" (p. 213).

Sklar goes on to argue that this bourgeois class, because it has been promoted by the MNCs, will not turn against the interests of the foreign corporations. There is, he says, an essential coincidence between the "values of the business world, which are inimical to social revolution, and bureaucratic values of a similar conservative stamp [which] permeate the bourgeoisie as a whole" (p. 200). He allows that two "wings" of the bourgeoisie compete against each other in domestic politics, but maintains that neither the "local" nor the "corporate international" wing wishes to jeopardize the links to internationalist capitalist sources that laid the foundation for their rise to power (p. 209). And yet, in a confusing discussion about the "ardent desire" among the Zambians for "self-management," Sklar notes emphatically that "the national bourgeoisie yields to no group or class in the intensity of its nationalism" (p. 201). That statement is probably realistic. Capitalist though it may be, it is difficult to believe that Zambia's managerial bourgeoisie (when it attains enough expertise and confidence) will not follow the example of Venezuela and other developing countries in "putting the squeeze" on the multinationals.

Even though Sklar shows that Zambia's road to socialist humanism has led merely to the entrenchment of a managerial bourgeoisie, that real political power resides with this class, that multinational corporate activities have contributed greatly to the growth of this class, and that this class is generally "capitalist in its orientations," he has not demon-

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strated that foreign corporations will control the managerial bourgeoisie, and hence Zambian politics, in the long run. It may be true that "the influence of international capitalism functions to reinforce immanent tendencies toward embourgeoisment of the state bureaucratic elite" (p. 200). But to "reinforce immanent tendencies" is not the same as to "shape the political environment of any society." Sklar may (or may not) have proven the efficacy of class analysis in Zambia; he has not demonstrated that the multinational corporations dominate the dominating class.

Moran attempts to place the Chilean experience with international copper companies within a model that posits an evolution in the balance of power between foreign companies and underdeveloped countries. Beginning with the frameworks that characterize relations between foreign investors and host countries on the basis of game theory and bargaining models,[19] he traces two historical patterns in Chile that lead him to conclude that this approach is too static. First, he notes that relations between Chile and the multinational corporations have been punctuated by abrupt swings of uncertainty that reflect the stages of an investment cycle. At the outset of each cycle, the MNC has the advantage; in order to initiate its activities, it demands lucrative agreements to compensate for risks. But as its capital is sunk and the risks reduced, the corporation loses ground to the host government. In Chile, concession agreements have been redrawn at this stage to give the government a better deal (pp. 158-62). In addition to this short-term cycle of fluctuation, Moran introduces the idea of a long-term "host-country learning curve." He observes a cumulative shift in the balance of power as knowledge, domestic technical skills, confidence, and overall economic development rise and enable a host country to understand and perform the functions that were formerly restricted to the foreign companies (pp. 163-67).

To determine how Chile has used its potential bargaining power, Moran looks at the interplay of political and economic interests in the formulation of domestic copper policy between World War II and the fall of President Allende. He distinguishes four broad groupings that

[19] Essentially, such frameworks view foreign investors and host governments as trying to maximize their benefits by making threats and offering benefits. The host country has the mineral resources, the labor force, control over access, as well as the ability to manipulate taxes, economic incentives, and regulatory requirements. The foreign investor has the skills, technology, international marketing connections, and large doses of capital to help the country develop its resources. For an excellent illustration of how this general approach has been applied, see Raymond F. Mikesell and others, *Foreign Investment in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).

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played prominent roles in setting copper policy during that time: (1) academic "developmentalists" who tended to follow Raul Prebisch's views on trade and the need for development strategies of import substitution; (2) the Marxist left, especially the leadership of the Socialist and Communist Parties; (3) political leaders of the center and right, who professed allegiance to free enterprise and the multinational corporations, but believed that Chile must establish mechanisms to control the policies of foreign enterprise and protect its national sovereignty; and (4) interest groups dedicated to stimulating the growth and proliferation of the national manufacturing industries.

The growing feeling of dependency among all of these groups, Moran maintains, led inexorably to Chileanization under Eduardo Frei, and then to nationalization under Allende. The most important element in the erosion of support for the foreign corporations was the growing disillusionment among the "bourgeois" center and right political parties, and the domestic industrialists. The very groups which, according to dependency theory, will collaborate with multinationals brought on the fall of the copper companies in Chile after the country had advanced far enough along the learning scale and not long after the companies had made major new capital investments in Chilean mining operations (pp. 170-215).

Moran's study of Chile has been widely acclaimed by political economists and in public-policy circles, and rightly so. It is an excellent and thorough examination of the many domestic variables that must be considered in an analysis of the political bargaining relationship between foreign investors and host countries. The fact that Moran is not concerned with analyzing the broad political impact of MNCs in Chilean politics does not necessarily detract from his book; but it does leave many questions unanswered about the long-term political impact of foreign enterprise in Chile. The "non-bargaining" aspects of the politics of multinationals are especially important in light of the reopening of Chile to foreign investors in recent years.

Although the situation and outcome in Venezuela differ from those in Chile, Tugwell's frame of analysis is very similar to Moran's. He studies the strategies pursued by Venezuelan leaders to control multinational oil companies and "to sow" Venezuela's oil to ensure all-around economic development. To ascertain how Venezuela has approached the challenge posed by the task of controlling multinational oil companies, Tugwell divides the strategic context into three distinct but interrelated parts:

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1. *The companies and the government.* Analogous to the situation in Chile, the relationship between the oil companies and the Venezuelan government has been characterized both by interdependent bargaining and continuous conflict. The periods between bargaining phases were punctuated by struggle and disharmony: the corporations complained about arbitrary policies and broken contractual agreements, and the Venezuelan government complained about excess profits and corporate intervention in domestic affairs. Tugwell describes a series of bitter disputes from the 1940s into the 1970s that eventually led the Venezuelan government to claim larger percentages of profits and to place greater restrictions on the oil companies. This evolution, which culminated in nationalization in 1976, illustrates what Tugwell calls the "degenerative" tendency in relationships between MNCs and host countries (pp. 16-17).

2. *The political process.* Tugwell identifies four broad political trends as having been important in the shaping of petroleum policy in Venezuela. First, the inordinately rapid social and political mobilization since the 1940s, as the middle class, and then the rural and urban lower classes, moved into the arena of national politics. Second, the formation and rise to power of *Acción Democrática* (AD), a reformist political party that initially provided a political outlet for the newly mobilized political groups; its subsequent fragmentation transformed Venezuela into a multiparty system. Third, the rapid growth of the Venezuelan state as an independent power, a process primarily supported by funds generated by the petroleum industry. Finally, the growth of a complex system of private-sector groups and associations, reflecting the efforts of economic elites to gain a stronger foothold in economic policy making; it has led to constant conflict between the elites and the government (pp. 17-32).

3. *Ideology for sowing the oil.* To a remarkable extent, the distinctive ideas of one man, Pérez Alfonzo, have influenced Venezuelan policy and strategy about oil, the international petroleum network, and Venezuelan development. Tugwell considers the following practical objectives as stemming from Alfonzo's doctrinal framework: conservation; highest possible taxation of wealth; high prices that reflect the "intrinsic" value of petroleum; controlled production to prolong reserves and produce only needed income; and high levels of public regulation of both national and international industry (p. 36). In the implementation of Venezuela's strategy, the role of this doctrine was essential because it legitimized policy and guided long-term goals. However, the flexibility and avoidance of extreme nationalism displayed by Vene-

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zuelan leaders in their pragmatic application of this ideology was equally as important (p. 153).

In his historical analysis of the interplay between domestic forces and the multinational companies, Tugwell demonstrates how these three components worked together to determine the options open to and the policies arrived at by Venezuelan policy makers. Among the factors that were fundamental in spurring Venezuelan democratic governments after 1958 to search for assertive modes in coping with the multinational oil companies, Tugwell lists the following: the wealth generated by the oil industry; the readiness of economic elites to disengage themselves politically from foreign corporate support; the inevitable course of "the cybernetics of dependence management" whereby knowledge and skills of the host country expand; and the guidance of Alfonzo's doctrine.

Like Moran, Tugwell stops short in his analysis. Foreign oil companies, albeit under different terms, still have extensive dealings with Venezuela. Of perhaps even greater significance, many non-petroleum MNCs have entered the Venezuelan market in recent years. Valuable though it is, Tugwell's analysis makes no effort to look beyond the arena of oil policy making to discern how international corporations have affected politics in Venezuela. Such a task is beyond the parameters of Tugwell's study; but his efforts indicate that a democratic Venezuela might make an ideal case study of the relationship between mass participation and policies favorable to multinational corporations in a rapidly developing country.

Pinelo's case study of the International Petroleum Company in Peru adopts a relatively straightforward historical approach. An accurate historical exposition is imperative, according to Pinelo, because it sheds light on current Peruvian policies and on the circumstances that distinguish the I.P.C. expropriation from Peru's treatment of other foreign companies. These circumstances consisted of I.P.C.'s blatant political interference in Peruvian politics and its arrogant disregard of the wants and needs of the Peruvian government and people. I.P.C., in the words of one general quoted by Pinelo, "bribed ministers, corrupted governments, and promoted revolutions" (p. 149).

Because of I.P.C.'s sordid past, the longstanding nature of its quarrel with the Peruvian government, and its isolation from other foreign companies, Pinelo concludes that harsh action against I.P.C. was not only logical, but had tactical political value by the late 1960s: "A gigantic paycheck of national political goodwill" awaited the person, group,

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or party that nationalized I.P.C. (p. 150). This fact had obvious overtones for Peruvian domestic politics in the period just before the military takeover in 1968. I.P.C., in a last-ditch gamble to save its position and prevent more radical solutions under a new government, yielded to the demands of President Belaunde and the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA). This "vindication" infuriated *El Comercio*, one of Peru's most influential newspapers, as well as the radical left and the military—all of whom had hoped to reap the benefits of nationalization for themselves. The military, which had carried out electronic surveillance of I.P.C. throughout the 1960s, was doubly threatened: it viewed the agreement with I.P.C. as violating Peruvian sovereignty, while its political rival, APRA, seemed on the verge of consolidating support and reaping the public benefits from the agreement with I.P.C. Pinelo therefore argues that the I.P.C. affair helped precipitate the coup since it posed a now-or-never situation for the generals. Moreover, the affair provided a convenient justification for keeping APRA out of power; and the scandal that broke out over a missing page in the government's agreement with I.P.C. undermined the Belaunde administration's credibility.

Other developments were influential in leading up to the takeover of I.P.C. The Peruvian oligarchy, far from allying itself with I.P.C., seems to have tried to keep the controversy alive over the years in order to provide an object of public hatred and thus keep "Peru's pressing socioeconomic problems . . . out of the political vortex" (p. 153). In addition, as Peru changed from being an importer to being an exporter of oil in the early 1960s, the strategic position of I.P.C. was substantially weakened. The company no longer played a big role in generating foreign exchange for development.

Pinelo's study is an indication of just how insightful historical examinations of multinational corporations in developing countries can be. The processes of "cross-referencing" domestic political history and the country's relationship with the MNCs, and of subsequent analyses of the points of interface, are likely to yield a wealth of new information on politics and multinational corporations.

Goodsell's examination of Peru is significantly broader in scope than Pinelo's. He attempts to test four hypotheses to determine whether Peruvian independence has been challenged by American business and whether the domestic political system—either in part or in totality—has been vitally affected by the presence of multinational corporations. The first two hypotheses conform to the alternative scenarios spelled

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out in the dependency literature and in corporate bargaining models. Goodsell concludes that both are partially valid. The dependency model "is essentially right about political behavior (except for alliance with the oligarchy), but is essentially wrong in total dependence and policy control." On the other hand, the bargaining model "is largely right in acknowledging the nonabsolute nature of dependence and control and in predicting economic bargaining behavior; but it is largely wrong in expecting political noninvolvement" (p. 219).

In his third hypothesis, Goodsell predicts that in Peruvian communities where American corporations are the principal employers, the companies will dominate local political life by means of economic dependence, bribes, benefits and services to the workers, and control of the mass media. In the company towns investigated, this hypothesis—as might be expected—was confirmed to a high degree (p. 220). Goodsell details cases of "puppet" local governments run by company personnel, of towns open only to company employees, and of blatant company paternalism (pp. 169-89). But his most interesting discovery lies in the wide disparities of conditions among towns "owned" by different companies. Implicitly, Goodsell develops evidence indicating that the attitude of the individual company's management is the most important variable in the degree of local political sovereignty found in a company town.

Goodsell's fourth hypothesis focuses on the political system as a whole: by contributing to communications and transportation networks and by operating remote facilities that help to assimilate Indians, the corporations inadvertently contribute to the long-run political integration of the Peruvian nation. Unfortunately, Goodsell's discussion of this hypothesis is highly ambiguous. He traces the growth of commerce and transportation networks that was stimulated by MNCs, and concludes that some corporations have helped to bring isolated Indians into the political arena (p. 211). Although his arguments seem logical, they are not well-substantiated by data, or qualified by a discussion of how corporations may also stimulate opposing trends.

More than any of the other case studies, Goodsell's makes the pretense of examining the whole gamut of potential political consequences stemming from the presence of multinational corporations in developing polities. However, his approach is frustrating in many respects. He brings forth a wealth of material on corporate political activities and influences in Peru; but he presents it in a relatively static forum, manipulating it to prove or disprove his hypotheses, to the detriment of coherent contextual analysis. Especially in light of the fact that the hy-

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potheses are so general and stereotyped that there was little doubt about the ambiguous outcomes from the outset, Goodsell can be faulted for not developing a more systematic methodology to examine his subject.

Prolegomena for Future Studies

Multinational corporations are actors in the domestic political system to the extent that they make or influence the authoritative decisions of a developing country. As the five case studies show, there are many ways for MNCs to do this. They can bribe officials or resort to other shady means of political manipulation, as I.P.C. did in Peru throughout much of this century. They frequently can translate their considerable economic power to disrupt a developing economy into effective political influence. Thus, despite President Kaunda's antipathy toward capitalism, Zambia was constrained after independence to offer continued access and certain concessions to multinational mining companies because the country needed the proceeds from the mining sector. In Chile and Venezuela, a constant bargaining process between the MNCs and the government depended in large part on the economic benefits that a corporation could offer. In seeking to participate in policy formation on issues that affect its operations, a multinational may lobby officials and line up supporters among domestic groups, as corporations do to a high level in the developed countries, and as American corporations frequently did during the Belaunde period in Peru.

Moreover, a multinational corporation may have a secondary impact on politics—not so much by affecting particular decisions, but by its role in catalyzing and defining political issues. Goodsell's exposition of corporate influence on political integration, and Pinelo's conclusion that I.P.C. helped to build political unity and indirectly brought about the military coup of 1968, are examples of this sort of impact on Peruvian politics. Sklar's examination of the underlying values and interests that he sees as shaping Zambian politics in accordance with the long-term political interests of multinational corporations may be inconclusive; but it is an effort to identify secondary political impacts that may be attributable to the presence of multinational corporations in developing countries.

A better understanding is necessary of when, where, and how multinational corporate activity entails all these potential political impacts. To date, political scientists have not contributed much in the form of empirical studies or analytical tools to serve this need. Of the works reviewed here, all but Apter's represent preliminary attempts at gener-

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ating case-study material and methodological frameworks. None of the case studies can be said to have provided satisfactory answers to, or even adequate means of assessing, the many questions concerning the extent to which MNCs affect political outcomes in developing countries. Moran, Tugwell, and Pinelo focus primarily on the politics of policy making aimed at controlling the multinationals and harnessing them to developmental needs. Sklar and Goodsell cast their nets more widely, looking at the longer term and examining the subtle effects that corporations may have in a developing polity. But in doing so, they have both strayed deeply into the realm of chimerical statements and inferences. They have not accumulated much evidence to support their conclusions.

In spite of their shortcomings, the case studies make significant contributions to the study of the multinational corporation as a political force in developing countries. Taken together, they suggest three important dimensions that affect how a corporation can use or rely upon its political power, as well as the capacity of a developing country to resist or at least to channel the political impacts of a corporate presence.

1. *The historical dimension.* In all five case studies, it is clear that multinational corporations can no longer use some of the more extreme forms of political power that they wielded in the past. Today, no government in the world can be expected to remain totally subservient to corporate whims. Banana republics, I.P.C.-type manipulations, and "gunboat" diplomacy by home governments to open up new markets are no longer tolerated. International morality and publicity, the decline of American hegemony, and the growth of nationalist fervor have fundamentally altered the rules of the game. Bribery, under-the-table collusion with government officials, and occasional attempts at gross political manipulation cannot be ruled out; but increased scrutiny by congressional committees, church groups, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and international organizations has made them more difficult—especially for American companies.

In another ongoing historical shift, there has been a decreased involvement of extractive MNCs in developing countries and an increased presence of manufacturing and service corporations. Politically, this trend is likely to be extremely important. The interests of manufacturing companies are considerably different from those of the oil and mining companies; and the former can affect the appetites and whims of wide segments of the population to a greater degree than extractors of raw materials can.

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The historical trends described above indicate that the subtle, agenda-setting capabilities of the MNCs are likely to become increasingly significant. With direct political interference more predictable and routinized, the case for or against the MNCs as major actors in politics rests increasingly on the *indirect* political impact they have on developing countries. Recognition of that fact prompted Sklar's attempt to revise dependency theory by playing down the outward manifestations of bold political power and emphasizing the underlying concept of control and interest.

2. *Level of development.* Apter's speculation that the corporate political impact can be determined by ascertaining a country's stage of modernization is fallacious. However, Moran, Tugwell, and Pinelo illustrate that there are levels of learning, economic stability, economic diversity, and technical capability that can alter a developing country's ability to counter undesirable influences or activities on the part of multinational corporations. The threshold of tolerance for accepting "political externalities" is significantly reduced as a country's knowledge about corporate functions, space in its economy to maneuver and bargain, and technological capacities increase. Unlike that of the historical dimension, the evolutionary path of the developmental dimension will vary considerably among different countries; it is contingent on such factors as the type of industry, the economy's dependence on the industry, the world market for the commodity or product, and other techno-economic considerations. The factors that make up the development dimension, then, will have a significant effect on the range of strategies open to a developing country seeking to control rather than simply to obliterate the presence of multinational corporations.

Ideally, there are numerous measures to which a developing country may resort in an effort to reduce the power of MNCs to manipulate and exploit it, since it has ultimate control over territorial access. If, as Michael Clapham has emphasized, countries often lack the *wit* or the *will* to get the most out of multinationals, they do not lack the *power* to control them.[20] The development dimension, in effect, determines the wit of a developing country to use its power to control the multinational corporation.

3. *Domestic politics.* Domestic political circumstances have a fundamental impact on whether and how a country uses its power over multinational corporations. Since the will to control the corporation is

[20] Michael Clapham, *Multinational Corporations and Nation States* (London: Athelone Press, 1975), 29.

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determined primarily by domestic politics, it is important to recognize that the difficulties and bad consequences often associated with multinational corporations in developing countries may be as much the result of internal domestic problems as of the evil, rapacious intent of corporations. As all the case studies demonstrate at length, domestic political factors can also determine the ideology informing control strategies; the choices and perceptions of alternative strategies; the timing, speed, and degree of attempts to regulate the corporation; and the degree of political latitude within which a government may maneuver.

To portray the realities of this dimension accurately, it is necessary to transcend the economic notion of the "host country" and to discard the assumption that nation-states are monolithic entities when dealing with corporations. It is important to look at the wants, needs, and motivations of different elite groups in the context of emerging domestic political patterns. The behavior of these groups is not likely to conform to a rigid model of domestic *compradors*. The studies of Peru, Chile, and Venezuela, for example, show the dynamic role which conservative, free-enterprise oriented elites played in the moves to restrain multinational corporations in all three countries. In short, one cannot begin to understand the political impact of multinationals on developing countries without disaggregating and dissecting the whole world of domestic politics. Dependency theory and Apter's model notwithstanding, students of multinational corporations and of their impact on politics in developing countries must place heavy emphasis on the interplay of domestic groups—especially the key elites pursuing their own interests and visions of the national interest.

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

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

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Joel S. Migdal

Despite all the literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict in recent years, there has been little non-polemical treatment of Palestinian social and political life. The contributors to this volume believe that a richer, more complex view of the interplay between Palestinian society and politics is necessary. Relying principally on archival sources and interviews, and using a variety of methodologies and analytic perspectives, these scholars focus on the changing nature of the Arab population in Palestine and the leadership to which that population looks. *Written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.* Cloth, $20.00. Paper, $6.95

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